Immigrants
into Citizens: Political Mobilization in France And Canada |
By
Sarah Virginia Wayland
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of The University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1995
© Copyright by
Sarah Virginia Wayland
1995
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
CHAPTER THREE:
THE FRENCH REPUBLICAN TRADITION
Among western democracies, France comes closest to epitomizing the
assimilationist model of minority incorporation. The French state has been able to make
Frenchmen out of persons of various origins (Weber 1976). Strong centralization which
filtered down through the church, the military, and trade unions induced minorities to
abandon previous identities. Jules Ferry's introduction of free and compulsory primary
education in 1883 ensured cultural as well as linguistic assimilation through the school
system.
Although the administrative streamlining of French culture began with the
establishment of the French language in the seventeenth century, it was the French
Revolution that institutionalized the concept France Une et Indivisible. Under
Jacobin rule, 83 departments of equal size and equal subordination to the French
government replaced traditional regional provinces. Any regional privileges were
abolished, and France became a "full nation, ethnic and political, with no other
acknowledged ethnies within the territory of the French state" (Krejci and Velimsky
1980: 157). According to Jean-Claude Barreau (1992: 140), scholar and current advisor to
Interior Minister Pasqua on immigration questions, France does not identify itself by any
ethnic identity, rather it is a state which transcends all ethnicities. Because the French
nation is formed of bonds between individuals and the state, there is no recognition of
intermediary minority groups, nor of group rights.
Not unlike the melting pot imagery that was used to describe the United
States, the French model is that of a creuset or crucible which reshapes persons
into French citizens (Noiriel 1988). Although immigration has been essential to French
population growth, France was a long-established entity by the time that large-scale
migration got underway. As such, migrants to France entered a country with an strong
national identity which officially dated to 1789 but in actuality went back centuries
earlier (Beaune 1991). Immigrants were needed to labor and to populate France, but not to
create or settle the country as they were in North America. If they wanted to become
French, they had to speak French and adapt to French ways. As such, although France has
long been a country of immigration, immigration has only reached national consciousness in
the past few decades. As French sociologist Dominique Schnapper puts it, la France est
un pays d'immigration qui s'ignore.
In this chapter, the French Republican tradition is presented with
specific regard to several factors: the strong state tradition, the evolution of
citizenship laws, and France's immigration history. Intertwined, these factors comprise
France's particular model of assimilationist nation-building. Then these national identity
structures are placed in the current French context. Immigration issues of the 1980s are
given particular attention, as this is the time period for the mobilization efforts
examined in Chapter Six. The 1980s in France saw immigration issues assume center stage in
politics. More importantly, immigration has challenged the state's assimilationist
machine.
A Strong State Tradition
The political history of France has been a turbulent one. Since
revolution in 1789, France has had three monarchies, five republics, two empires, and one
pseudofascist state. On average, there has been a new regime every two decades. Yet the
links between the state and civil society have always been very strong in France. In the
absence of long-lived political regimes, the French people have clung to a more idealized
notion of the state. Unlike the regime, the state is above political interests and
reflects the will of the people, as embodied by Rousseau's social contract. In actuality,
this guardian of the national interest is the bureaucracy. During periods of political
instability, highly trained state officials were the real rulers of France.
France embodies the strong state tradition. The state has played an
essential role in economic development, the regulation of social life, fostering national
unity, and promoting secularism in France. In the words of French sociologist Dominique
Schnapper (1990: 255): "If the French remain very attached to it [the state], it is
that more than anything else, it expresses their collective identity." Two factors in
particular illustrate France's strong state tradition: centralization and the lack of
powerful interest groups.
Centralization. Since the seventeenth century, the most salient
characteristic of the French state has been the extreme centralization of authority. A
relic of the absolute monarchy, the strong central state was cemented as part and parcel
of French politics during the French Revolution, the reign of Napoleon, and the Fourth and
Fifth Republics. In the wake of the French Revolution, regional privilege was abolished,
and France was reorganized into a system of equally sized and equally weak departments.
Indeed, local governments were under the "tutelage" of state and prefect-level
institutions until 1982, when President Mitterrand formally made departmental, municipal,
and regional councils responsible for their own decisions (Roth et al. 1989: 90).
France's statist tradition persists. Under the Fifth Republic, dating from
1958, the French constitution grants considerable powers within the executive. The
constitution's drafter Charles de Gaulle had wanted to provide the country with stronger
leadership than under a pure parliamentary system. As such, parliament plays a lesser role
in policy-making, and its members are therefore less likely to be the targets of organized
interests. In addition to the concentration of decision-making power within the executive,
the creation of a Planning Commission for long-term social and economic development and
the appointment of officials to ministerial cabinets to aid ministers in running their
departments have protected the independence of policy-making in France (Roth et al. 1989:
317).
Weak interest groups. Hand-in-hand with centralization in France
and limited access to the decision-making process is the country's tradition of weak
interest groups. Interest groups are viewed with suspicion under the Rousseauian tradition
which favors direct participation of individuals in politics. Rousseau believed that the
pursuit of special interests endangered the commitment to the national interest:
Therefore it is essential, if the general will is to be able to express
itself, that there should be no partial society within the State and that each citizen
should think only of his own thoughts (cited in Wilson 1987: 13).
Rousseau's conviction that groups were dangerous was embodied in laws
prohibiting the formation of interest groups. The 1791 Chapelier law, which was not
repealed until 1884, dissolved medieval guilds and impeded the formation of trade unions
and other groups (Wilson 1987: 13). More recently, antipathy towards groups and the desire
to protect the state from group pressures lay behind de Gaulle's strengthening of the
executive in the Fifth Republic.
Suspicion of groups was not limited to professional or political
organizations, but extended to ethnic ones as well. Ethnic minorities were citizens of the
French Republic as individuals, not as members of any particular cultural group. As
Brubaker (1992: 106) notes, a famous adage during the Revolution was: "One must
refuse everything to Jews as a nation and grant everything to Jews as individuals ... They
must be citizens as individuals." There was to be no place for ethnic identity in
public life.
Another impediment to the formation of interest groups in France is the
strong individualism of the French, which makes them hesitant to join voluntary
organizations. Although this may be rooted in French history and very much a part of
French political culture, group life has flourished in France in recent decades (Wilson
1987: 14-15). As will be shown in later chapters, the 1980s were particularly ripe for the
emergence of voluntary associations, even ethnic and culturally-based ones.
In brief, France is a strong state with considerable capacity for
producing and implementing policy. There is broad agreement as to the effectiveness of
national policy-making. France's high output capacity stems from the centralized nature of
decision-making and a suspicion of interest groups. Although associational life in France
has made gains in recent decades, it remains for the most part weak and fragmented.
The closed nature of the French political system has implications for the
means by which persons and groups attempt to influence policy. Given that
"lobbying" has such negative connotations, challengers must often resort to
protest and other more visible actions. In the absence of more institutionalized
consultations, interest groups take to the streets to draw attention to their causes
(Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; Tarrow 1994). And they are often successful. The most
celebrated example of this were the May 1968 protests and strikes which effectively shut
down the city of Paris for weeks. More recently, student mobilization against university
reforms in 1986 resulted in an embarrassed government withdrawing the proposed
legislation.
In conclusion, the strength of the French state has implications for the
types of mobilization pursued by challengers as well as for the outcomes of such
mobilization. France's statist traditions are also reflected in the country's immigration
policies and in its understanding of citizenship.
Citizenship Tradition in France
It is said that in France the state both preceded and created the
nation. If the nation was a political creation of the French Revolution, so was modern
national citizenship. Never before had a Western state formally codified its membership.
Indeed, numerous legacies of the French Revolution have become crucial components of our
understanding of citizenship: the principle of equality before the law, where citizens
enjoy common rights and share common obligations; the rights of political participation
for all members; the distinction between nationals, or citizens, and non-nationals -- and
therefore the division between nation-states; and the codification of state-membership,
made possible by the emergence of a centralized polity with powers of enforcement
(Brubaker 1992: Chapter 2).
A voluntary act of political will rather than allegiance to a monarchy
became the defining aspect of citizenship. Citizenship was to be based on certain
philosophical values such as adherence to the Revolution and acceptance of a Rousseauian
social contract. This, rather than national origins, was the essence of citizenship. Thus,
persons residing in France were either citizens or foreigners -- among citizens, there was
no reference to national origin which might disturb the status of equality.
The 1791 French Constitution relied on a combination of jus sanguinis
(citizenship based on kinship ties) and jus soli (citizenship based on birthplace).
Citizenship was granted to persons born in France of a Frenchman, but also to persons born
in France of foreigners as well as to persons born abroad of a Frenchman, if those persons
moved to France and took a civic oath. Foreigners domiciled in France for five years could
also acquire citizenship by taking a civic oath. Interestingly, although important to the
ideology of the Revolution, such voluntary allegiance to the polity was required by only a
minority of persons. Citizenship was attributed to the vast majority of French citizens at
birth, and therefore independently of their will.
The Girondine Constitution of 1793 granted citizenship to those living on
French soil for as little as one year, while the Montagnard Constitution of the same year
contained similar conditions. These two constitutions were pragmatic documents, focusing
more on conditions for exercise of citizenship rights than on the origins of French
nationality.
The 1804 Civil Code almost completely abandoned jus soli in favor
of jus sanguinis. France was experiencing net emigration at that time, and Napoleon
did not want to lose population, particularly those eligible for military service. More
significantly, however, there was considerable concern that French citizenship not be
conferred on persons who happened to be born in France but did not want to settle in the
country. Although Napoleon himself favored the granting of citizenship to all children
born in France of foreign parents, emphasizing France's powers of assimilation, his
opponents prevailed by arguing that citizenship should reflect an enduring tie to France,
not merely an accidental connection. In the end, those born in France to foreign parents
could claim citizenship at majority rather than having it automatically attributed to
them. French citizenship was to be granted liberally, but not so widely as to devalue its
status and weaken the ties of nationhood.
In brief, the state's demographic and military interests were less
important than political and ideological factors in determining citizenship policy. Since
the Revolution, an openness to immigration and an expansive definition of citizenship had
been favored in France. These were bolstered by a Francocentric self-confidence which held
that permitting foreigners to become French would strengthen and expand the nation. Such a
view differs remarkably from ethnocultural understandings of the nation that have
prevailed in Germany and that would briefly emerge in France at the end of the century.
When it became apparent that few potential citizens were claiming French
citizenship at majority, thereby avoiding military service of up to eight years in length,
efforts were made to extend jus soli. This was accomplished by an 1851 law which
gave citizenship to all persons born in France of foreign parents, providing at least one
of them had also been born in France. Such third generation immigrants were presumed to
have such a strong attachment to France that they were prétendus étrangers,
persons who claimed to be foreigners. The law was viewed as necessary to remedy an
"abnormal situation" in which persons were in actuality French who had not been
recognized as such by the law. This was an uncontroversial reform whose goals of
transforming long-settled immigrants into Frenchmen were widely accepted.
Controversy followed relatively soon thereafter, in the debate leading up
to France's first real nationality code. Proponents of a code based solely on jus
sanguinis, citizenship based on descent rather than birthplace, gained a significant
following. In part this was made possible by the emergence of the term nationalité
in France to denote ethnocultural community distinct from the state. Nationalité
thus assumed two connotations: communal identity and formal membership in the state. A
linkage between the two was viewed as desirable by some: legal and communal nationalities
could converge into perfect nation-states. A second factor that facilitated some
ethnicization of French nationhood was France's 1870 defeat in the Franco-Prussion War.
French intellectuals blamed France's universalism and advocated a more particularist
patriotism along the lines of Germany.
Yet proponents of a more ethnoculturally-based understanding of France
could not prevail against the established combination of jus sanguinis and jus
soli. In the end, there was little justification for -- and little historical and
ideological self-definition of -- the French nation as a community of descent. In fact,
one of the very factors motivating the ultimate extension of jus soli was the
emergence of ethnocultural communities within France. The existence of such communities --
especially Italian ones -- was viewed as a challenge to France's unitarist polity, and
moves were made to ensure that these foreign collectives would be broken apart to
faciliate the "Frenchifying" of individuals.
In addition to this fear of emerging nations within the nation, that
long-settled foreigners were still abstaining from military service spurred on the
creation of a nationality code which would grant them citizenship, thereby making military
service compulsory. Again, French Republicans showed remarkable confidence in the
assimilationist powers of the state. The civic incorporation of these persons was deemed
an acceptable solution precisely because it was believed that a change in their legal
status would alter them socially as well. Specifically, they would be transformed into
Frenchpersons through universal primary education and universal military service.
Republican reforms in the 1880s had made primary education universal, compulsory, free,
and secular. Classroom religious training was replaced by civic education which fostered
patriotism. Military service was to complete the assimilation process, an assimilation not
only of immigrants but of French peasants as well (Weber 1976).
Brubaker (1992) makes a forceful argument that the institution of jus
soli in France's first nationality code of 1889 was directly rooted in France's
state-centered and assimilationist understanding of nationhood, reinforced at that time by
universal primary education and universal military service. This is not merely a cultural
explanation but rather an "idiom of nationhood" which was reinforced within a
"particular historical, institutional, and political context" and was
subsequently able to shape perceptions of state interest (86).
The 1889 legislation has proven to be an enduring model for the
attribution of French citizenship: the principle of jus soli for second-generation
residents of France has not been touched by major revisions of the nationality code in
1927, 1945, 1973, and 1993. Jus soli lies at the heart of the French model. The
expansiveness of French citizenship rests primarily on the jus soli laws which make
second- and third-generation immigrants French citizens, not on liberal naturalization
policies.
The French way of discussing citizenship in relation to immigration has
its roots in the Revolutionary period, but it adopted definitive form in the 1880s. It has
been challenged, most recently since the mid-1980s, but it has prevailed thus far.
Citizenship matters in France can be characterized by the rhetoric of inclusion and the
prevalence of social and political factors over ethnic origin. However, France's history
also includes periods of nationalism and of xenophobia (Brubaker 1992: 110-3). The
particularities of various nationality codes and citizenship-related issues are included
in the discussion of immigration below.
History of Immigration
Prior to 1851, when the French census first included a question on
nationality, relatively little is known about migratory movements to France. France has
formally received immigrants since the thirteenth century, its population growing slowly
until the end of the eighteenth century (Weil 1991a: 23; see also Lequin 1988). Migrant
numbers were not large however. Relying on historical accounts, French demographer Georges
Tapinos hypothesizes that France experienced negative immigration flows until the
nineteenth century. An estimated 100,000 foreigners were residing in France in 1800
(Tapinos 1975: 1-2).
There is evidence that, like today, the presence of migrants in France was
the subject of debate and controversy. Conflicts between French and foreign workers,
particularly Germans, during the first half of the nineteenth century have been documented
in police reports and the press. Violence was especially high in 1848, resulting in many
foreign workers returning to their countries of origin. In 1849, a law pertaining to the
expulsion of foreigners was enacted, which was used to expel persons deemed to be
"dangerous or harmful" (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 18-9).
1851 - 1914. Immigration became increasingly significant in France
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. According to the 1851 census, the number of
foreigners residing in France had increased to 378,561. At this time, the eve of the
Second Empire, foreigners constituted only about one percent of the French population and
were concentrated in border regions and within the Paris metropolitan area. The foreign
population was 34 percent Belgian (128,103 persons), 17 percent Italian (63,307), and 15
percent German and Austrian (57,000). By 1872, the beginning of the Third Republic,
foreigners were two percent of France's population -- over half of whom were Belgians. By
1886, foreigners had risen to three percent, or 1.1 million persons.
From the 1850s, France's foreign population increased during a period of
unrestricted migration. Rural to urban migration was insufficient to fulfill the labor
force demands of a rapidly industrializing France, so France looked outside its borders.
Moreover, immigration was also becoming a demographic necessity. French population growth
rates were low, but not from famine or epidemic as in previous centuries. Rather, growth
was hindered by deliberate restraint: in contrast to every other European country at that
time, France was experiencing declining birth rates. Its population had increased by nine
million between 1801 and 1860, but only by 2.5 million between 1861 and 1913. A confluence
of numerous factors led the French to practice birth control: the relative wealth of the
French populace, declining influence of the Catholic Church, better education, the
mandated division of property among all offspring, the ideals of liberation rooted in the
French Revolution, and especially the influence of Malthusianism.
Not surprisingly, then, France needed manpower. The labor shortage enabled
French workers to have easy access to jobs as well as to avoid menial and socially
unacceptable work. Imported labor was to assume responsibility for those undesirable jobs,
thereby fulfilling needed tasks but generally avoiding competition with indigenous labor.
Evidence of a dual labor market in France appeared as early as the 1880s (Cross 1983:
6-9).
Migration to France during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries can be characterized as unregulated and coming primarily from neighboring
countries. Foreign workers were dispersed throughout various industries and thus were not
as geographically segregated by national origin as they would be in later years (Prost
1966: 536). This, in turn, facilitated their integration into French society.
This period in French history, which lasted until the outbreak of the
First World War, occurred simultaneously with mass migration to North America and Oceania.
In contrast to transoceanic migration, however, immigration within Europe was more likely
to be temporary. Migrants travelled shorter distances, and their labor was not used to
settle new territory but was rather a supplement to existing labor. In general, it was
labor migration rather than settlement migration.
The impetus for migration and its often temporary nature help explain why,
up until the 1870s, the terms "immigration" and "immigrants" were
practically nonexistant in French legal and sociological literature (Noiriel 1988: 78).
Instead, "foreigner" was used. As immigration increased during the industrial
revolution, and as many foreigners did decide to settle in France, one began to speak of
immigration in plainer terms. A dilemma was emerging then that to some extent is still
being faced by France: how to maintain the social construction of the French nation in the
face of massive but much needed immigration.
By the 1880s, the presence of foreigners was mobilizing public opinion in
several directions. France needed migrants to produce offspring who would become French
citizens, laborers, and eligible for military service. There were concerns that foreign
workers were reluctant to settle in France permanently, as evidenced by their very low
naturalization rates, even among those born on French soil. French elites advocated
assimilating foreigners as quickly as possible. As one journalist wrote in 1885:
Obligatory naturalization appears today to be a political and economic
necessity.... it is the best and only means by which we would be able to remedy the
regrettable slackening (ralentissement) of our population. Since we don't have
enough children, let us adopt the children of others (cited in Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 22).
Not surprisingly, liberal immigration and naturalization policies were
also supported by business interests.
Protectionists, especially the working class, felt otherwise. Tensions ran
high between French workers and foreigners, particularly Italians, whose population in
France was increasing rapidly. Protectionists argued that the continued influx of
foreigners into France would compromise French nationality. Between 1885 and 1893, eleven
bills were introduced which sought to tax foreign workers in France. Of the fifty or so
restrictive measures proposed between 1883 and 1914, most failed due to the strong
resistance of both employers and the state (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 20-23).
The liberal camp ultimately prevailed, as evidenced by the implementation
of France's first real nationality code in 1889. This law simplified naturalization
procedures and made naturalization obligatory for the offspring of foreigners born in
France. The results: the percentage of naturalized Frenchpersons in comparison to the
foreign population increased from seven in 1881 to twenty-one in 1901 (Mauco 1932: 60).
Whereas France had naturalized 12,000 persons during the forty year period 1848 to 1888,
the following twenty five years, 1889 to 1914, would see over 200,000 persons acquire
French nationality (Decouflé 1992: 63). France's liberal nationality code has been hailed
by many as the principal factor facilitating the rapid integration of foreign populations
(cf. Schnapper 1991b; Tribalat 1991).
In addition to the nationality code, the enactment of other
immigration-related measures signalled increasing state intervention in this domain.
Beginning in 1888, foreigners were obliged to make a declaration of residence at the town
hall, which had to be renewed in case of relocation. The declared purpose was so that the
administration could know the conditions under which foreigners were establishing
themselves in France. Non-compliance could result in expulsion. In 1893, a declaration of
profession was added to the declaration of residence. Although the 1893 law did little to
change the 1888 one, its passage was the result of public pressure and mounting foreign
populations in the border regions (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 24).
Between 1906 and 1914, industrial activity accelerated in France, and
government and business began to work together to recruit foreign workers. In light of the
fact that spontaneous migration from other European countries had become insufficient to
fill labor needs, more formalized recruitment strategies were initiated. Beginning in
1908, mine workers and farmers were brought in from Poland under labor contracts. France
also signed labor conventions with Italy (1904, 1906, and 1919), Belgium (1906), and
Czechoslovakia (1920). These conventions institutionalized what proved to be mutually
beneficial arrangements. The countries of origin could guarantee that foreigners would
work for the same wages as the French, and France was able to select its immigrants,
preferring European laborers to ones from colonial holdings (Weil 1991a: 25).
The War Years: 1914 - 1945. With the onset of the Great War, the
need for manpower became even more acute. During the course of the war, over seven million
Frenchmen would be taken out of the economy for military service. Indeed, all of Europe
was in need of men.
The government became heavily involved in foreign worker recruitment.
France turned to alternate source countries and was able to secure 100,000 Greeks,
Portuguese, and Spanish laborers. In addition, 132,000 North Africans and 49,000
Indochinese were placed at the disposition of the Ministry of Armaments to work in
manufacturing. These non-white workers were treated as militarized labor, strictly
controlled and segregated by country of origin so as to avoid racial conflicts (Cross
1983: 34-6). Many of these persons were sent home at the conclusion of the war, having
never really been exposed to French society. Of the 220,000 non-Europeans recruited during
the war, only 1200 Chinese and 5000 North Africans remained in France by 1920 (Prost 1966:
537).
France was refining its techniques of immigration organization and
control. It was during the war that foreigners residing in France for more than two weeks
were first obliged to carry identity cards, instituted by the decree of 2 April 1917. This
replaced the declaration of residence that foreigners had been making since 1888. The
decree was to be implemented by all foreigners, regardless of nationality, profession, or
length of stay.
France suffered great loss during World War I: 1.4 million men died,
another 1.5 million were discharged due to injuries, and the country was in need of
reconstruction. A post-war manpower shortage encouraged France's second wave of
immigration, from North Africa in particular. The Société Générale d'Immigration
(SGI), a private organization established to help firms locate foreign labor sources, was
created in 1924. Immigration was no longer individual and spontaneous but was collective
and organized. However, the SGI only controlled about thirty percent of immigration into
France. One-third of immigrants entered through border stations while the other one-third
were illegal migrants (Prost 1966: 539). Immigrants sought out others from their home
regions, resulting in numerous cities having large concentrations of foreigners.
During the decade of the 1920s, France experienced its highest-ever
immigration levels. Between 1.9 and two million persons entered France over the course of
the decade, accounting for 75 percent of total population growth for that period (Tapinos
1975: 7). From 1921 to 1926, the foreign population grew by ten percent each year,
compared to two percent before the war (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 33). The most numerous
national groups in France during the 1920s were Poles, Italians and Spaniards.
A little-debated 1927 law facilitated naturalization. Since 1893,
immigrants had been required to reside in France ten years before applying for citizenship
and were then required to wait an additional three years as a permanent resident while
their petition was being examined (Cross 1983: 177). The new law reduced the residence
requirement to three years and eliminated the three year waiting period, thereby allowing
naturalization of the numerous persons who had settled in France since the war.
The 1927 law was referred to by Jean-Charles Bonnet as a "law for the
time of demographic crisis." According to one commentator at the time:
The substance of the 10 August 1927 law is characteristic of our era,
worried about the rarity of births, of increasing immigration, tormented by the desire to
Frenchify as quickly as possible these foreign elements... (Picot 1928: 5, cited in Schor
1985: 540).
Between 1926 and 1930, 315,066 foreigners acquired French nationality --
compared to 95,215 for the five preceding years (Bonnet 1976: 150-65, cited in Weil 1992:
29). The new law primarily served the most established migration cohorts, particularly
those who had advanced up from the working class. This nationality code would remain in
place until 1939.
In comparison to the United States, however, naturalization rates remained
low. Census figures reveal that 11 percent of France's foreign population was naturalized
in 1931, compared to 55 percent in the United States in 1930. Bureaucratic delays,
application fees consisting of several months' pay, and the lack of government
encouragement of naturalization all contributed to these relatively low rates. Although
demographically France needed more citizens, economic factors favored maintaining workers
as foreigners. As foreigners, workers were denied political rights as well as rights to
settlement and occupational mobility (Cross 1983: 178-80).
By 1930, France hosted the highest percentage of immigrants of any country
in the world (Noiriel 1988: 21). The 1931 census documents the presence of 2.7 million
foreigners in the country, comprising close to seven percent of France's population. Yet
immigration was still largely the domain of male laborers, not families. In 1931, there
were 2.03 foreign men in France for every foreign woman, compared to .88 Frenchmen for
every French woman. Whereas 23 percent of the French population was under the age of
fifteen, only 20 percent of the foreign population was (Cross 1983: 176).
Immigration continued throughout the 1930s, despite increasing
unemployment and restrictive measures passed by the National Assembly in response to
public opinion. A 1932 law gave the government the power to establish quotas for
foreigners in private enterprise. Despite restrictions on immigration, an influx of
refugees -- particularly from Spain -- maintained the number of foreigners in France at
about two million until the beginning of World War II. Moreover, many foreigners had
become French citizens and therefore were not reflected in census statistics: 1936 saw
517,000 naturalized French citizens.
Debate continued within France as to the role that immigrants were playing
in altering French society. In the aftermath of the First World War and up until the
1950s, assimilationism was predominant. This was reflected in the 1927 nationality law but
also revealed itself in a less optimistic light. Public discussions reflected desires to
preserve ethnic and cultural unity through immigrant selection (Schor 1985).
During the 1930s, assimilationism gave way to segregationism and
hierarchization schemes of foreigners. Depression era xenophobia was bolstered by
pseudo-scientific theories of racial superiority (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 53-79; see Mauco
1932 for a well-known example). The principle of ethnic and racial hierarchy was raised to
new heights during German occupation of France, from 1940 to 1944. Collaborating with the
Nazis, the Vichy regime treated French citizens, political refugees, and foreigners alike,
that is, according to national origin. About half of France's foreign population left the
country during World War II, many of whom were deported or sent to death camps (Weil
1991a: 33-54).
The Third Wave: "Les Trentes Glorieuses". Facing ongoing
low birth rates as well as the loss of some 600,000 military and civilians in the war,
General Charles de Gaulle -- then head of the provisional government -- ardently supported
an active immigration policy to repopulate France. In the immediate postwar period, France
launched another massive program of labor importation and established the National
Immigration Office (ONI) to oversee immigrant recruitment. Some French policy makers --
including de Gaulle -- favored George Mauco's plan for a preference system based on
national origin: 50 percent of immigrants were to be northern European; 30 percent
Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian; and 20 percent Slavs. Coming in the wake of the second
world war, however, this ethnic quota plan (which was modelled in the American system)
came to be seen as unethical and reminiscent of Nazi ideology. It was never implemented.
Instead, France embarked on its first egalitarian and liberal immigration policy (Weil
1991a: 53-62).
In actuality, many policy makers continued to favor migration from
northern and central Europe, but the closure of Eastern Europe meant that France had to
turn to Italy, Spain, and then Portugal for labor. When the 20 September 1947 law gave
French citizenship to Algerian Muslims and mandated free circulation between France and
Algeria, Algerians filled some of the labor gap. Despite government preferences, the alien
workforce increasingly consisted of non-Europeans.
Immediate postwar policies encouraged foreigners to permanently settle in
France. An ordinance of 19 October 1945 facilitated the acquisition of French nationality
and made provisions for the possibility of "Frenchifying" one's name. A law of
22 August 1946 established a natalist regime for family allocation (prestation)
which specified that funds be allotted only for children declared French at birth or
within three months of birth (Tapinos 1975: 24).
The rise to power of the Gaullists in 1958 -- the advent of the Fifth
Republic -- signalled an increasingly interventionist role of the state. Yet the labor
market was already expanding on its own. France's "third wave" of immigration
had begun in the mid-1950s, in the midst of what are known as the "the thirty
glorious years." Three times as many immigrants entered France between 1955 and 1965
as during the previous decade (Silverman 1992: 42). France averaged an intake of 248,800
immigrants per year between 1956 and 1967. Only a fraction of this immigration was
controlled by ONI, however. Despite its mandate to control all immigration, ONI supervised
only about twenty percent of entries into France in 1966. Migrants from Algeria and other
colonies as well as from French overseas territories (DOM-TOM) did not face the
restrictions set up by ONI. Decolonization brought on an influx of white and non-white
Frenchmen and Africans.
Since World War II, French immigration policy had been two-pronged. On the
one hand, the state sought to remedy a demographic deficit by encouraging foreigners to
settle in France and have children who would become French. To facilitate integration,
these immigrants should be European in nature. On the other hand, France needed temporary
labor and thus recruited young single foreign adults to work under limited contracts.
These men came from outside Europe -- mainly from Turkey and Africa -- and were strong,
mobile, and made few demands. To avoid attempts at family reunification in France, these
workers were often housed in company or state-owned barracks. Though it was technically
controlled by ONI, most immigration continued to be spontaneous, and often illegal. In
need of labor but with a system incapable of processing enough workers, the state turned a
blind eye.
With the onset of industrial specialization, immigrant workers were
concentrated in the most difficult, least paid jobs. Algerians were the first to be
recruited to the outskirts of large cities, where they had to cope with deplorable working
and living conditions. Life in shantytowns, or bidonvilles, was so appalling that
the French state had to step in to improve the housing situation. Nonetheless, the
Algerian population in France grew steadily during and in the wake of the Algerian war.
The Fonds d'Action Sociale (FAS) was created in 1958 as a welfare institution for
Algerian workers. In addition, Portuguese labor was important to building and public
works, as was Malian and Senegalese labor for janitorial and other physical work.
In the early 1960s, France signed migration treaties with several North
African states, Senegal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. In actuality, recruitment was no longer a
necessity: immigrants were all to eager to flee poverty in their home countries. France
accepted almost 220,000 immigrants in 1963 -- 67 percent were from Spain, 12.5 percent
from Portugal.
During the presidency of Georges Pompidou, from 1969 to 1974, immigration
began to be perceived differently within policy circles: it came to be recognized as more
than a matter of temporary manpower and economic import. It was increasinly acknowledged
that immigration had far-reaching social implications as well (Freeman 1979: 85-98;
Silverman 1992: 46-52). Discussions of immigration control recognized the need for ongoing
cheap labor but also maintained that France needed to keep its ethnic balance tilted in
favor of Europeans or risk facing new social problems. By 1970, the number of foreigners
in France had passed the three million mark, the highest recorded figure since World War
II. The numbers rose to 3.6 million in 1972 and 3.7 million in 1973. More important to
discussions of "ethnic balance" was the profound shift in the racial composition
of foreigners in France, brought on by decolonization and lack of opportunity in many
developing countries. By the beginning of 1974, the two largest foreign populations in
France were the Algerians (846,000 according to the Ministry of the Interior) and the
Portuguese (812,000).
France moved to regain control of migration flows by enacting a series of
provisions to limit the influx of Algerians and to restrict the issue of work and
residence permits to foreign workers. The latter restrictions, which were known as the
Marcellin-Fontanet circulars of 1972, sparked the first widespread protests by foreign
workers in France, including hunger strikes, labor strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins
(Miller 1981: 100-104; Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 157-85). Media attention began to focus on
the socioeconomic situations of foreign workers in France, particularly the deplorable
housing conditions.
Rising unemployment and the onset of the energy crisis led to increasing
politicization of immigration issues. In 1973, an increase in racist incidents --
including the murders of numerous Algerians -- led Algeria to suspend migration of its
citizens to France. In 1974, France -- under the new leadership of President Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing (1974-81) -- suspended non-EEC immigration and imposed measures to
encourage the return of foreign workers to their home countries. The suspension, which is
technically still in effect today, paralleled moves by the other countries of Western
Europe to stem migration flows. Strict controls were justified on the grounds of rising
unemployment and the need to integrate foreigners already in the country. Despite these
measures, the foreign population in France did not decrease.
By 1976, seven percent of the French population (3.7 million persons) were
immigrants: twenty-two percent of them were Portuguese, twenty-one percent Algerian,
fifteen percent Spanish, thirteen percent Italian, eight percent Moroccan, and four
percent Tunisian (Braudel 1990: 204-5). Most of them were male adults.
Under Giscard, immigrant-related questions were targets of much rhetoric
and little social action. Moreover, the security of immigrants was jeopardized by a series
of control measures which included expulsion of the unemployed, attempts to restrict or
suspend family reunification (overturned by the Council of State), financially-aided
repatriation (aimed especially at Algerians), and the Bonnet Law of 1980 which attempted
to combat illegal immigration through the introduction of a stricter regime defining entry
and residence rights.
Immigration in the 1980s. If the 1970s can be characterized as an
era of heightened insecurity for foreign workers and other immigrants in France, the 1980s
ushered in an era of greater tolerance under the leadership of Socialist President
François Mitterrand (1981-present). Yet, in the context of immigration having become one
of the major political issues in the country, it was an uneasy and short-lived tolerance.
The 1980s witnessed dozens of legislative initiatives, a major debate on citizenship and
national identity, and the rise of the anti-immigrant Front National (FN) party as
well as the emergence of anti-racist activity and new forms of cultural expression for
"second generation" youth. Immigration was increasingly viewed as a social issue
as opposed to an economic one, and the immigration "problem" was no longer the
temporary presence of immigrants but that they were permanently settling in France. These
developments are worth examining in more detail.
Immigration was increasingly central to French political life in the
1980s. In the wake of their 1981 presidential victory, the Socialist Party emphasized the
need to increase immigrant security and improve the situation left by more than twenty
years of right-wing rule. Indeed, several measures were taken in 1981 along these lines:
the right of association granted to foreigners; the suspension of all expulsions of
foreigners born in France or having entered France before the age of ten; an amnesty for
illegal aliens who had entered France before 1981 (thereby legalizing about 130,000
persons); and the suspension of the paid repatriation program. Accompanying these
measures, however, were stricter definitions of entry and residence rights and rhetoric on
the need for control over illegal immigration. By 1983, rising unemployment and the first
electoral victory of the FN party led the government to espouse a tougher line on
immigration by instituting more controls as well as renewing financial aid for the
voluntary repatriation of foreigners.
The rise of the FN influenced developments outside the government as well.
An increase in racial attacks, seemingly legitimized by the popularity of the FN, spurred
a huge mobilization of anti-racist support. This took the form of rallies such as the
March for Equality in 1983 and Convergence '84, both of which were spearheaded by Beurs,
the new generation of Frenchpersons whose parents were from North Africa. In direct
response to the 1983 march, the government introduced a single ten-year residency and work
permit for foreigners, alleviating a major bureaucratic hassle and chronic source of
insecurity for immigrants. Simultaneously, there was an explosion of new immigrant,
second-generation, and anti-racist associations, most notably SOS Racisme in the
fall of 1984. A free rock concert sponsored by SOS Racisme in June 1985 drew
300,000 persons. Another national organization was formed in 1985 which appealed to Beurs.
Entitled France Plus, the aim of this nonpartisan organization was to involve Beurs
in electoral politics by getting more of them on the election lists. Both France Plus
and SOS Racisme had close ties with various leaders of the Socialist Party.
During the mid-1980s, then, the immigration debate assumed new
proportions, as evidenced by conferences organized by the right and the left as well as by
numerous books relating immigration and identity (cf. Griotteray 1984; Le Gallou 1985; Le
Club de l'Horloge 1985; Espaces 89 1985). Because France's Republican tradition allows no
room for minority groups, "immigration" has become a catch-all for issues of
racial and cultural difference in French society. Likewise, "immigrant" has
become synonomous with "Arab" in the minds of many Frenchpersons, connoting
Muslims of North African origin -- including French citizens -- who live in France without
readily assimilating into French society. These non-European immigrants are represented as
a "threat to social cohesion." Even their children who were born in France and
have French nationality are not yet considered as legitimate French citizens.
Despite attempts to recapture the agenda from the far-right, the Socialist
Party was branded "soft" on immigration policy. The election of a center-right
coalition in March 1986 resulted in France's first "cohabitation" period:
Socialist President Mitterrand would have to co-govern with a conservative government led
by Prime Minister Chirac until the next elections in May 1988. Keeping its eye on FN
sympathizers, immigration-related questions received higher priority under the Chirac
administration. The Pasqua Law was passed in September 1986 which changed conditions of
entry and residence of foreigners and suppressed their judicial guarantees, and, in a
highly publicized event, 101 Malians were expelled from France on a charter flight in
October.
It was in this context that that most significant immigration-related
debate of Chirac's tenure took place: proposed reform of the French Nationality Code.
Chirac submitted legislation to modify the code such that the acquisition of France
nationality would depend on a "prior act of will," or voluntarism, as opposed to
the long-existing jus soli principle which accorded nationality to all children
born in France of foreign parents at the age of eighteen as long as they had resided in
France for five years prior to the age of majority. As will be shown in Chapter Six, the
proposed reform was ultimately defeated, but not before a special commission was created
to look into the issue. Its televised "hearings" revealed many fears and
confidences about the strength of French national identity (Long 1988).
With the return of a Socialist government in 1988, immigration remained a
central political issue. The headline issue of the end of the decade was the affaire
des foulards islamiques, another issue which was not directly concerned with
immigration itself but rather with the integration of newcomers to France and their
descendants. This is also considered in more detail in Chapter Six. In the aftermath of
the affaire des foulards, a High Council for Integration was set up to recommend
ways to better integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities into French society. Few
concrete measures have arisen from the Council.
The Joxe Law was passed in August 1989, in response to mobilizations by a
variety of organizations to overturn the Pasqua Law. The Joxe Law improved the status of
foreign residents in France and legalized the position of undocumented asylum seekers if
they had been residing in France but made few changes regarding conditions of entry.
The new decade was ushered in by continued rhetoric on integration, the
problems of the "suburbs" (read ghettos), and of the "second
generation" -- and by few significant policy changes. Riots erupted in the suburbs of
Lyon in early October 1990 and in Sartrouville (near Paris) in March 1991. These
highlighted the frustration and social and economic marginalization of "second
generation" youth. Symbolic racial violence was also on the rise, as manifested in
the desecration of the Jewish cemetary at Carpentras in May 1990. A huge anti-racism march
followed, attended by President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Rocard, as did provisions to
strengthen the 1972 law against racial discrimination. However, rifts were deepening
within the anti-racist movement, and the anti-racism efforts of the late 1980s came to be
viewed by some as counter-productive (Taguieff 1988; Yonnet 1993). This is examined in
more detail in the following section.
In brief, France was experiencing deep national and social crisis, the
euphemism for which was "immigration." The FN was the greatest beneficiary of
the linking of "immigration" and "crisis," but the sources of the
connection go far beyond the far-right in France (Silverman 1992: 69). Not for the first
time, immigrants and ethnoracial minorities were scapegoated for larger social and
economic ills. When the Right re-took power in March 1993, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur
moved quickly to pass new legislation tightening citizenship rules, restricting the rights
of foreigners to enter France as immigrants or political refugees, and limiting family
reunification for those already settled in France. Under Charles Pasqua, now Interior
Minister, police were allowed to make random identity checks as a means of cracking down
on illegal immigration. In reality, such checks were certain to target those who were
visibly different from the majority population, "criminal face" (délit du
faciès) as it was termed by its detractors. Balladur's actions were met with
widespread public support.
The politicization of immigration-related issues in France is partly due
to the changing nature of immigration. Two decades ago, three of every four immigrants to
France were European. Today, more than half of France's four million foreigners are Arab
or African. That France looks very different demographically than it did a few decades ago
incites fears of loss of national identity, and sometimes translates into support for the
FN. We now turn to a brief look at the presence of ethnoracial minorities in France.
France's Foreign and Naturalized Population
In keeping with the republican tradition, France keeps no statistics
on its ethnoracial communities. Statistical evidence is based on nationality rather than
ethnicity or race. The census classifies residents of France into three categories set up
by the French nationality code: French by birth, naturalized French, and foreigners. There
is also a question on birthplace, which provides some basis for speculation on France's
minorities of immigrant origin. From the Third Republic on, however, all questions
concerning religion and language were forbidden in the census (Noiriel 1992: 72). In
addition to census figures, the Ministry of the Interior counts the foreign population
based on residence permits, some of which belong to foreigners who have left the country.
As a result, Ministry of the Interior estimates of foreigners residing in France are
greater than those provided by the census, generally by about 500,000 persons. Data on
"entry flow" is kept by the Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI)
and the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés Apatrides (OFPRA), but no
government agency tracks permanent settlement in France (Silberman 1992: 116-8).
Because it concentrates on "stock" rather than
"flows," census data is the most useful for the purposes of reaching some
estimates of minorities of immigrant origin population in France. But there are problems
with census figures as well. First, the census relies on respondents' statements with
respect to nationality. Given the complexity of and changes in the French nationality
code, respondents may give incorrect information. Such errors can sometimes be caught
given the information provided about birthplace. The debate on the French nationality code
in 1986-87 helped to educate immigrants and their descendants about their nationality,
many of whom had not even known that they were French citizens. This may account for the
slight drop in census figures of foreigners living in France between 1982 and 1990. In
1990, the census reported that 90.5 percent of France's population was French by birth,
3.1 percent was French by acquisition, and 6.4 percent was comprised of foreigners.
A more serious deficiency in census data is that the national-foreigner
distinction does not capture the reality of "immigration" in France today.
Persons from French Overseas Departments and Territories such as French Guiana,
Guadeloupe, and Martinique are not foreigners; "French Muslims" (Harkis)
who fought on the side of France during the Algerian war of independence, most of whom
were repatriated to France after 1962, are not foreigners; persons born to Algerian
parents in Algeria before 1962 (while Algeria was French) are not foreigners; persons born
in France of foreign parents who have automatically acquired French nationality at the age
of eighteen are not foreigners. Yet, although they are not statistically represented as
foreigners, they are often viewed popularly as immigrants, owing to the racialized links
made between immigration, Maghrébins, and Blacks. Foreigners from Europe, on the
other hand, are statistically foreign but are less likely to suffer the stigma attached to
immigration today (Silverman 1992: 37-8).
In addition to statistics providing an incomplete picture of
"immigration" in France, immigration figures have become highly politicized over
the past several decades. Official data has been used to support racist arguments (see
cover story of Le Figaro Magazine, 26 October 1985). The far-right has cited
"rough estimates" of the number of foreigners in France at double or triple
official figures. These figures include persons in the categories cited above who are
minorities but are not statistically foreign.
Given that even official figures vary and that data is not kept on ethnic
and racial groups, statistics are used sparingly here just to give some general indicators
of ethnoracial minority presence in France. They do provide some general information on
immigrant composition and trends.
Since most non-EU labor recruitment was suspended in 1974, the number of
foreigners in France has remained fairly stable. In general, family reunification and
births have been offset by departures and expulsions. Annual authorized immigration hovers
around 100,000 persons (102,000 in 1991), of which about 60 percent are family
reunifications, about 25 percent are workers, and about 15 percent are refugees. These
numbers do not include asylum seekers whose status has yet to be determined. In addition,
according to Jean-Claude Barreau -- then-President of the Office des Migrations
Internationales -- the number of illegal immigrants to France is estimated to be
around 30,000 persons annually (interview in Le Monde, 10 October 1989). Lastly, an
estimated 40,000 persons left France in 1991. Foreigners in France increasingly include
women and youth, and the majority reside in one of France's three main urban centers --
Ile-de-France (Paris region), Rhône-Alpes (Lyon region), and Provence-Côte d'Azur
(Marseille region). The Paris region alone received two-thirds of permanent workers, 70
percent of asylum seekers, 66 percent of admitted refugees, and half of the students who
arrived in France in 1991.
However, although numbers have remained stable, their composition has not.
Two decades ago, three of every four immigrants to France were European. Today, about half
of France's foreigners are Arab or African. The 1990 census estimated that of 3.6 million
foreigners in France, 45.4 percent were from Africa (including the Maghreb) and 11.8
percent were from Asia (including Turkey). EU source countries provided 36.5 percent of
foreigners living in France. With regard to "flows" rather than
"stock," 1990 statistics as kept by OMI and OFPRA indicate that of 96,635
authorized entries, 34,239 (35.4 percent) were from the Maghreb, 10,466 (10.8 percent)
were from other parts of Africa, 21,455 (22.2 percent) were from Asia, and 24,381 (25.2
percent) were from Europe, including Eastern Europe and Turkey. The remaining six percent
were from North and South America. A comparison of data from the 1982 and 1990 censuses
reveals that the number of foreigners of European origin continues to decline while those
of Asian origin is increasing, largely due to higher immigration levels from Turkey.
Not surprisingly, then, the national origins of those acquiring French
nationality have also shifted. Whereas Southwestern Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, and
Spanish) made up almost 61 percent of foreigners taking French nationality during the
period 1960-1964, their share had dropped to 33.5 percent for the period 1985-1989. Maghrébins
(Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians), by contrast, jumped from four percent to 19.7
percent for the same periods. For the 1985-1989 period, 5.7 percent of those acquiring
French citizenship were from sub-Saharan Africa and 11 percent were from Vietnam,
Cambodia, or Laos (Decouflé 1992: 68-9). The trend towards those of non-European origins
is evident even within recent years: Southwestern European obtainers of French nationality
fell from 33 percent of the total in 1987 to 17 percent in 1991. Maghrébins,
however, rose in almost the exact inverse proportions, from 19 percent in 1987 to 39
percent in 1991 (France 1993: 98). The changing composition of new French citizens
reflects the absence of ethnic or national immigration quotas as well as the continuing
ties between France and its former colonies in Africa and Asia.
French demographer Michèle Tribalat estimates that, as of 1 January 1986,
ten million Frenchpersons have foreign ties by either having immigrated themselves or
having a parent or grandparent who immigrated to France. When added to the 3.5 million
foreigners residing in France in 1982, we can say that somewhere on the order of
one-quarter of the French population are of recent foreign origin, that is, within two
generations (Tribalat 1991; Haut Conseil 1993: 257-60).
In conclusion, though no official statistics are available on ethnic and
racial minority presence in France, immigration and naturalization data reveal the extent
to which national and cultural diversity has increased in France over the past several
decades. What this diversity has meant for France's assimilationist model of minority
incorporation is addressed below.
The Assimilationist Machine in Question
To the claim that the French nation has been a successful experiment in
assimilation, many Frenchpersons would add a qualifying "Until now," citing
problems posed by the greater cultural and physical distance from which today's immigrants
come. Certain qualities of non-Western immigrants in particular, notably religion, are
seen as hampering France's ability to assimilate them. Islam is said to pose particular
problems because it permeates daily life, thereby conflicting with the laicité so
dear to the French. In a 1989 survey which asked which immigrants posed the greatest
difficulty for integration, fully half of the French respondents identified North
Africans, compared to 19 percent who named Black Africans and 15 percent citing Asians (Paris
Match, 14 December 1989, cited in Horowitz 1992: 19)
History shows us that the belief that "today's" immigrant
minorities will never be integrated is nothing novel (Noiriel 1988). Indeed, many of the
same "inassimilability" claims made about Arabs were aimed at Polish immigrants
between the World Wars as well as at Italians and Belgians. In the past, assimilation
largely prevailed in France, and many are confident that the French machine will continue
to work (Long 1988; Schnapper 1991b; Barreau 1992). This is possible because national
identity is the result of a continual process, altered by newcomers rather than being
fixed in history (Noiriel 1988). Others, however, believe that "Francization" is
an outmoded concept which should make way for cultural pluralism or American-style
multiculturalism.
Concerns over French national identity, and whether or not it is
threatened by cultural diversity, represent a natural evolution of the immigration debate
that has occupied French scholars and even politicians over the past several decades. Many
foreign workers who arrived in the postwar years have settled and raised families in
France. Authorized immigration levels have remained low since the recruitment of most
foreign workers was officially halted in 1973, at about 100,000 persons a year, most of
whom enter for family reunification purposes or as seekers of political asylum. Although
immigration continues to be a political issue, the targets are not only immigrants but
also their visibly distinct children who are often French citizens. Whereas the 1960s and
1970s were characterized by immigrant-related demographic and economic concerns,
immigration had assumed citizenship and identity-related dimensions by the 1980s. Central
to these debates was differentialist discourse and how it was (mis)construed.
Although the republican model precludes recognition of ethnic minority
groups in France, by the early 1980s persons on the left end of the political continuum
were pushing for culturally sensitive government policies (Safran 1985; Vichniac 1991).
When the Socialist Party assumed power in 1981, it put forth a two-pronged immigration
policy: reduce illegal migration while better integrating those "immigrants"
already in France. In addition, decentralization policies seemed poised to accommodate
both regional and non-territorial ethnic groups. Several government reports even
recognized a "right to be different" (droit à la différence) for ethnic
minorities (Giordan 1982; Gaspard 1983). The Giordan Report for Minister of Culture Jack
Lang -- which primarily focused on regional languages but included non-territorial
cultural minority needs as well -- cited France's need to form a "cultural
democracy" based on recognition of ethnic and cultural differences among important
segments of the French population (1982: 13). Gaspard's report referred to immigrant
minority incorporation as "insertion," a term that enjoyed popular usage in the
early 1980s. Minorities were no longer expected to assimilate, only to "insert"
themselves into French society while guarding their own cultural identities. In brief,
certain government circles were prepared to acknowledge and support cultural pluralism.
The days of "difference" were numbered, however, and Françoise
Gaspard herself fell victim to the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's anti-immigrant Front
National party. In 1983, Gaspard was defeated as mayor of Dreux in the FN's first
major electoral victory. The FN won popular support by blaming immigrants for French ills
ranging from unemployment to threats to the security and national identity of the country.
The extreme-right adopted the notion of "difference" for its own ends, arguing
that non-French elements were destroying French culture. With the rise of a new
nationalism embodied by la France aux français, "difference" became a
tool of race-based exclusion. By the late 1980s, the push for "difference" had
all but disappeared (Vichniac 1991).
Although it was the far-right which capitalized on French fears of
pluralism, many leftists rejected pluralism in the name of Jacobinism -- prominent
scholars Dominique Schnapper and Patrick Weil, for example. By their logic, France's
recognition of ethnic groups would represent abandonment of republicanism in favor of the
"Anglo-Saxon" model which recognizes, even fosters, communal identities. In
France, the Anglo-Saxon model has been reduced to two words: ghettos and quotas. Fears of
Los Angeles-type race riots and "positive discrimination" policies which would
crush France's tradition of individual equality before the law abound. Immigrants and
ethnic minorities themselves even look upon this model with disdain.
Minorities themselves, claiming that they never wanted to be seen as
different in the first place, formed the third faction in the backlash against cultural
pluralism. As Franco-Algerian activist and early critic of difference Farida Belghoul
stated,
The famous right to be different never leads to equality, it is a veiled
form of exclusion... France is a country which respects differences to the point of
imposing different justices, different living conditions, and thus perpetuating the status
quo (Le Monde, 16-17 December 1984).
Within a few years, other minority activists had followed Belghoul's lead.
SOS Racisme, the very association "credited" with promoting difference in
the early 1980s, today denies that it was ever one of their tenets.
In this context of pluralism being viewed as a threat to national unity by
both the far-left and the far-right, it becomes understandable that citizenship and
nationality should attract political attention in the 1980s. Debates on citizenship were a
way of addressing much broader questions of "difference" without having to use
the term. "Difference" and "insertion" were out as models of minority
incorporation. "Assimilation" had fallen into disfavor because of its
Franco-centric connotations which reminded too many of France's colonial past. In their
places, a new term -- intégration -- became the buzzword of the late 1980s.
Intégration soon reached the highest political circles. To diffuse
tensions generated by the affaire des foulards, a Haut Conseil à l'Intégration
was given a three-year mandate beginning in February 1990. The High Council, headed by
Vice President of the Council of State Marceau Long -- who also headed the Nationality
Commission in 1987, was given the mission of reflecting on questions related to the
integration of foreigners in the French Republic. One of its tasks has been to provide
accurate statistics related to immigration and integration in France, in order to quell
politically-charged disputes over conflicting figures.
In many ways, "integration" is a compromise term, lending itself
to numerous interpretations (Negrouche 1992). Even the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration
has avoided promoting a clear definition. It provides the following: integration consists
of creating "active participation" of persons living together on French soil
through acceptance of their "cultural specificities, but in putting the accent on
resemblances and convergences in the equality of rights and obligations, so as to assure
the cohesion of [French] social tissue" (Haut Conseil 1993: 8). The Haut Conseil
relied heavily on the work of immigration legal scholar Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, who
wrote that "assimilation emphasizes unity of the national community, and integration,
the choice and participation of new members" (Haut Conseil 1993: 34). In other words,
the integration model is an individualistic approach that falls somewhere in between
assimilation and insertion. Integration implies the enjoyment of a common citizenship in
conjunction with the maintenance of diverse practices in private life, or national unity
without cultural conformity (Schnapper 1991b).
Intégration à la française hinges on the specificities of the
French Republican tradition: the association of citizenship and nationality, equality of
individuals, and a rejection of the logique des minorités. The reports of the Haut
Conseil reiterate the emphasis on individual integration and a refusal to
institutionally recognize minorities. The French nation remains the product of individual
political will. Public institutions such as schools and military service as well as
employment, marriage outside one's milieu, and other factors are said to encourage this
individual intermixing (Kepel 1988: 281-2).
Intégration has not been without its critics, most of whom claim
that integration is just another name for assimilation (cf. Silverman 1992). Criticisms
notwithstanding, rejection of cultural pluralism means that the integration model is
France's best hope for promoting real participation of various minority groups in French
public life. Its emphasis on individual action allows room for adherence to various
linguistic and cultural practices on the side.
In the past, France had liberal policies of entry and residence. During
the 1950s and 1960s when guest workers were viewed as temporary laborers in most of
Europe, France made provision for their permanent residence. France has been open (though
not encouraging) in terms of granting French nationality, but has been reluctant to
abandon the assimilationist tradition that was so successful in molding Frenchmen from
foreigners. Yet assimilation made way for insertion or droit à la différence,
albeit briefly. Today, intégration is France's strategy for coping with a large
minority presence in France. Integration faces several obstacles, not the least of which
is determining who is integrated and who is not. Particularly in times of high
unemployment and low morale, it is not just ethnic and racial minorities who are
marginalized. Whether or not intégration will prevail hinges on France's ability
to overcome defining it solely in terms of immigration and immigrant minorities (Haut
Conseil 1993). If policies can be implemented that actually aid immigrant minorities
without specifically targetting them as minority groups, then the integration model may
succeed. How this could be accomplished remains to be seen.
In sum, tensions exist in France between the inclusive ideals of
citizenship and immigration and the reality that assimilation has not been achieved for
many of today's immigrants and their descendants. As we have seen, these tensions are
nothing new. Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, France has needed laborers and
settlers but has at the same time wanted to remain as homogeneous as possible.
France has sought to transcend this tension by resting the foundation of
the nation-state on political and ideological values rather than ethnicity. Strong,
centralized state institutions have served as vehicles of assimilation. Today, however,
national values have been called into question and attempts to move towards recognition of
cultural pluralism persist -- though they have not been successful thus far. Perhaps such
challenges to the French nation-state were inevitable. As Eugen Weber commented in his
monumental work on the development French national identity during the Fourth Republic:
...the French fuss so much about the nation because it is a living
problem, became one when they set the nation up as an ideal, remained one because they
found they could not realize the ideal. The more abstractly the concept of
France-as-nation is presented, the less one notes discrepancies between theory and
practice. When one gets down to facts, things become awkward (1976: 112).
As has been shown, nowhere has this been truer than with respect to
immigration and the settlement of ethnoracial minorities in France.
Next
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
Back to Top
|
![[ Virtual Library ]](/graphics/vl_but.gif){kind=small}
