Virtual Library Document

Immigrants into Citizens: Political Mobilization in France And Canada

By
Sarah Virginia Wayland

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of The University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1995

Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The significant levels of postwar transnational migration from lesser developed areas to Western Europe and North America have serious political implications. Industrial democracies have become home to millions of immigrants, foreign workers, illegal aliens, refugees, and their extended families from the developing world. By the 1980s, this influx had forced immigration to the forefront of European politics. Even across the Atlantic -- where immigration has always been crucial to state-building -- political, economic, and social questions are emerging from the presence of "newer" minorities in North America. Both continents are facing similar situations today: large numbers of ethnoracial minority immigrants and their descendants living within their borders.

The protracted presence of non-European communal groups in Western Europe and North America raises larger questions about the status and influence of those who live in Western societies but are of non-Western origin. How are these often permanent settlers to be integrated into existing political, economic, and social systems? More profoundly, there is a challenge to the nation-state as an entity. Massive postwar migration is forcing immigrant-receiving states to rethink the meaning of citizenship and to reshape their institutions and "models" of minority incorporation accordingly.

The situation presents challenges to immigrants and minorities of immigrant origin as well. Above all, how do ethnoracial minorities participate in the political dialogue of which they are increasingly the subjects? More specifically, what factors determine the goals of group mobilization and the outcomes of such activities? This study examines levels of political activity among immigrants and visible minorities in two Western democracies: Canada and France.

At 16 percent, Canada contains among the largest percentage of foreign-born residents of any advanced industrial democracy. Canada considers itself an "ethnic mosaic" and instituted a Multiculturalism policy in 1971. In addition, it is likely that immigration will become a more prominent political issue in Canada within the next few decades. Canada holds only 0.5 percent of the world's population, yet it is the second largest country on earth (behind Russia). As world population continues to climb, approaching six billion by the end of this century, more pressures from would-be immigrants will be exerted at Canada's borders than ever before.

France follows Germany as the second largest recipient of immigrants to Western Europe. Like Canada, France has long been a country of immigration. One-third of French population growth from 1946 to 1982 came by way of immigration. One in four Frenchpersons has a parent or grandparent who is not or was not French. Today, residents of foreign origin compose six to eight percent of the French population. A changing political climate significantly influenced by immigration issues has been especially evident in France. French attitudes are illustrated by the rise of anti-immigration sentiments, ranging from the prominence of Jean-Marie Le Pen's right-wing Front National party to a system of identity checks instituted by the Balladur government upon its election in March 1993. Unlike Canada, France accords little place for immigrants in its national ethos.

What is significant in both the French and Canadian cases is that, although the percentages of foreign-born relative to the native populations have remained fairly constant, the ethnic and national composition of this foreign-born population has changed drastically. Whereas the typical immigrants were at one time of European origin, today's immigrants largely come from outside Europe, bringing with them new cultures, religions, and social orientations. To illustrate, of the 3.5 to 4.5 million resident aliens who have settled in France, almost one-half hail from the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco). Including those who are French citizens, there are now between three and four million Muslims in France (out of five million Muslims in the European Union). In the 1980s, Canada received about two-thirds of its immigrants from lesser developed countries and only one-third from Europe or the United States.

Ethnocultural differences within both countries are exacerbated by recent urban settlement patterns which result in greater contact among ethnic groups. In 1981, 74 percent of Canada's foreign-born population lived in cities exceeding populations of 100,000 compared to only 47 percent of native-born Canadians (Kalbach 1987: 101). Moreover, non-European immigrants show a decided preference for Canada's urban centers of over 500,000. About 30 percent of immigrants to Canada in the 1980s settled in Metropolitan Toronto alone. By some estimates, visible minorities will constitute 44.6 percent of Toronto's population by 2001 (Toronto Star, 30 May 1992). The situation in France is similar. In 1990, 66 percent of non-European laborers, 47 percent of families of foreigners, and 66.5 percent of asylum seekers lived in the Paris region (Le Figaro, 9 January 1992). As will be shown, although France and Canada illustrate contrasting cases of immigration policies and policies toward immigrants themselves, the two countries share many similarities as well.

Minorities of Immigrant Origin as Political Actors

Scholarly research on the political mobilization of immigrants and ethnic minorities is new, primarily emerging since the early 1980s. This can partially be attributed to the changing conditions of immigration and composition of immigrant cohorts over the past several decades. To illustrate, until recently, the vast majority of literature on foreign workers in Western Europe and North America depicted them as unempowered recipients of discriminatory treatment in the workplace or from the government (Cross 1983; Freeman 1979; Power 1979). Marxist analyses tended to portray immigrant workers as lower-class victims of the capitalist system (Castles and Kosack 1973). Immigrant conditions -- notably illiteracy and language barriers, inferior legal status, poor working and housing conditions, and discrimination -- have been seen as precluding much political engagement. Miller (1981) referred to this pervasive thinking as the theory of "political quiescence." Moreover, based on past behavior of European immigrants, it was believed that newcomers would either readily assimilate into their new society or return to their countries of origin.

The situation for migrants, however, had begun to change remarkably by the 1970s. Foreign workers came from farther away, many of them refusing to give up their old ways of life, and they often decided to remain indefinitely in their host country. In the absence of state support and even in the face of government restrictions or repression, immigrants began to set their own political agendas. Signs of ethnic minority political activity have become more evident in the past two decades. In Europe, job-related demands crossed into the broader sociopolitical arena. For example, the Forum des Migrants des Communautés Européennes has been created to promote the interests of migrants in the European Union -- especially the EU's eight million non-European residents -- to the bodies of the EU. Headquartered in Brussels, the Forum publishes a newsletter to "explore the processes of integration" for these minorities. In addition to publicizing collective action efforts around Europe, it engages in debates on citizenship, foreigners' voting rights, and associational recognition. This is an important phenomenon because it implies the existence of some power base as well as being a step toward incorporation.

The transition of foreign populations from transient workers into long-term or permanent settlers, especially in Western Europe, has directed scholarly attention to the rights of immigrants and foreign residents as (potential) members of a society (Brubaker 1989; Hammar 1990; Layton-Henry 1990b). These scholars make normative arguments for increased "citizenship rights" for migrants and their descendants, particularly in countries such as Germany where citizenship is not easily obtained. Discussions of political participation tend to focus on electoral politics, arguments for foreigners' voting rights, and in general migrants' lack of political rights. Although this body of research has made important contributions to the description and advocacy of foreigners' rights, it has perpetuated the view of migrants as unorganized and lacking political resources.

Increasingly, however, social scientists are being drawn to the subject of minority political activism. In his seminal work, Miller (1981) argued that foreign workers in France, West Germany, and Switzerland were "an emerging political force." In Great Britain -- where migrants from colonial holdings have enjoyed full citizenship rights -- there has been quite an interest in racial minority political participation, but research has almost exclusively focused on electoral politics. Scholars such as Wihtol de Wenden (1988 and others) and Jazouli (1986; 1992) have brought much credibility to the study of extra-institutional "immigrant" political mobilization in France. Yet information on minority mobilization remains to be placed into a larger framework.

Only Ireland's thesis on France and Switzerland (1990) has used comparative theory to examine factors relevant to immigrant participation. His conclusion that institutional context and "institutional channeling" outweigh class and ethnic factors in determining the nature of immigrant political participation complemented his finding that immigrants assume forms of participation already existent in the host country as opposed to bringing particular repertoires with them. While Ireland's work is methodologically superior to most other studies in this area, his efforts are flawed in several ways: he fails to define "institution," and he does not consider the importance of immigrant origin but rather lumps all immigrants together. Yet attitudes toward and political opportunities for Maghrébins and the Portuguese are dissimilar to say the least. Ireland's contribution is noteworthy, especially in that he considered institutional, homeland-oriented, and confrontational forms of political action as well as several types of impact. However, his period of analysis ended in 1984 and, at least in France, the situation has altered considerably in the meantime.

The emergence of research on ethnic and racial minority participation can also be attributed to changing ideas as to what constitutes political activity. Indeed, there is evidence that the traditional political order is being disrupted by a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Dalton 1988). This changing nature of political behavior includes more active participation in the democratic process, particularly through "unconventional" means such as demonstrations, protests, and public violence. While this more inclusive perspective of political activity is not new to students of social movements and resource mobilization models of collective political action (cf. Gamson 1975; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978), the importance of unconventional political participation is increasingly acknowledged in other circles of political science as well. The fact that citizens are increasingly resorting to "alternative" means of political expression such as marches and protests can be seen as boosting the legitimacy of social movements research. Thus, the changing boundaries of the political are evidenced by the expansion of the repertoire of mainstream political expression. The boundaries between "conventional" and "unconventional" have lost their significance. In addition to broadened means of participation, the substantive boundaries of the political are changing also: political agendas increasingly include important social issues (Maier 1987).

Changes in the instruments and substance of politics provide new avenues for participation by communal groups who have largely been viewed as politically inactive. They are especially salient to foreigner political activity. Whereas the methods of participation are a matter of choice for citizens, options are more restricted for the unenfranchised. As immigrants generally are not represented through normal democratic channels, they resort to unconventional political behavior out of necessity. Even beyond the extent to which unconventional political activity is becoming more common, other forms of expression which would not normally be considered political actions take on political significance for those with limited options, e.g., minority groups. Working and housing conditions, relations with the police, majority-minority group relations, and other concerns may become politically charged issues (Miller 1981: 22-3). Little analysis has been done of the political activities of those who must necessarily operate outside conventional boundaries.

The challenge to foreigners, then, is how to exercise political voice without citizenship. For those ethnoracial minorities with citizenship but who are also often viewed as politically inactive, there must be a means of increasing political efficacy. In both cases, this can be done by expanding the realm of political participation beyond the vote.

In brief, though most relevant studies note the lack of political rights and resources among newcomers to Western Europe and North America, they neglect the signs that immigrants and their visibly distinct descendants are politically active through other means such as associations, demonstrations, strikes, even violence. Based on this populist view of the democratic process, I want to examine the politics of immigration -- post-migration phenomena in particular -- from a "grass roots" level.

Literature Review

This thesis is an attempt to bridge two largely separate bodies of literature which are both quite relevant to immigrant minority mobilization: social movements and ethnopolitical or communal mobilization. My research illustrates how combining both bodies of literature provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding mobilization of immigrant minorities. Surprisingly, few attempts have been made to incorporate research on communal mobilization into a social movements framework. Conversely, a longstanding criticism of social movements theory is its failure to take external institutions into account. Although this criticism has been addressed by some social movements scholars (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978), social movements theory can profit from renewed focus on the political. After all, social movements are inherently political.

Communal Group Mobilization. Immigrants to industrialized democracies and their descendants literally hail from all over the world, entering their host countries as economic migrants, political refugees, or to reunite with family members. These migrants may have little in common with each other, except that they have entered a society in which their customs and their appearances are likely to be perceived as alien, particularly if they are of non-Western origin. Analyzing data on 233 communal groups for the Minorities at Risk project, Gurr (1993a) found that the extent of differences between minority group culture and the dominant national culture tend to correspond with the extent of majority-minority political and/or economic inequalities as well. This correlation stems at least partially from the existence of discrimination. My research examines the extent of the political powerlessness of such disadvantaged communal groups.

In this study, communal groups are viewed as psychological communities "whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they interact" (Gurr 1993a: 3). The basis for common identity usually stems from a shared history (or myths about one), language, religion, race, or region of residence. Several of these traits usually reinforce each other, thereby distinguishing communal groups (which are also referred to as ethnic groups, minorities, and peoples). These common traits may not be evident to an outsider, yet they matter to members of the group. Indeed, a minority group is characterized by its collective will to survive (Chaliand 1989: 6). Minorities see themselves as different. If collective identity fades with time, minorities may simply assimilate into larger society. As such, some hold that ethnicity is at least partially chosen by persons, based upon a cost-benefit analysis of a particular set of "life chances" implied by a given ethnic boundary (Olzak 1983: 362).

While this instrumentalist approach seems best suited for understanding communal identity in modern Western society, it overlooks one important identity trait, that of race. Unlike the other components of a communal group, race is defined according physical characteristics. This has several implications. First, whereas self-identity can be altered by converting to another religion or learning a new language, one's racial attributes do not change. Second, race provides a more visible indicator of group identity than any of the other attributes of communal identity. Some minorities will be categorized as belonging to certain groups, like it or not, because of their skin color and other physical characteristics. Such is the case for many migrants from developing countries. Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs from India may be lumped together with Tamil refugees and Canadian-born offspring of Pakistani immigrants as "South Asians." Africans, Afro-Caribbeans, and African-Americans are all considered as "Blacks," yet they may share little in common. Third, because racial categorization usually precedes contact and communication, racial distinctions foster prejudice and discrimination. In addition to being a determinant of differential treatment on its own accord, race may engender increasingly negative attitudes and behavior when coupled with other noticeable contrasts from the dominant national culture, notably linguistic and cultural differences such as dress. According to Gurr (1993a: 3),

The psychological bases of group identification are reinforced by cultural, economic, and political differentials between the group and others: treat a group differently, by denial or privilege, and its members become more self-conscious about their common bonds and interests.

Differential treatment may even lead to ethnogenesis, the creation of larger identities as a result of like treatment by dominant groups. While a Tamil refugee still considers himself a Tamil, he begins to think of himself as South Asian as well. Thus, communal identity may be reactive, emerging from power and income inequalities.

In this sense, racial and ethnic boundaries are socially constructed. As Barth asserted in what has become a dictum for students of ethnicity and social organization, it is the "social boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses" (1969: 15). His definition is especially applicable to groups in the process of change, such as migrants. Following Barth, what is crucial to the study of communal mobilization is understanding the interaction between groups and, especially in this study, between groups and the state. Likewise, though real cultural differences between societies may be decreasing with the advent of mass communications, this reduction will not necessarily lead to decreasing relevance of communal identities or a breakdown of the boundaries (Barth 1969: 32). One only has to point to ongoing conflicts in Africa, former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet republics to illustrate the salience of identity. Communal groups persist only through the maintenance of boundaries.

In brief, communal groups have double boundaries, one from within which is maintained by socialization process and one from without which is established by intergroup relations (Isajiw 1985; Brass 1985). In a comparative study, it is the external boundary which is more important. How are various communal groups perceived by others, especially by decision-makers wielding political power? These external boundaries manifest themselves in specific government policies and programs. They are evident in the reasons and ideologies behind specific immigration policies, cultural policies, and models of minority incorporation.

My point here is that the protean nature of communal groups prohibits a precise understanding of them. At the same time, due to racial and cultural differentials, the boundaries surrounding the group often remain fixed. As such, the existence of such groups is taken as a given in this research, so as to better be able to focus on the activities of such groups, either independent or in concert with one another. I do not seek to specify differences between particular groups but rather to show how they have acted in the political arena.

Following Gurr (1993a), there are distinctions between types of communal groups, most generally, between national peoples and minority peoples. National peoples are regionally concentrated groups who want to protect or reestablish some degree of politically separate existence, possibly even independence. Minority peoples seek to protect or improve their status in the larger society. The distinct status of the latter is derived from some combination of their ethnicity, immigrant origin, economic roles, and religion.

I am most interested in the category of minorities known as ethnoclasses, the "ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, with special economic roles, usually of low status" (Gurr 1993a: 18). Gurr finds 45 ethnoclasses in his study of 233 communal groups, eight of which are in advanced industrialized societies, e.g., Muslims in France, people of color in Great Britain and the United States, and gypsies or Roma in Europe. Ethnoclass demands commonly call for equal treatment: more economic opportunities, effective political participation, better public services, and sometimes the promotion of the group's cultural traditions. Ethnoclasses have been more politically active in the Western democracies than in any other region of the world (Gurr 1993a).

With the exception of Gurr (1993a), most studies of ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization focus on national, territorially-based groups. Researchers have shown a preference for this approach because there is more evidence of political mobilization, because collective action is easier to study when it is concentrated in a geographical region, because studies of political participation have traditionally concentrated on electoral politics (an avenue closed to foreign residents), and because postwar immigration -- especially in the European context -- was viewed as temporary recruitment of foreign labor. Much of the literature consists of single case studies. Those of truly international scope are rare. Moreover, international compilations have tended to focus on communal contenders vying amongst each other for political power in developing countries. Chaliand (1989) is a compilation of research on minority peoples, but only those in non-democratic societies. Montville (1990) draws on a global variety of cases but remains an anthology of articles by individual authors without an overarching unifying framework.

Within studies limited to national and minority groups in Western Europe and North America, individual case studies remain prominent, many of them dealing with well-known linguistic minorities in Western Europe or the Québécois in Canada. In the American and British contexts, studies center around racial minorities who may be geographically dispersed but also possess citizenship. With the exception of individual case studies and those works listed in the previous section, there has been scant treatment of immigrant minority political mobilization. As two researchers of ethnic politics noted,

more work needs to be done concerning ethno-political demands generated by the foreign workers and immigrants themselves. There is little discussion of their role in the policy process and this forces us to conclude tentatively that they have only a small role, but it is not a conclusion with which we are particularly comfortable (Thompson and Rudolph 1986: 54)

The paucity of research on ethnoclasses is unfortunate, especially in light of the fact that ethnoclasses have become the most politically active type of communal group in the West (Gurr 1993a).

Social Movements Research. McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as a "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution in a society" (1977: 1217-8). Social movements are more than just opinions and beliefs, however. Supporters must also act on these beliefs in some way, most commonly through formation of associations which represent the goals of the movement, provide arenas for supporters to come together, and form bases through which new members can be recruited. McCarthy and Zald (1977) coined the term "social movement organizations" (SMOs) for activist groups possessing the skills and contacts necessary to mobilize grass-roots actors in pursuit of causes. Based on an assumption of popular discontent, such discontent finds expression (mobilization) through the funneling of resources to SMOs.

Similarly, Tarrow (1983: 7) sees "social protest movements" as "groups possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify their goals with the preference of an unmobilized constituency which they attempt to mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system." Gamson (1975) prefers the term "challenging group," which has two criteria: 1) it seeks the mobilization of an unmobilized constituency and 2) its antagonist or target of influence lies outside of its constituency.

A social movement is broader than an SMO, however (cf. Oliver 1989). Moreover, social movements do not have to assume organizational form. Spontaneous protest or collective violence may also be evidence of social movements around certain issues. Most mobilization efforts are instigated by associations or collectivities of associations, but not always. In brief, SMOs are a crucial component of most mobilization efforts, but alone they cannot provide a complete picture. As such, organizations are a focal point of this research, but they are not an end in and of themselves. Rather, I look at the role of associations in various mobilization efforts.

Social movements theory has added much to our understanding of collective mobilization. In general, political mobilization occurs when a group of persons has both grievances about its status and resources at its disposal which may remedy the grievances. Relative deprivation and the mobilization of resources have been treated as mutually exclusive etiologies of mobilization, but in fact together they provide a more comprehensive explanation of collective mobilization. Mobilization is more likely to occur in the context of both deep-seated grievances about a group's collective status and some organizational base coupled with external support factors (Chong 1991; Gurr 1993a; Tarrow 1989b; Webb et al. 1983). If grievances and group identity are weak, the chances of mobilization are slim, even if a strong organizational base exists. Conversely, an aggrieved population is unlikely to act given an absence of resources.

Mobilization of resources. Whereas relative deprivation theory holds that political action is primarily motivated by peoples' discontent about unjust deprivation (Gurr 1970), resource mobilization (RM) theory emphasizes the importance of tangible resources. The RM approach has dominated social movements research in recent decades. The popularity of RM lies partially in its ability to respond to Olson's (1965) puzzle of collective action for public goods and partially in its tangible tenets which are conducive to empirical scrutiny. The emphasis of social movements research thus shifted from grievances and deprivation to costs and benefits, and from the "whys" to the "hows" of collective action.

As noted above, organization has often been the basis for the "how." According to RM advocate Charles Tilly, collective action -- including civil violence -- is a normal social process; action is purposeful, rational, aimed at collective interest, and inherently political. His mobilization model presents five components for analysis: interests, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself (1978: 7). Group organization depends on the commonality of interests ("categories") as well as the extent of unifying structures within the group ("networks"). In short, "the more extensive its common identity and internal networks, the more organized the group" (1978: 54, 62-4). Within a population, interests and organization determine the degree of group mobilization. By Tilly's logic, the common identity inherent to communal groups facilitates their abilities to mobilize. Communal identity has the capacity to "combine an interest with an affective tie" (Bell 1975: 169).

A number of other theorists have argued that the organizational bases found in established groups frequently serve as catalysts for the emergence of social movements. According to Oberschall's theory of mobilization (1973), effective social movements depend on the existence of networks within the minority community. In the absence of networks, contenders are capable of only "short-term, localized, ephemeral outburst and movements of protest such as riots" (1973: 119). In his study of organizational characteristics and success rates of voluntary associations in the United States, Gamson (1975) found that groups with limited goals, selective incentives, and/or some violent tactics were more likely to meet with success than were their counterparts.

More recently, students of social movements have shown that mobilization is a product of various factors, not all of which are subsumed under the RM approach. Most notably, McAdam's (1982) "political process model" treats indigenous organizational strength, the available structure of political opportunities, and the level of "insurgent consciousness" within the movement as factors which are all crucial to the generation of a social movement (see especially his Chapter 3). In addition, McAdam's model emphasizes the continuous process of a movement -- in this case the American civil rights movement -- from generation to decline as well as the inherently political, as opposed to psychological, nature of social movements.

Political Opportunity Structure. Although few researchers have been able to develop such broad-based models, most now agree that mobilization is a product of factors both internal and external to the movement. Let us now turn to those external factors which influence mobilization, that of opportunity structure in particular.

Political opportunity structures help explain why a challenger's chances of engaging in successful collective action vary over time -- and why powerful movements sometimes fail whereas weak groups have been known to make gains. According to Tarrow (1994: 85), political opportunity structures are "consistent -- but not necessarily formal or permanent -- dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure." In contrast to resource mobilization theory which focuses on resources inside the challenging group, this approach emphasizes external resources as determinants of mobilization, and ultimately of success. Any shift in the political system, any "restructuring of existing power relations" -- be it through events such as wars or processes such as great demographic change -- causes a shift in the political opportunity structure. Such shifts have the potential to indirectly encourage or discourage challenging groups (McAdam 1982: 41).

Political opportunity structures are more often used to explain the emergence of a social movement, but they can also determine the outcomes of collective action (Tarrow 1989: 33). While the opportunities that encourage protest are not necessarily the same ones that contribute to its success, Tarrow notes that scholars have more or less used the same variables to examine both etiology and outcome: the degree of openness or closure of the polity (Eisinger 1973; Button 1978; Kriesi et al. 1992); the stability or instability of political alignments (Piven and Cloward 1977); the presence or absence of allies and supporters (Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977); and political conflicts within and among elites (Jenkins and Perrow 1977).

In a similar formulation, Kitschelt (1986) notes that political opportunity structures can aid or hinder a social movement's capacity to engage in protest in at least three ways. Mobilization by a social movement depends on: access to various resources, primarily non-violent resources in Western democracies; access to the public sphere and political decision-making, as determined by institutional rules; and the emergence and disappearance of other social movements, fluctuating over time (61-2). Moreover, political opportunity structure is a more important determinant of policy impact than is the magnitude of protest (75).

Movements themselves alter political opportunities as well. The occurrence of collective mobilization alters the political context for other movements, for elites and political authorities, and for opponents (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994).

This brief survey of research based on political opportunity structure reveals that its application has largely been limited to institutional variables, namely the openness of the polity, the strength of state institutions, political alignments within and between political parties, and the role of elites. More recently, however, prominent social movements theorists have broadened its application to include cultural factors as well (Gamson and Meyer 1992; Rucht, in preparation). Their work reveals that opportunity structures are not only found in the state but also in society. Although they have been hailed as important, these societal variables have not yet been subject to empirical scrutiny.

Gamson and Meyer (1992) provide a useful breakdown of the various components of opportunity structure (See Figure 1). In addition to dividing political opportunity into cultural and institutional aspects, they show that the components of political opportunity structure can be divided into stable and shifting elements as well. According to Gamson and Meyer (1992: 3),

Some aspects of opportunity are deeply embedded in political institutions and culture. If they change at all, they do so very gradually over decades or centuries or through revolutionary changes in regime....Other aspects are relatively volatile, shifting with events, policies, and political actors.

They note that while the volatile elements are useful for explaining the rise and fall of specific movements, the stable elements are "especially useful in comparisons over space, explaining differences in movement activity and relative success in different countries or other units of analysis." As a cross-national comparison, my own research focuses on these stable elements.

FIGURE 1. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

(from Gamson and Meyer 1992: 10)

STABLE

Through a brief examination of social movements literature, we have seen that collective mobilization is both a product of the ability to mobilize resources, often organizational in nature, and of external structures of political opportunity. There is a third element as well which may also apply to the genesis and outcome of collective action. Less tangible than RM or POS but influential to both, it is a symbolic, normative, or cultural impetus to mobilize. As Gamson (1988: 220) notes, mobilization potential depends on structure and culture, but whereas social movements research has made inroads into understanding structure, the tools for assessing culture remain relatively undeveloped.

Frames and culture. Our understanding of the role of culture in political mobilization has been advanced through the notion of "framing" as articulated by David Snow and his various collaboraters (see especially Snow et al. 1986). Frames are the means by which individual and collective thoughts and actions are organized in a meaningful manner. As the term implies, frame alignment consists of the "linkage or conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks" (Snow et al. 1986: 467). Similarly, Tarrow notes that movement sectors are unified by "the interpretive themes that inspire people to collective action and frame their concrete grievances in terms that both dignify them and have meaning for other groups, allies and elites" (1989a: 24). These authors argue that frame alignment is a prerequisite for movement participation. Movements cannot persist in the absence of a general set of common values and understandings held by supporters. Moreover, new or expanded norms legitimizing claims are a condition favoring successful mobilization.

Collective action in general is a struggle to construct specific meanings around issues, actors, and events:

For every challenge, there is a relevant discourse -- a particular set of ideas and symbols that are used in the process of constructing meanings relevant to the struggle. To achieve and sustain mobilization, a challenger must participate in such discourse (Gamson 1988: 221).

Today, the framing of discourse is consciously embarked upon by SMO leaders in speeches, advertising, lobbying efforts, and the like. Organizations seek to produce meaning, and the response of the media can make or break efforts to win supporters of their causes (Gamson and Modigliani 1989).

The cultural dimension of mobilization has most often been used in the context of relations between individuals and the movement. Otherwise stated, it has been applied to micromobilization processes (those relevant to SMO operation) as opposed to processes of macromobilization (changes in power relationships and opportunity structures). In limiting framing to relations between the individual and the SMO, the usefulness of frames for understanding broader linkages is overlooked. While the recruitment and active participation of members is vital to the mission of an SMO, participation must be viewed as a means, not a goal in and of itself. The ultimate targets of an SMO, after all, are public institutions. Interpretive frameworks between SMOs and the state or public powers are just as important, if not more, to an SMO. Moreover, mastery of these frames is crucial to the outcome of a mobilization effort. SMOs must be heard by public institutions in order to secure financial gains, recognition, and influence. They must learn to "play the game," that is, to articulate their concerns in a manner which resonates with public authorities. Similarly, albeit less commonly, SMOs may be able to alter the public discourse in ways consistent with their own objectives, through promotion of "counterthemes" (Gamson 1988).

Political culture helps explain why certain discourses or frames prevail over others in a society. Within a political culture, certain social, political, and economic traditions have shaped the frames of reference through which persons communicate. Appeals are shaped and constrained in the context of this culture. Although it can also happen that public discourse may be altered by such appeals, the odds are stacked against any social movement which attempts to do so. More commonly, SMOs and other challengers learn to negotiate within existing frames of reference, rephrasing and perhaps even reconceptualizing movement goals. Sometimes this movement compromise is seen as essential to keeping the movement alive and is not viewed as compromise at all, but as simply "learning the ropes." This is particularly true for newcomers to a political culture. Other contenders may refuse to "compromise," but they may find themselves losing influence and resources as their message loses resonance. In addition to contributing to the prevailing discourse, i.e., what is an "issue" and what is not, political culture also helps determine how these issues are settled.

The relationship between mobilization efforts, political culture, and the state is the focus of this research. Whereas micromobilization framing has already received considerable scholarly attention, the notion of framing has not been applied to macromobilization processes. Indeed, an exploration of cultural dynamics in framing and macromobilization comes very close to being an investigation of the sociocultural components of political opportunity structure discussed above. This research will reveal the common ground between two areas of social movements research.

The importance of broader cultural context has been hailed in passing by several prominent students of social movements. According to Klandermans and Tarrow (1988: 23), "national political traditions and alignments condition the formation, the strategies, and outcomes of the new movements, however much they operate outside of politics." As noted above, Gamson and Meyer (1992: 3) assert: "some aspects of opportunity are deeply embedded in political institutions and culture." Gamson (1988: 227-8) laments the difficulty challengers face when trying to alter frames, particularly when confronted with "official packages that resonate with long-established and deeply embedded cultural themes." It is not only movement activists who are engaged in constructing meaning; it is also undertaken by those in power, who are often able to make better use of the media. In sum, these scholars claim that the existence of certain themes (and counterthemes) in a political culture influences mobilization potential. As Gamson (1988: 241) notes: "Packages on a given issue resonate in varying degrees with these larger themes, thereby providing constraints and opportunities." Nonetheless, while the influence of political culture has been noted, it has not been the explicit focus of empirical research. My research will help to remedy this gap in our knowledge.

Gaps in social movements research. Briefly, I would like to address several additional deficiencies in social movements research which may be remedied by this research. First, most research on POS has not been of a comparative nature. This is especially true of American students of social movements, who have preferred to examine ebb and flow within the same movement (cf. Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1989a). Kitchelt (1986) is an exception, and, although Gamson (1975) studied numerous challenging groups, they were all American.

Second, particularly if one accepts Hechter et al.'s assertion (1982: 413) that nothing distinguishes the causes of ethnic collective action from general collective action, the virtual lack of analysis influenced by both ethnic conflict and social movements theories is surprising. Olzak and Nagel (1986) and Olzak (1992) have drawn from some social movements literature, principally that of resource mobilization, in support of their ethnic competition model for explaining mobilization. Olzak (1992) applies ecological theories of competition to explain instances of ethnic collective action in American society between 1877 and 1914. Her empirically-based conclusions are that ethnic conflicts and protests result from desegregation of the labor market, that is, when "ethnic inequalities and racially ordered systems begin to break down" (3). Contrary to traditionally held assumptions that intergroup conflicts subside as ethnic and racial differences are lessened, Olzak's general finding has been supported in other research (Banton 1983; McAdam 1982; Olzak 1983). It also resonates with non-empirical analyses which hold that France's "immigration problem" surfaced not in response to high levels of immigration, but rather as a reaction to Maghrébins attempting to integrate into French society (cf. Naïr 1992).

Although Olzak's research is to be highly commended, she proposes an economic argument, focusing almost exclusively on competition between ethnic or racial groups within the same labor market. Indeed, it can be said of competition theory in general that it focuses too narrowly on material economic struggles and overlooks broader structures of political opportunity (James 1988). Olzak insufficiently addresses the importance of political context in relation to ethnoracial conflict and protest (see 1992: 43-5). Granted, theories can only include so many factors, and Olzak's effort does manage to synthesize research on ethnicity, conflict, and social movements literature. Nonetheless, her analysis is incomplete. My contribution can complement hers and provide a more comprehensive understanding of minority protest.

A final observation on the "state of the art" in social movements theory deserves mention. Until recently, American and European social movements theorists largely worked independently of each other, the Americans focusing on resource mobilization and the Europeans pursuing research on the "new social movements" emerging on the continent around gender, environmental, and peace issues (Rucht 1991b; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). Over the past decade, however, prominent scholars on both side of the Atlantic have joined forces in collaborative research projects (cf. Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 1988; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995). Though synthesis of all social movements research may be an impossible task, there is at least increasing awareness of cross-national differences in approach and findings.

The one exception to this convergence is the study of social movements in France, principally as embodied in the work of Alain Touraine (see especially 1969 and 1978). Though Touraine virtually defined the new social movement and remains the foremost researcher in France in the field, his work remains largely isolated from that of other social movements theorists. In large part, this is due to his unique methodology of "sociological intervention." In Touraine's version of "actionalist sociology," the researcher is actively involved in "converting" small groups of activists, engaging them in self-analysis regarding collective action and encouraging them to mobilize. Touraine has been soundly criticized for his controversial research methods, the level of abstraction in his writing, significant contradictions in his work, and his sense of self-importance (Rucht 1991a). Nonetheless, he is to be commended for his acknowledgment that social movements research cannot be completely neutral, his attempts to create broad theory in an age of micro-specialization among social scientists, and for venturing beyond Western European and American political cultures to study the Solidarity movement in Poland (Touraine et al. 1982) and the 1973 military coup in Chile (Touraine 1973). Interestingly, several of Touraine's students -- François Dubet, Didier Lapeyronnie, and Michel Wieviorka -- have become well-respected researchers on immigration and race issues in France.

Focus of this Research

The goal of this research is to employ a political opportunity structure (POS) framework to clarify links between mobilization efforts, political culture, and the state. A fundamental assumption of this research -- which has support in both communal group mobilization and social movements research -- is that the political culture of Western democracies involves mutual expectations, by activists and officials, about appropriate actions and responses. This serves to reinforce reliance on protest by the former and on concessions by the latter, as long as these actions remain within limits which are acceptable in broader society. This study is limited to the mobilization of immigrants from developing countries and their descendants who are living in industrial democracies. However, this framework (outlined below) has broader applications for other minority groups as well, if they live in a place where such mutual expectations exist.

Recalling the dissection of POS variables as proposed by Gamson and Meyer, I am particularly interested in the quadrant of stable, cultural factors, which I refer to as political culture. These variables -- myths and narratives, values, cultural themes, belief systems, world views -- seem especially relevant to understanding the role accorded immigrants and racial minorities in a society. They are particularly important if one wishes to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of how immigrants and their descendants negotiate their incorporation into the larger society -- and how those incorporation efforts are either aided or hindered by existing structures and mentalities. The institutional variables cannot be discounted, but -- in light of their prominence in most studies of POS, the focus of this particular research, and the need to limit one's research goals -- they are deemed secondary to sociocultural variables in this study.

In general, political culture is the aggregate set of political beliefs, opinions, feelings, and values which are prevalent in a given country at a given time. One problem with political culture is that its components are too nebulous for research based on "hard" evidence. It is found as much in public opinion as in fact. Indeed, Almond and Verba's (1963) landmark study of political culture in five democracies was based on survey research. To illustrate the salience of opinion, popular conceptions of nation-building -- even if only mythical -- are more important constitutors of national identity than are historical realities. Although I try to separate myth from reality in my research, the "power of the myth" cannot be underestimated. As such, my research is based on a combination of historical analyses, popular literature, and interviews with activists, academics, and others. Perception is as important as reality in the formulation of mobilization goals and activities.

Cultural norms shape and constrain minorities' abilities to mobilize as well as the outcomes of any action. In order to better assess this relationship, I have tried to render political culture more manageable by dividing it into several more tangible components, namely immigration history, the development of citizenship and nationality, and the prevailing majority or elite model of minority incorporation. In addition, the presence of a strong or weak state tradition and openness or closure of the polity are deemed important to minority mobilization efforts. Each of these is further explained in Chapter Two of this thesis. None of these components are perfectly constant, but they have evolved slowly, over decades or centuries, and form a national identity that is most resistant to change.

I propose that the objectives, methods, and outcomes of minority political mobilization are all closely linked to these aspects of political culture. Cultural factors influence which issues become targets of collective political action, how the issues are framed, the extent of collective action, and finally its impact. As Snow et al. (1986) note, the framing and interpretation of grievances may be more important than their actual content. In particular, I focus on the demands and the outcomes of collective action efforts.

To ascertain whether national political culture does influence both the issues around which minorities mobilize and the outcomes of protest, this research is based on a "comparable-cases strategy" as articulated by Lijphart (1971; 1975) -- essentially the same as Przeworski and Teune's (1970) "most similar systems" design. This strategy consists of trying to minimize variance of control variables while maximizing those of the independent and dependent variables. Thus, by selecting cases which are similar in a large number of important characteristics, one can better examine meaningful systemic differences. Moreover, by focusing on key variables while omitting marginal ones, as advised by Lijphart, I will be able to make "partial generalizations" concerning immigrant minority collective political action. The particulars of my comparison of France and Canada are detailed below.

As opposed to communal conflict, which involves symbolic or physical confrontations between communal groups, my focus is communal protest, in which the target audience is the general public or some government body. Protest involves the "use of disruptive collective action aimed at institututions, elites, authorities and other groups, on behalf of the collective goals of the actors or of those they claim to represent" (Tarrow 1989a: 8). Conflict involves competing claims whereas with protest only one contingency is making a claim. The outcome of the claim is determined by the state's response.

According to Oberschall (1973: 28), mobilization efforts are "processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals." Mobilization is thus a product of grievances and of resources, including organizational resources and favorable structures of political opportunity. The particular foci of this research are the demands made by immigrants from developing countries and their descendants and the policy response or outcome. Social movements and communal mobilization literatures are helpful concerning demands and outcomes.

Demands. The demands of frustrated communal groups usually reflect the desire to benefit from or, barring that, withdraw from a larger national society. This dichotomy of demands corresponds with the difference between national and minority peoples. When minority groups seek benefits, they are more particularly asking for recognition, access, and/or participation. National groups on the other hand demand separation, autonomy, and/or independence (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 582). Progression through this list in the order presented can be seen as evidence of increasing and enhanced potential for conflict: recognition, access, participation, separation, autonomy, and independence.

We are concerned here with the demands of minority groups, i.e., recognition, access, and participation. The weakest expression of minority groups is that of recognition of its cultural -- usually linguistic or religious -- identity. More commonly, groups seek to redress perceived inequalities by pressing for access and participation as well as recognition (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 582). Minorities generally want both equality with the majority population and recognition of their distinctive identity (Chaliand 1989: 7). The demands of a group may fluctuate over time, and many factors govern the desires of minority groups, including leadership, government responses, economic conditions, degree of group distinctiveness, and attitudes of the dominant majority group (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 584). Demands are also shaped by what groups think they can get. The state is both a resource and a distributor of resources (Brass 1985).

Demands are associated with the groups' situations as well as with desires for particular cultural-political arrangements. If a group believes its culture and beliefs to be threatened, it will seek recognition and protection of a distinctive collective status. It may demand from the state the establishment of an official language or religion or of distinct cultural institutions. Most groups, however, want more than recognition. Ethnoclasses in particular want access in a plural society or, more specifically, redress for economic disadvantages. Demands for freedom from discrimination, opportunities for employment and advancement, and even special subsidies to enhance opportunities can be achieved through affirmative action measures, anti-discrimination laws, and economic development assistance. If a group lacks political power, its leaders want participation. Those groups desiring communal participation may seek systems of proportional representation or ethnic quotas in government. In all three cases, groups seek equality of status and opportunity with other groups (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 587-8; Gurr 1993a: 306).

Outcomes. Researchers have delineated several types of impact or outcomes of collective action (cf. Gamson 1975; Gurr 1980; Kitschelt 1986; Ireland 1990). In general, outcomes can be divided into two categories: procedural and substantive, or in Gamson's terms, acceptance and new advantages. Procedural gains are made when a challenging group is accepted as a legitimate representative of demands, and they often result in opening new channels of participation for the protagonists. Substantive gains or new advantages are policy changes resulting from protest. Policy change consists of "deliberate alterations of laws, administrative routines, or allocations of resources by which political authorities maintain or alter the socioeconomic and political systems" (Gurr 1980: 255). In Gamson's study, it was never assumed that the protesting party caused the beneficial outcomes, only that the desired results were achieved for whatever reason (1975: 34).

Unlike Gamson (1975), I am not assessing possibilities for success of challenging groups by looking at random associations in a historical context. Rather, I am interested in the outcomes of specific, contemporary mobilization efforts, most of which were spearheaded by an association or collective of associations. My goal, therefore, is to ascertain whether the mobilizers got some of -- or even all of -- what they demanded. Did the challengers secure desired changes in public policy? Therefore, my analysis is limited to substantive outcomes. Whether or not the individual organizations involved are "accepted" is a lesser concern. Following one of Gurr's prescriptive criteria for "good empirical research" on outcomes of conflict (1980: 291-2), this study focuses on only a few narrow and precisely defined dimensions of outcomes. In addition, whereas Gamson looked at RM-type variables, paying little attention to the larger political context, my research points to the importance of political opportunity structures in determining the outcomes of protest efforts.

There are several possible categories of policy response: repression, no response, minimal response, compromise response, and adoption of policy congruent with protestors' demands (Schumaker 1975). What are the conditions that favor success or, more specifically, favorable policy response? Social movements research calls attention to the salience of political opportunity structure. Empirically tested conditions that have been found favorable to protestors include unstable alignments within the political system, especially realignments among protest groups; the presence of allies and support groups; and political conflicts within and among elites. Based on interviews with decision-makers, Button (1978) suggests five broad conditions under which violence may be effective in securing desired outcomes, including when public resources to fulfill the demands are fairly plentiful; when a significant portion of the public and of those in power are sympathetic to the challengers' goals; and when the demands are relatively limited, specific, and clear to those in political power (174-6). It would seem that Button's findings should apply to nonviolent protest as well.

State response to communally-based demands hinges on how those in power best see themselves as able to promote the continuity and legitimacy of the government. State structures regarding the status of minorities can be placed on a continuum ranging from unitarist (assimilationist) to pluralist. At one extreme minorities receive no special provisions while at the other they are given representation in decision-making processes (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 588-9). In general, state response will fall into these pre-established relationships with minority groups, also referred to as models of minority incorporation. In this research, policy concessions or the lack thereof are the most common outcomes.

Hypotheses. This research is based on what Arend Lijphart termed "hypothesis-generating" cases, or case studies in which researchers begin with some vague hypotheses which are subsequently refined so as to be tested on a larger number of cases (1971: 691-2). According to Lijphart, these kinds of studies are of great theoretical value because they provide a basis for the development of generalizations in areas where no theory yet exists. Following this model, the hypotheses outlined below were constructed with some prior knowledge of conditions in France and Canada. It is hoped that, should these hypotheses stand up to empirical scrutiny, they may be applied to a broader range of cases in the future.

Preliminary hypotheses regarding the relationship between the demands and outcomes of immigrant and visible minority collective mobilization are as follows:

1. The extent to which collective demands by immigrants and visible minorities will be of a particularistic nature will vary positively with the extent to which state structures recognize and promote pluralist or multicultural arrangements.

2. Demands which are congruent with a state's national identity structures are more likely to result in an outcome favorable to the challengers than are those which go against the grain of such structures.

3. Minority demands which do challenge existing identity structures are more likely to result in favorable outcomes in weak states than in strong states.

Methodology

Country choice. Among possible case studies, i.e., all advanced industrial democracies, Canada and France represent extreme models of national identity and minority incorporation. Canada is a young, bilingual federation which was formerly part of the British Empire. It is also one of three officially "multicultural" countries in the world (the other two being Sweden and Australia). France, on the other hand, is highly centralized and has been avowedly assimilationist. Although Bretons, Corsicans, and Basques would beg to differ, it has been called the first modern nation-state. This forms an important component of France's national ideology.

Whereas Canada considers itself a country of immigration, French politicians declare that their country can no longer afford to be one. Canada accepts ethnic segregation of its immigrants and their descendants; French policies try to prevent it. Canada is an officially multicultural society; France is trying to keep its monocultural identity (but does not want to appear too assimilationist). Details are provided in the following chapters.

Yet the countries share similarities as well. Although multicultural in name, Canada outside of Quebec is dominated by one Anglo-Saxon culture. Whereas ethnic identity is not recognized in France, immigrants are often communally organized -- and ethnically-based associations do receive government funding. One of the tasks at hand is to ascertain to what extent theoretical differences in models of incorporation between the two societies translate into actual differences in policies and activities.

As noted above, Canada and France have fairly large, numerically stable foreign-born populations, 16 percent and 6 percent respectively. Both countries experienced an 18 percent average annual increase of asylum seekers and refugees for the period 1983 to 1989 (OECD 1991). Both have relatively liberal policies for acquiring citizenship, though it is encouraged by the Canadian government (after three years of permanent resident status) more than by the French. Nonetheless, according to French nationality scholars, France has the most liberal citizenship laws in Western Europe. Because immigration is not a new phenomenon in either country, France and Canada also contain considerable populations of "second generation" immigrants, born to migrants and possessing French or Canadian citizenship. Whereas France limits documented immigration to about 100,000 persons annually, Canada hoped to attract up to 250,000 immigrants per year in the early 1990s.

Although I would like to reach some generalizable conclusions from this research, a cross-national countrywide study is beyond my means. As such, I concentrate on the largest urban center in each country. My Canadian research centers on Toronto, the capital of Ontario and -- with over 3.5 million residents -- the country's most populous metropolitan area. Since the end of World War II, Ontario has consistently received over one-half of Canada's foreign-born. The bulk of non-European immigrants settle in metropolitan areas in Ontario, particularly in Toronto. Although Vancouver is receiving a large influx of Asians, Toronto remains the most ethnically diverse urban area in Canada.

In France, I researched immigrant minority mobilization in Paris, the destination of most immigrants in that country. The Paris region has witnessed more immigrant collective action than anywhere else in the country. The importance of Paris stems from its concentration of minorities as well as its being the center of a highly centralized state.

Time frame. This research generally covers the decade of the 1980s. In the years leading up to the 1980s, both countries had altered their immigration policies, France with its partial stoppage of foreign worker recruitment in 1973 and Canada with its revised "point system" of 1967 followed by the Immigration Act of 1976, which explicitly prohibits discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, or gender. Thus, by the 1980s, the first wave of "new" immigrants from the developing world had had time to settle in, acquire citizenship, and/or have children who were or would become citizens. The concerned parties are no longer single workers who intend to return home eventually. Today, immigrants consist largely of families who plan to stay in their host countries. If the immigrants themselves do not stay, their children -- who know no other home -- almost always do.

The decade of the 1980s saw the end of postwar development and prosperity in most industrial democracies, and with it, a political shift to the right. France witnessed the rise of the anti-immigrant Front National party in 1983, and a center-right coalition took power in 1986, ruling along with a Socialist President during France's first "cohabitation" period. Canadians elected Conservative leadership to replace the Liberals in 1984. At the close of the decade, European countries were looking toward economic union to take effect at the beginning of 1993, while Canada and the United States sought to expand their existing bilateral free trade accord, signed in 1988, with the North American Free Trade Agreement to include Mexico as well. In brief, major political and economic developments roughly paralleled each other in France and Canada. All of these factors influenced immigrants' expectations.

The 1980s was a particularly salient period for immigration and collective action in France. The election of Socialist President François Mitterrand in 1981 ushered in a new, more tolerant era for immigrants and political activists. Mitterrand's lifting of existing restrictions on the formation of foreigners' associations had not only tangible repercussions -- an explosion in the number of such associations -- but also sent positive signals to immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. The mid-1980s, concurrent with the rise of the Front National, were particularly active years for minority collective action. From the close of the decade until the present, it appears that the cycle of activism has run its course. The number of active associations has declined, as have effective mobilization efforts. When the Socialists came to power, they attempted to institutionalize cultural pluralism. These efforts were abandoned as the decade progressed (Vichniac 1991).

This research is very much rooted in the present, however. First, though the case events all began in the 1980s, some of them continue to be issues of contention. Second, this research is largely based on documents obtained from associations and interviews with activists. Little of this information has been systematically organized and preserved, and in many cases only current documents are available. Moreover, as I found in my interviews, precise motivations and actions of past campaigns are already fading in the minds of movement activists. What is published and remembered today has been colored by subsequent developments. To attempt research of this nature for a period of time more than fifteen years ago would mean facing even more drawbacks of this nature. This is also a major justification for researching the 1980s. The events are far enough behind us to gain some perspective, but not so far gone as to be forgotten.

Cases of collective action. This research looks at specific mobilization efforts by groups acting for the rights of immigrants and minorities of immigrant origin. Inherent in this research is the assumption that the vast majority of those involved are settlers in France and Canada, i.e., they do not view their stays as temporary. As such, they are in the process of negotiating their individual and collective entrance into the larger receiving societies.

Although for personal and family reasons immigrants and their descendants are sensitive to immigration policies, such policies have little impact on immigrants' own lives after entry and settlement. Thus, I am less interested in mobilization around immigration-related issues than around issues of integration. These are the questions which affect the rights of immigrants and their children in the present and in the long-term. These are the issues which reflect demands for equal status and opportunity.

Based on newspaper accounts, scholarly analyses, and above all the opinions of movement activists, I have chosen what I deem to be the three main mobilization efforts around integration issues since 1980 in Paris and Toronto. My list of six campaigns is not definitive -- it is based on what I was able to accomplish within a limited timeframe. But it represents a variety of intriguing issues. My Canadian cases are demands for access to culturally sensitive social services, outrage over deteriorating relations between Metro Toronto Police and the Black community, and mobilization for employment equity (affirmative action) legislation in Ontario. In France, I examine the movement for municipal voting rights for foreign residents, efforts to prevent changes to the French Nationality Code in 1986-87, and the "Islamic scarf affair" in the Fall of 1989.

This collection of cases illustrates the different types of issues which caused mobilization in two contrasting political-cultural contexts. The cases were particularly salient for Muslim North Africans in France and for Blacks in Canada. Though my analysis is not limited to these groups, they feature prominently in mobilization efforts, perhaps because collectively they face the most discrimination.

Associational context. In examining these mobilization efforts, I have paid particular attention to the role of associations -- ethnoracial, immigrant, pluricultural, and solidarity associations. In Canada, the large number of these associations reflects the country's "ethnic mosaic" in which individuals maintain their distinctive ethnic identities. As such, these associations represent a wide range of nationalities, including visible minorities of Asian, African, and Latin American origins. Government support for certain associations, primarily those of European origin, is also part of Canada's program of Multiculturalism which was initiated in 1971. In France, associations have proliferated since 1981, when President Mitterrand lifted existing restrictions on the formation of associations by foreigners.

Associations are key to this research for several reasons. First, most associations are in contact with state institutions, as consultants on various issues and/or as implementors of government programs. They are subject to laws of the state. Most importantly, organizations are often funded in part -- sometimes entirely -- by state agencies. When this is the case, their goals and objectives reflect state mandates. Associational programs are thus a principal way we can view the priorities of the state with regard to its minorities. In what ways does "multiculturalism," for example, translate into actual policy? For the minority of associations which do not receive any state funds, the rationales behind not soliciting those funds (or having been denied them) are also telling.

Second, associations provide a tangible and fairly constant means of measuring political behavior. Many outlast the leadership of their founders, and those which have brief lifespans usually leave some traceable records of their goals and activities. In general, associations produce a larger paper trail than do strikes, demonstrations, protests, and collective violence. Moreover, it is usually an association or coalition of them which serve as instigators of these more visible forms of collective action in the first place.

Third, the trend in collective political action in Western democracies appears to be toward less visible, long-term oriented forms. In France, the often illegal worker activism of the 1970s has given way to a drive for political incorporation at the local level. This was no doubt a consequence of the fact that, by 1981, over 70 percent of France's foreigners had been in the country for more than ten years. Aided by the election of a Socialist government in 1981, the principal concerns of immigrants passed from the factory into society. With the subsequent lifting of restrictions on immigrant associations, new avenues of political expression were opened.

Ethnic minority political demands have emerged in Canada over the last two decades, but they have not been as visible. Since Canada does not have a visibly distinct working class to the extent that exists in much of Europe, it has witnessed little foreign worker activism. Neither has political protest very often assumed violent forms. There are a large number of ethnic associations in Canada, but their political roles remain largely undocumented. Under Canada's Multiculturalism policy, which actually created some ethnic organizations, many associations are dependent on the government for funding.

Fourth, immigrant associations have been shown to play a positive role in assisting settlement and aiding integration in host societies (Thomas & Znaniecki 1927; Layton-Henry 1990a; Rex 1987). As their constituents become more settled in the host country, associational agendas move from initial concerns with homeland news and cultural retention to a focus on protecting rights in the new country of residence. Associations are instrumental in providing skills and resources for political mobilization, especially in light of the sophistication required for unconventional means of political activity. This shift toward externally-oriented involvement is especially evident in organizations established by the "second generation."

In conclusion, minority mobilization efforts in the 1980s provide an indication of likely developments in the coming years. Recent mobilization may signal the likelihood and issues of future communal protest. Gurr (1993b) found that political mobilization by a communal group in the 1970s was the strongest determinant that the group would also act in the 1980s. What does the rest of the 1990s hold in store for the visible minorities of France and Canada?

Overview of Chapters

The presentation of this research is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two builds on the framework outlined above by articulating the pressures placed upon the nation-state system by transnational migration, namely in terms of membership, diversity, and participation. In it, I argue that the ways in which nation-states respond to these challenges are deeply rooted in political cultural variables. Taken as a whole, the variables which are particularly important for responding to integration-related demands by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities are termed "national identity structures." Specifically, they are: immigration history, the development of and links between citizenship and nationality, and the national models of minority incorporation. In addition, whether the state has traditionally been strong or weak and whether the polity is generally considered to be open or closed are also important for mobilization efforts.

In the chapters which follow, I turn to the details of the French and Canadian case studies, highlighting their national identity structures. In Chapter Three, the French traditions are presented: a strong state tradition; a commitment to liberal access to citizenship; the importance of immigration in terms of labor and population, but not in terms of French national identity; and the strength of assimilationism and republican values. Chapter Four introduces the structures of the Canadian "mosaic," namely its weak state tradition; liberal access to and high expectations for citizenship for immigrants; the contribution of immigration to Canadian nation-building; and Canada's commitment to multiculturalism. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of potential challenges to the powerful models, specifically, challenges to republicanism in France and a backlash against multiculturalism in Canada.

Chapter Five provides an overview of the organizational bases of immigrants and ethnoracial minorities, namely through associations and associational networks. The organizational bases within France and Canada are described, with particular attention paid to the funding of associations. For each country, a history of immigrant and ethnoracial minority collective action is outlined, beginning in the late 1960s but with emphasis on the decade of the 1980s. The French chronology focuses on action by Muslim North Africans and their descendants; Blacks are the focus in the Canadian chronology.

Chapter Six contains the details of three mobilization efforts in France, including their outcomes: the movement for municipal voting rights for foreign residents; mobilization against proposed changes to the French Nationality Code in 1986-87; and the "Islamic scarf affair" which occurred late in 1989. Chapter Seven presents the Canadian mobilization cases: calls for independent investigation into acts of possible police wrongdoing, particularly regarding police shootings of Blacks in Metro Toronto; mobilization for employment equity legislation in Ontario; and demands for access to culturally sensitive social services for immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. In each chapter, an analysis of the mobilization effort and its outcomes is presented, including discussion of how the mobilization is linked to national identity structures.

The final chapter contains a summary of the framework used in this research and an analysis of how the six mobilization case studies fit with the three hypotheses previously stated in this chapter. The chapter highlights differences between the French and Canadian cases and seeks to explain them based on contrasts in the political opportunity structures, particularly the cultural components. Lastly, I state the contributions of this research to social movements theory and make suggestions, based on my findings, for further research.

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Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography

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