Immigrants
into Citizens: Political Mobilization in France And Canada |
By
Sarah Virginia Wayland
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of The University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1995
© Copyright by
Sarah Virginia Wayland
1995
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
CHAPTER TWO:
MIGRATION, THE NATION-STATE,
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY STRUCTURES
Although students of social movements have noted the importance of
national political traditions and themes in conditioning the formation, strategies, and
outcomes of movements, these relationships have not been the principal foci of empirical
research. This study seeks to clarify links between the nation-state, the structures of
national identity, and mobilization. Examination of mobilization efforts by ethnoracial
minorities of immigrant origin provides a remarkable lens with which to view these links.
As outlined in this chapter, migration to industrialized democracies poses real challenges
to these countries of settlement as well as to the very essence of the nation-state. My
general hypothesis is that states respond to these challenges, and to specific
mobilization efforts, based on distinctive conceptions of nationhood.
To begin, I present an analysis of the links between nationhood, the
nation-state, and migration, especially as they have occurred in the European context.
This sets the stage for an exploration of how states respond to the presence of immigrant
minorities. I develop the beginnings of a framework for understanding state response by
arguing that it is rooted in distinctive understandings of nationhood. These
understandings, which I term "national identity structures," are reflected in
sharply different definitions of citizenship, immigration histories, state-society
relations, and models for the incorporation of minorities.
This chapter concludes with a brief overview of the differences between
the Canadian and French nation-building models. As will become evident, the French and
Canadians models represent some of the extremes found among Western democracies. Specific
treatment of the French and Canadian models is given in Chapters Three and Four,
respectively.
Nationhood and Nation-State
We begin by exploring nationhood and the ideal of the nation-state.
British sociologist Anthony Smith (1990: 14) describes a nation as "a named human
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass,
public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."
In contrast to a state which is an institutional structure, a nation is more nebulous,
best identified by a cultural and political bond. Indeed, Anderson (1983) has
characterized a nation as an "imagined political community."
Nations are built upon historical ties, memories, and common myths. As
Ernest Renan stated during his 1882 lecture at the Sorbonne, entitled Qu'est-ce qu'une
nation?,
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, to tell the
truth, only result in one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. The first is in
the past, the other in the present. The first is the common possession of a rich legacy of
memories; the other is the mutual consent, the desire to live together, the will to
continue to assert the heritage granted.
According to Renan, nations are formed not by fixed criteria but rather by
commonalities shared in both the past and the present. In a departure from the nineteenth
century understanding of "nation" as "race" (race referred to common
descent rather than skin color at that time), Renan was perhaps the first scholar to
separate the two. Renan remarked that if nations were defined by blood rather than by
political will, then "the noblest countries" -- England, France, and Italy --
could not be nations because these were the countries with the most mixed blood (Renan
1990: 14-5). Yet even Renan's understanding of nationhood was informed by ideas of spirit
and tradition, thus essentially by notions of common culture (Silverman 1992: 20-4). In
general, then, nationhood is rooted in a (broadly-defined) common culture.
In addition to cultural ties, a nation cannot exist without some bounded
territorial space -- though the territorial claims may be historical or under dispute, as
in the cases of claims made by the Palestinians or the Kurds. Ideally, the boundaries of
the nation are the same as the boundaries of the state, hence the term
"nation-state." Such congruent boundaries facilitate recognition, and thus
legitimacy, of a state. The modern nation-state, then, is an idealistic political
construction in which the boundaries of the nation, or people, are congruent with the
boundaries of the state, or political entity.
In reality, however -- despite the endurance of the term -- few countries
are actual nation-states. Even the long-standing states of Western Europe contain
distinctive indigenous populations, Scots in Britain, Catalans in Spain, and Bretons in
France for example. Most of these indigenous groups have reached some level of
accommodation with the state and make few serious demands for secession. They simply view
themselves as both members of the communal group and members of the nation-state. The
interaction between such "historical" communal groups and the states within
which they reside has resulted in the formation of social structures which influence the
conditions for the settlement of immigrant groups. These structures vary widely from state
to state.
The nation-state is an ideal which persists but which is under pressure.
One the one hand, recent history -- not to mention current conflicts -- shows us that
recognition of nationhood is a powerful motiving factor among communal groups. Indeed,
quests for the achievement of homogeneous nation-states lie behind the majority of the
world's protracted conflicts (Gurr 1993a). On the other hand, the nation-state ideal is
challenged by recent migration patterns which bring foreigners of differing ethnic and
racial backgrounds to settle in long-established societies. The nation-state as an ideal
may endure, but in reality it faces great challenges, first and foremost of which is that
past and present migration means that there are few -- if any -- authentic nation-states
remaining in the world.
The Nation-State under Pressure
Transnational migration is putting the Western ideal of the
nation-state under pressure in two regards. First, immigration means that a state's
population is no longer composed just of citizens, but also of substantial numbers of
foreigners. This has rendered traditional understandings of membership in a state obsolete
and poses particular challenges to democratic states where political participation is the
essence of the political system (Layton-Henry 1990b). Settlement unaccompanied by
citizenship erodes the citizen-foreigner distinction that delineates membership in a
nation-state. In addition -- particularly in the welfare state -- legal, social, and
economic benefits of citizenship have been extended to foreigners, thereby decreasing the
impetus to naturalize.
Second, migration increases ethnoracial diversity within a state. This
introduces new tensions to a societal fabric which has gradually developed over time. As
citizenship is expanded to these new settlers, national traditions may be called into
question. The country of settlement must grapple with ways of incorporating these new
ethnoracial groups. Each of these challenges -- membership and diversity -- is examined in
turn.
Membership. In the past, the authority of the European state lay in
the monarch who controlled a certain territory. All persons residing within this territory
were subjects of the monarch. With the rise of the modern nation-state, as established by
the French and American Revolutions, subjects became citizens. The power of the state was
derived from the aggregate of citizens, or the nation, and was manifested in a
constitution and laws. Therefore, it became crucial to define who belonged to the
citizenry, who constituted "the people." The status of citizen, which brought
with it certain rights as well as obligations, became the connection between state and
nation.
By definition, then, the nation-state is a "membership organization,
an association of citizens" (Brubaker 1992: 21). Boundaries determine who is a member
and who is not. As long as these boundaries exist, the members must make "admissions
decisions" by using some criteria to select among applicants for membership (Walzer
1983: 31-4). The state, as representative of the nation, controls access to membership.
This seems simple enough, but the complicating factor is that
nation-states possess two sets of boundaries (Brubaker 1992; Walzer 1983; Zolberg 1981).
There is a physical, territorial boundary which determines who is residing in the state
and who is not. Then there is a political boundary which separates citizens from
foreigners. This is the necessary boundedness of a political community. The problem is
that many of those crossing the territorial boundary never traverse the political one.
The territorial state has a stake in controlling the flow of persons over
its borders (Brubaker 1992: 23-7). The extent to which states control entrance to their
territories depends on the physical size and constitution of the border, who the neighbors
are, and how strictly the state wants to limit immigration. For several decades after
World War II, for example, France tacitly condoned illegal immigration in order to fill
labor shortages in a rapidly exanding economy. The United States, in a unique position
among industrialized democracies, borders with third-world Mexico, and the border is too
long to be carefully patrolled. Not surprisingly, illegal immigrants constitute a
significant labor force in the southwestern United States. But their presence has had
costs for public institutions such as schools and the welfare system.
The modern state is more than just a territorial entity. It is also a
political one. In some cases, states need labor within their territories but are reluctant
to grant citizenship to workers who have settled in the country, brought their families,
and had children. Migrants are viewed in terms of their economic contributions, but their
social and political needs may remain unrecognized. This is particularly the case in the
"guestworker" recruitment countries of Germany and Switzerland, the term
"guestworker" implying that migrants are welcome so long as their labor is
needed but that they will never be more than visitors to the country. In other cases, such
as Australia, Canada, and the United States, immigration was crucial historically to
population growth and the settlement of undeveloped regions. Immigrants -- especially
European Christians -- were viewed as settlers and as such were expected to become
citizens. As will be shown below, states have a variety of means for encouraging or
discouraging entrance into the polity.
In general, however, the more settled a migrant becomes in a foreign
state, fewer restrictions will be faced and there will be access to a larger number of
rights. Admission entails some economic rights -- though they may be fragile in the case
of undocumented laborers. With permanent residency, in which the migrant is viewed as a
potential settler, comes membership in the national social and economic community. In
today's welfare states, eligibility for the receipt of social services mirrors access to
the labor market. Permanent residents may even participate in politics via migrant
associations, unions, political parties in some cases, and even strikes and demonstrations
(Miller 1989). But permanent residents do not have all the rights -- e.g., voting in
national elections -- and obligations -- such as military service -- of citizenship. Only
with citizenship comes full political rights (Brubaker 1989; Layton-Henry 1990b).
It is the permanent non-citizen status that blurs the lines between
citizen and foreigner. Termed "denizens," these are foreign citizens who have
acquired permanent resident status and whose extensive rights indicate membership of the
host society despite lacking formal citizenship. In most regards, denizens share more in
common with citizens than with other foreigners (Brubaker 1989; Layton-Henry 1990b). This
would seem especially true given the opportunities for some forms of even political
participation by non-citizens.
The idea of non-citizen residents is not new. It was widely accepted in
ancient Greece where resident aliens, called "metics," were drawn to Athens by
economic opportunity. Metics, a caste ranking between slaves and citizens, shared
responsibilities for defense of the city but had no political or welfare rights. Nor did
their descendants: citizenship was hereditary. Aristotle, himself a metic, supported this
system, arguing that "A citizen does not become such merely by inhabiting a
place" and that a certain "excellence" not had by everyone was required for
citizenship. In contrast to the controversial issue of slavery, the philosophy underlying
the metic status appears to have been accepted among both metics and citizens (Walzer
1983: 53-5).
Although ancient Athens may have been the birthplace of democracy, our
ideas of democracy have evolved considerably over the past centuries. Citizenship has been
extended to women, ethnoracial minorities, and persons owning no property. Extended
franchise means that virtually all adult citizens of democratic states have voting rights.
In addition, the range of rights held by citizens has been extended. The late British
sociologist T.H. Marshall's seminal work on social development provides a frequently cited
framework on citizenship. He considers three elements of citizenship -- civil, political,
and social -- arguing that these elements were blended in feudal times but have since
become distinct. In England, the civil aspects of citizenship developed in the eighteenth
century in the courts of justice, political rights in the nineteenth with the rise of
parliament and local government councils, and social rights in this century with the
expansion of education and social services (Marshall 1964).
As espoused by Marshall, the extension of citizenship rights among the
citizenry had a profound effect on patterns of social inequality. But the unforeseen
implication of this extension was that some citizenship rights applied to non-citizens as
well. A further implication is that a substantial majority of migrants who are eligible to
naturalize have been unwilling to do so, particularly in European countries. This
reluctance to naturalize may stem from several factors such as a sustained "myth of
return" or not wanting to compromise national identity, but it is also in large part
due to the diminishing benefits of naturalization. To many migrants, the enjoyment of full
political rights in a country which they do not consider their own is simply not worth the
fees and paperwork involved in the naturalization process. Such "devaluation of
citizenship" may be irreversible (Schuck and Smith 1985).
Diversity and Participation. We have seen how migration generates
challenges to the nation-state by eroding the distinction between citizen and foreigner.
Another challenge posed by migration is the transformation of nation-states into
multinational, multicultural, and multiracial societies. These two challenges touch
different elements of the "nation-state." Whereas the former affected the state
or polity, the presence of new communal groups impacts more upon the nation. The
challenges to nationhood include how to define the nation in the absence of a single
collective identity and how to establish core values and behavioral norms in the midst of
a plurality of cultures and traditions (Castles and Miller 1993: 38).
Increasing ethnoracial diversity within a state may exacerbate existing
ethnic, religious, or class cleavages, and it will probably introduce new cleavages. At a
minimum, diversity adds new dynamics to existing conflicts. This is aggravated by the
intermixing of minorities with the larger population, an inevitable occurrence given that
-- unlike most indigenous minorities -- migrants do not occupy their own territory. They
may form ethnic ghettos, but this entails the displacement of others.
In addition, migrants bring with them their own identities, as manifested
in their language, customs, and dress. As migrants come from further away, their
differences from the native population increase. This widening "cultural gap"
often fosters xenophobia, particularly when migrants are perceived as not wanting to
integrate into their new society. In France, for example, the presence of Muslims has led
to diatribes not only on whether Muslims want to integrate but whether they are able to do
so. Certain aspects of Islam, such as the lack of separation between church and state, are
seen as precluding any chances of meaningful acculturation. Moreover, migrants may be
reluctant to share in the founding myths and national histories of the country of
settlement. As citizenship is expanded to these new settlers, the traditions of the
nation-state may be called into question.
Acceptance of diversity is especially difficult for countries such as
Germany whose identity is expressly based on a common ethnicity. In countries where
ideological conformity takes precedence over cultural homogeneity, as professed by the
French republic and states promoting multiculturalism, the inculcation of similar values
must still be achieved. Shared identity will only result from some level of assimilation,
and this is rarely achieved quickly. Most often, it occurs in the schools, thereby
targetting the descendants of migrants rather than migrants themselves. No matter what
philosophy prevails concerning the acceptance of diversity in the country of settlement,
the state must grapple with ways of incorporating these new ethnoracial groups.
We have seen that migrants pose a double threat to the nation-state, first
by their physical presence as foreigners and subsequently by their becoming
(ethnoracially-distinct) citizens and participants where they have settled. Much of
existing research in this area focuses on questions related to the rights of ethnoracial
and foreign minorities living in democratic societies (Layton-Henry 1990b; Brubaker 1989;
Hammar 1990). These authors argue for the extension of the franchise, at least in local
elections, to "denizens." Others have argued that some foreigners already
participate in politics by "extraparliamentary" or unconventional means, that
is, through protests, strikes, and workers' councils. Moreover, mobilization around
socioeconomic issues such as housing and working conditions takes on more political
significance for those without recourse to the ballot (Miller 1981; Miller 1989; Wihtol de
Wenden 1988). Still others push farther for a reconceptualization of the nation-state and
a complete dissociation of citizenship and nationality (Silverman 1992; Bouamama et al.
1992).
This is only half of the story, however. The other half concerns how
states respond to these challenges. There is little research which relates the distinct
models and means pursued by nation-states to the mobilization of these minorities. One
exception is Ireland (1990), who concludes from studies of two Swiss and two French
industrial towns that immigrant politics are determined by institutions of the host
country first and by ethnic origin or social class second. I take a broader approach than
Ireland, looking at past and present sociocultural factors which shape institutional
response -- in other words, at the stable, societal components of political opportunity
structure.
The Nation-State Response: National Identity Structures
States respond to the presence of migrants and settlers through
policies and institutions, all of which are related to defining who is a citizen, how one
becomes a citizen, and what citizenship means (Castles and Miller 1993: 38). Not
surprisingly, these vary widely from country to country. Responses are rooted in political
tradition, are influenced by political culture, and are instituted in differing national
political climates. As argued in Chapter One, cultural norms shape and constrain how
states respond to the presence of immigrant minorities. They also influence the
mobilization abilities of challenging groups.
In order to better delineate how states respond to both the presence and
the demands of newer minority groups, it is helpful to dissect national response into
tangible components. These elements are not found solely in state institutions but are
rooted in the context of broader society. I refer to the ensemble of such components as
"national identity structures." Of course, this dichotomy between state and
society is not absolute, but it helps us to discern the aspects of opportunity which are
of greatest salience for a cross-national comparison of immigrants and ethnoracial
minorities. It also corresponds with the stable, cultural aspects of political opportunity
structure.
The dimensions of national identity structures are broad in scope, but I
have narrowed them down to components which are relevant to the study of the political
roles of immigrants and their descendents. In particular, the factors I consider are (1)
the national understanding and definition of citizenship and nationality, (2) the extent
of cultural pluralism and group rights which is allowed or encouraged by the state, (3)
state-society relations, especially the distinction between strong and weak state
traditions, and (4) the importance of immigration to population growth and national
development. In fact, all of these variables are interconnected. They are presented as
such, with emphasis on their distinctions.
Two of the dimensions -- citizenship and the incorporation of minorities
-- roughly correspond to the challenges to the nation-state: the presence of non-citizen
residents and (the participation of) new communal groups. Though all four dimensions are
considered below, citizenship and models of minority incorporation are examined in
greatest detail.
Citizenship. As we have seen, citizenship is formal membership in a
political entity. It consists of the rights and responsibilities a state confers upon
individuals living in its territory, possibly as part of a larger social contract.
Traditionally in European societies, citizenship implied a sense of community, a loyalty
of persons to a common civilization which grants equal rights and equal protections under
common law. In its ideal form, citizenship levels out ethnic and cultural differences,
providing symbols of cultural unification for members of the society as well as for those
waiting at the gates. This common loyalty is an artificial creation: "The
People" is said to be unified only insofar as they are subject to the same
governmental control.
The term "nationality" is generally used synonymously with
citizenship to denote legal membership in a state. It also has a less legal connotation
which is that of belonging to a nation in its literal sense. In modern usage, citizenship
and nationality become interchangeable concepts, although there are exceptions.
French-Canadians, for example, may hold Canadian citizenship but consider themselves to be
Québécois by nationality. International law also recognizes the two terms as
equivalents, and they are used as such in this analysis, unless otherwise specified.
For the most part, nationality is a legal consideration in which
individual will plays little part. In most countries, nationality is more often determined
by the accident of birth as opposed to voluntary declaration. In the words of Montesquieu,
"...I am a man before being French ... I am necessarily man, and only French by
chance" (cited in Schnapper 1991: 25). This is as true in the United States, where
citizenship derives from place of birth, as in Germany, where citizenship is largely based
upon kinship ties. Nationality is an objective tie which binds an individual to a state.
If individuals generally have little control over their citizenship,
states do. States accord citizenship based on a diversity of criteria which may become
more or less restrictive over time, depending on the country's particular demographic
needs and political climate. National regulations governing the acquisition of citizenship
are based on several common principles. The differences between states' policies hinge
primarily on the ways in which jus soli and jus sanguinis principles are
combined and in the extent of control over individual applications for citizenship.
Jus soli and jus sanguinis are standards for the
transmission, attribution, and acquisition of citizenship. According to strict definition,
jus soli accords citizenship to all persons born in the national territory while jus
sanguinis restricts citizenship to those descended from earlier citizens. The former,
literally "law of the soil," accords citizenship by place of birth whereas the
latter, "law of the blood," depends on kinship ties or descent. One could say
that jus soli emphasizes the territorial dimension of the nation-state definition
and jus sanguinis gives pre-eminence to the population dimension. The principle of jus
soli derives from feudal and monarchical rule under which those born on the territory
of a lord or a monarch were his subjects. The contrary tradition of republican states was
to seek legitimacy in the national community. According to jus sanguinis,
citizenship was viewed as hereditary membership in the community (De Rham 1990: 159).
The strictest application of either concept would mean that one's
citizenship was determined at birth, with no possibility of alteration. In reality, the
citizenship policies of almost all states fall between these two extremes, thereby
allowing more possibilities for the attribution and acquisition of citizenship. Among the
democracies of Western Europe and North America, citizenship based on jus sanguinis
is predominant in Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden, whereas jus soli is stronger in
the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
States also control access to citizenship by the complexity of the
application procedure: residency requirements, necessary paperwork, and the application
fees involved. Canada has only a three-year residency requirement as a permanent resident
before one can become a citizen, but -- as of June 1, 1994 -- a $500 minimum application
fee is required up front. France has a five-year residency requirement, a minimal
application fee -- and an exemption for the high proportion of applicants who earn less
than the minimum legal wage, and a low rejection rate of applicants (De Rham 1990: 164).
Yet the French state does not actively solicit applications for naturalization. In
Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the process is longer and requires some evidence of
commitment to integration in the settlement country. Switzerland has the most complex
procedure, with a twelve year residency requirement, a sliding-scale fee (depending on the
applicant's income) ranging from $140 to $50,000 as of April 1987, and involving three
levels of government (De Rham 1990: 174-5).
Although it is impossible to obtain strictly comparable data on the
effects of naturalization policies, one comparison of Europe's largest immigration
countries indicated that over five percent of all foreigners in Sweden acquired
citizenship in 1984, compared to 0.87 percent in Germany (De Rham 1990: 178). Brubaker
(1989: 117-20) asserts that if Germany is used as a base, foreigners naturalize at a rate
four times higher in France, ten times higher in the United States, fifteen times higher
in Sweden, and over twenty times higher in Canada. Even if the data used were not exactly
comparable, these figures indicate the extent to which naturalization rates are controlled
by states pursuing different objectives.
Models of minority incorporation. In some countries, cultural and
racial diversity is a recent phenomenon, caused by transnational migration. In others, a
population divided by linguistic, religious, and other cleavages dates back for centuries.
Intentionally or not, states have developed various ideologies or models for handling
cultural and racial diversity within their populations. These models are the product of
numerous factors, including political culture, state-society relations, and past
immigration. A typology of such models is presented below. These are simplified, ideal
models, which are used for heuristic purposes. However, they are more than abstract ideas.
They stem from various historical traditions and are reflected in state policies,
institutions, and minority behavior as well.
Assimilation is an individualistic strategy under which minority
persons are encouraged to subordinate or abandon old communal identities and adopt the
language, values, and behaviors of the dominant group (Gurr 1993a: 308). It is a one-way
process of absorption into the larger society in which the cultural basis of the
subordinate society is stripped away, minorities are transformed into productive citizens,
and their entry into mainstream society is facilitated (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 60). In
Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia, assimilation is also referred to as
"Anglo-conformity."
Sociologist Milton Gordon (1964) developed a multilinear, multidimensional
model of the assimilation process. Gordon asserted that assimilation may occur most
readily in economic, political, and educational areas and be met with more resistance by
minorities concerning religious, cultural, and family matters. According to Gordon, once
structural assimilation (incorporation into social institutions) advanced, all other types
would follow. In fact, assimilation has generally been easier, and therefore more
successful, for people who are culturally similar to the dominant group. Roman Catholics
from southern Europe, for example, have assimilated into French society more rapidly than
have Muslim Africans.
In an assimilation model, citizenship and nationality are synonymous.
According to this model, citizenship is acquired by immigrants as they are culturally
assimilated into the host society. Citizenship laws are fairly liberal, as the extension
of citizenship is viewed as a means for assimilation.
Until recent decades, most Western democracies followed an assimilationist
model for immigrants and indigenous peoples. With decolonization and increased attention
paid to human rights, including group rights, the concept of assimilation has fallen into
disfavor. It has been attacked on two fronts: by those favoring group recognition and
group rights, and by ethnic nationalists (neo-racists) among the dominant group. According
to proponents of assimilation, the former leads to ghettoization while the latter would
result in the expulsion of communal minorities (cf. Taguieff and Weil 1990).
Despite a hesitancy to use the term, however, the practice of assimilation
is still prevalent. In the United States, assimilation remains a powerful force affecting
ethnic and race relations (Glazer 1993). Indeed, many individual members of minority
groups want to assimilate. The assimilation of non-Europeans in North America and Western
Europe continues to be impeded by racial hostilities and xenophobia.
Integration is best characterized as a fusion or "melting
pot" process. It is a two-way process in which elements of the majority and minority
cultures are merged into a single national framework. Like assimilation, integration is an
individual strategy: all persons are formally equal, with no favors or distinctions based
on group identity. This model presupposes the desire for dialogue and communicability
between cultures.
The "melting pot" of late nineteenth-century America is often
hailed as the classic example of this model. The melting pot referred to the melding of
various immigrant cultures in the United States. However, integration was limited to
recent immigrants and their descendants; it did not become a real possibility for Blacks
until the United States Supreme Court ruled school segregation unconstitutional in 1954.
The "American melting pot" had its limitations.
The reality of the integration model is that dominant institutions,
languages, and identities rarely change to accommodate minority groups. Although changes
do occur, the essential societal outline varies little. Given a society which is dominated
-- in terms of numbers and power -- by a particular group, its history, and its language,
this outcome is perhaps inevitable (Gordon 1964: 127). The United States' population is
becoming less and less White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, but this is reflected more in
changing American cuisine and popular culture than anything else. Despite considerable
immigration, the United States remains distinctly Anglo-dominant.
Understandings of "integration" vary between countries. In the
United Kingdom, it has assumed negative connotations, having been linked with assumptions
that racial minorities should be coerced into conforming to "the British way of
life" (Fitzgerald 1993). Americans no longer speak of integration, and certainly not
of "Americanization" (Horowitz 1992: 18). Recent reports from the Canadian
government (Canada, Employment 1993a, 1993b), on the other hand, have claimed that Canada
is officially committed to the "integration model of immigrant life," as
evidenced by Canada's "cultural mosaic" and multiculturalism policy. These
reports cite integration as an "ideal medium" between assimilation and
segregation. In other words, "integration" is viewed as congruent with cultural
pluralism.
Interestingly, while most of the English-speaking western democracies have
abandoned "integration," some European countries are beginning to adopt the
term. In France, "integration" has enjoyed particular popularity over the past
half-decade, though there is still some confusion about what the term actually means. In
the French context, integration is seen as the enjoyment of equal rights in the public
domain while remaining free to practice one's own cultural beliefs in private. In reality,
although the concept has been received more favorably by minority groups in France, this
may differ little from assimilation.
If in reality integration is little more than a variation on assimilation,
it is presented separately in this analysis because it is conceptually distinct. Moreover,
the term is of rhetorical importance. States which have become hesitant to speak of
assimilation can express many of the same tenets in more politically acceptable
terminology such as "integration." In the case of Canada,
"integration" may also be more politically astute than government promotion of
cultural pluralism.
In brief, "integration" needs conceptual clarification. In the
author's point of view, it is best considered as a by-product of incorporation rather than
a means for it. As "integration" is not central to either the French or the
Canadian context -- the term has been used, but the rhetoric has not been backed by the
understanding of integration as developed here -- this will not be treated in further
detail.
Under a segregation model, society is segmented into groups,
usually based on skin color or national origin. Such groups are separate and unequal in
status. This model is generally unacceptable among liberal democracies today and is more
common in developing countries. The recently dismantled South African apartheid system was
the last major example in a Western society.
In a less pronounced form, segregation does exist in the West. For
example, indigenous peoples of North America and Australia have been "protected"
by such policies by being placed on reservations and becoming wards of the state.
Moreover, European countries which recruit "guestworkers" from foreign countries
without offering much possibility of obtaining citizenship can be considered exclusionist
(Castles and Miller 1993). Germany especially has received much international criticism
for maintaining separate coexistences of Germans and foreign workers.
In addition to restrictions on access to higher education, religious
practice, and place of residence, countries following this model often place restrictions
on access to citizenship as well. Citizenship may be granted to those with a particular
ethnonational heritage as opposed to others who have lived within the country in question
for several generations. Ethnic Germans living abroad, for example, can easily acquire
German citizenship whereas "guestworkers" from Turkey born in Germany face
financial, bureaucratic, and cultural obstacles to naturalization.
Assimilation and integration models anticipate individual absorption and
the disappearance of group identity. The cultural pluralism model, which can be
summed up in the phrase "equality without conformity," is a significant
departure from these individualistic models. In contrast to the other models presented
here, adherents of the pluralist model view diversity as compatible with national unity
and identity. As practiced in Canada, this model "openly promotes the values and
virtues of diversity as a necessary, beneficial, and inescapable feature of Canadian
society" (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 63). It provides a framework under which
minorities can retain cultural distinction without compromising their social equality. It
also gives greater weight to collective rights and interests of minorities.
Cultural pluralism draws upon the three models presented above. Like
segregation, it acknowledges separatist tendencies, yet differences are voluntarily chosen
and self-imposed rather than mandated by the state. Like integration, there is a
commitment to bring minorities into the mainstream, yet it takes the form of a mosaic
rather than a melting pot. As with assimilation, societal unity is viewed as contingent on
a primary allegiance to core values, yet conformity is not considered important to the
social order. Pluralism allows for a secondary or parallel attachment to a distinctive
heritage (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 64).
Under this model, citizenship is divorced from cultural conformity.
Persons qualify for naturalization based on residency, perhaps with minimal language
requirements, and naturalization is expected of most immigrants. The large countries of
immigration such as the United States, Australia, and Canada have minimal residency
requirements and encourage naturalization. The United States grants citizenship to
virtually all persons born on American soil, regardless of national origin of the parents.
Cultural pluralism is the most recent model of nation-building to gain
favor. Although it certainly existed previously, it was not recognized as a desirable
model until the twentieth century. Today, it has gained increasing acceptance in North
America, Australia, and many Western European states. It has been the impetus behind
national multiculturalism policies in Australia, Canada, and Sweden.
The concept of cultural pluralism was first formally devised in 1915 by
American philosopher Horace Kallen, who argued that diversity was valued by the American
forefathers. According to Kallen, pluralism was in accordance with the traditional ideals
of American political and social life. He wrote:
"Equal," in the intent of the Declaration (of Independence), is
an affirmation of the right to be different: of the parity of every human being and
every association of human beings according to their kinds, in the rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (cited in Gordon 1964: 146, emphasis added).
Interestingly, the "right to be different" enjoyed a revival in
assimilationist France in the late 1970s. Its popularity was brief, however, because the
slogan was co-opted by the far-right and used to argue that "difference"
precluded France's immigrant minorities from ever becoming true Frenchmen.
Not surprisingly, cultural pluralism has its critics. Some argue that the
established values and traditions of liberal democratic society embrace principles of
universality rather than of particularism. By this logic, pluralism may pose a "vague
threat to the democratic system" (Hawkins 1982: 78). Others criticize the divisive
effects of the pursuit of cultural pluralism (Schlesinger 1991; Bloom 1987). Canadian
sociologist Reginald Bibby (1990) argues that the demographic realities of diversity have
been converted into something prescriptively valued.
The verdict is still out. Political scientist Myron Weiner's observation
of three decades ago remains hauntingly relevant today: "It remains to be seen
whether the ideals of unity and diversity, that is, political unity and cultural
diversity, can be the foundations for modern states" (1965).
With the exception of segregation, which is increasingly unacceptable for
democratic societies, all three of the above models may eventually result in some form of
assimilation. Indeed, when Gordon published his seminal work on the subject in 1964, he
referred to all three of his "ideological tendencies" -- Anglo-conformity, the
melting pot, and cultural pluralism -- under the rubric of assimilation. It is difficult
for us today to project the longevity of the fusion and pluralist models which may turn
out to be nothing more than delayed assimilation into the mainstream.
Interestingly, Olzak and Nagel (1986: 2) found that the degree of
assimilation of immigrants and minority groups may actually vary positively with the
"strength of ethnic group loyalty and attitudes favoring the importance of ethnic
traditions." Olzak and Nagel found this at group and individual levels: more
assimilated ethnic groups sometimes had higher levels of ethnic mobilization and activity
than did less assimilated groups. Within groups, the more assimilated members were more
likely to support ethnic social movements. Although these findings relate to the degree of
assimilation rather than to states' models for the incorporation of minority groups, they
are important to our examination of mobilization efforts.
Strength of state tradition. Strong or weak state traditions do not
specifically target immigrants, but such traditions are important in nation-building and
are particularly relevant to a study of political mobilization. Moreover, this is the sole
dimension of national identity structures which has been the focus of empirical research
on mobilization. Research has shown that closed regimes repress social movements, that
open and responsive ones assimilate or co-opt them, and that moderately repressive ones
allow their expression but do not easily give in to their demands (Kitschelt 1986: 62). In
a study of four Western European states, Kriesi and collaborators (1992) found that
grouping states according to a strong/weak dichotomy and an inclusive/exclusive prevailing
response to challengers allowed for accurate predications with respect to the general
level of mobilization, the general form and strategy of the mobilization efforts, and the
system level at which efforts are typically oriented.
Consideration of the state also reveals differences between Western
European and North American political systems. European countries such as France and
Germany have stronger statist traditions whereas the United States and Canada have more
liberal, pluralist political cultures. In addition, European states are more likely to be
unitary than federal, thereby masking long-standing societal cleavages (Hollifield 1992:
174-5). The federal systems found in North America allow for greater division of power,
and therefore provide more -- and more accessible -- targets for challenging groups.
Immigration history. Immigration history provides an intriguing
component of identity structure in that past policies are a reflection of the kind of
nation-state that was desired. In many cases, states desirous of maintaining cultural
homogeneity had preference systems for immigrants based on national origin. In other
cases, the consequences of immigration were largely unforeseen by receiving states. States
recruiting foreign labor found that migrants were much more than an economic force which
returned "home" when the job was done. Rather, they contributed to
nation-building whether the nation sought their contribution or not.
Immigration does not offer us a simple means for understanding differences
between countries. A myriad of factors contribute to transnational migration, and these
factors fluctuate over time. What knowledge of a country's past immigration does provide
us with is a look at how understandings of citizenship, membership, and diversity were
carried out in concrete policies and received by the general public. The French and
Canadian immigration contexts are respectively examined in Chapters Three and Four.
Comparing National Identity Structures: A Brief Look at the Case
Countries
As will be detailed in the following chapters, France and Canada have
long received immigrants, political refugees, and dissidents. Both experienced large
migration flows in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by an
interwar hiatus and then resumed flows from a wider variety of sending countries in recent
decades. Both have become home to large numbers of persons from the developing world, and
therefore to greater racial and religious heterogeneity than ever before. The differences
between France and Canada lie not so much in immigration as in ideas about immigration --
and about communal identity -- and in the institutions that oversee the reception of
immigrants and their descendants.
Canada is a relatively young state whose national history can be defined
by tensions between French- and English-Canadians. It is a federation, under which the
provinces wield considerable power and national unity is frequently deemed to be in
jeopardy. Canada's strong ties with Britain, more in the past than in the present, have
hampered the development of a uniquely Canadian identity. This is exacerbated by Canada's
multicultural model of minority incorporation, which has been enshrined as a national
policy and has also been reflected in provincial and municipal policies. Many Canadians
fear that there is no glue holding the fabric of their society together.
France, on the other hand, is an older state with a stronger sense of
identity. France has been cited as the birthplace of the modern nation-state and ought to
be included in any discussion of the development of nationhood and national identity. As a
result of the French Revolution in 1789, personal allegiance to a monarch was replaced by
allegiance to some abstract notion of rights and duties. Citizenship was to be rooted in
the universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, not in any particular ethnic
identity. In reality, however, French nation-building hinged on the powerful forces of
assimilation found in highly centralized institutions such as the schools. The postwar
arrival of migrants from Africa and Asia pose challenges to the state's assimilation
machine.
We now turn to a more in-depth examination of national identity structures
in France and Canada. For each country, the factors considered are state-society
relations, citizenship, and immigration tradition. These three dimensions highlight the
distinctive understandings of minority incorporation, and how they have evolved over time.
Next
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
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