Immigrants
into Citizens: Political Mobilization in France And Canada |
By
Sarah Virginia Wayland
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of The University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1995
© Copyright by
Sarah Virginia Wayland
1995
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
CHAPTER FOUR:
THE CANADIAN "MOSAIC"
Canada was born on 1 July 1867 by an act of the British Parliament. It
was to be self-governing British dependency, a Dominion. At that time, Canada consisted of
the English-speaking colony of Upper Canada (Ontario), the French-speaking colony of Lower
Canada (Quebec), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. The British North America Act created a
federal system, with the new provincial legislatures wielding considerable power while
Ottawa regulated inter-provincial and international economic affairs, defense, and care of
native peoples.
The central fact of white Canadian history has been the relationship
between Canada's two founding peoples, the British and the French. At Confederation, the
French retained the distinctive cultural features such as language, the civil code, and
the educational system in those parts of the Dominion where they had already been
established by law or custom. These rights to distinction were maintained, but not
extended (Creighton 1970: 12). That the British North America Act recognized certain
rights for religious groups and for linguistic groups set the tone for a collectivist
notion of rights in Canada and would foster the eventual acceptance of a pluralistic
society.
From Canada's beginning, regionalism, language issues, a large
foreign-born population, and a weak federal government have hindered the creation of a
strong Canadian identity. On the international front, Canada's stature has always been
overshadowed by its powerful neighbor to the south. Canada is a young and diverse country
with roots in British tradition. In fact, all Canadians held British passports until 1947.
There was no Canadian flag until 1964, when the Union Jack was abandoned amidst great
controversy. Although Canada has progressed towards nationhood over the past century,
French-English differences mean that it may never be a nation in the true sense of the
word.
A Weak State Tradition
Canada is a young country whose attempts to secure a definitive
independent identity have been fraught with difficulty. In contrast to the strong
centralized government of France, Canada is a federation under which the provinces wield
considerable power and interest groups and individuals have access to government
decision-making.
Federal system. The 1867 British North America Act (renamed the
Constitution Act) laid the foundation for a federation of provinces, each with their own
identities. Provincial powers are considerable, and premiers enjoy far fewer restraints
than do the governors of American states. The sheer size of the country renders control by
central authority more difficult, and most Canadians identify with their province at least
as much as with the country as a whole, Quebecers especially.
The Constitution Act was supplemented by a Charter of Rights and Freedoms
in 1982, which was ratified without the approval of Quebec. Indeed, Canada has yet to
ratify a constitution that meets the approval of all ten provinces, the latest effort
being the Meech Lake Accords which did not secure the necessary signatures before its 23
June 1990 deadline. Failed constitutional efforts have done little to boost feelings of
Canadian unity, much less confidence in state institutions.
Interest groups. Like the United States, Canadian politics have
longed included significant interest group activity. In contrast to more pluralistic,
competitive styles of decision-making, however, the main features of relations between the
government and interest groups are consultation and the search for consensus (Pross 1975:
18-9). The state even creates and funds interest groups to promote demands for certain
policies or to ensure that all sectors of society are represented. In return, groups are
expected to prepare formal presentations to the government, and to make policy
recommendations. According to one prominent commentator of Canadian politics,
The Canadian political system, then, tends to favour elite groups, making functional
accommodative, consensus-seeking techniques of political communications, rather than
conflict-oriented techniques that are directed towards the achievement of objectives
through arousing public opinion (Pross 1975: 19, emphasis added).
This consensual style of Canadian politics has direct implications for
social movements. That "elite" interest groups have sway within government
circles means that debate is oriented around the status quo and that other challengers
have little chance of achieving desired policy changes. Those outside the system are
limited by organizational weakness, the short attention span of the public, and the lack
of public support from the better established groups (Pross 1975). Though this has changed
somewhat with the increased use of television by social movement leaders and with the
proliferation of interest groups in Canadian society since the mid-1970s, elite interest
groups still dominate group relations with the Canadian state. A recent article on social
movements in Canada notes that movements tend to have closer relationships to the state
than do their counterparts in many other countries (Phillips 1994).
Related to the role of interest groups are the government's concerted
efforts to solicit the views of Canadians on issues of national importance through the
establishment of "royal commissions" and public consultations. Whereas the
former consist of assembling panels of experts to examine issues such as higher education
and reproductive rights, the latter include roundtables, fora, and hearings which are open
to the Canadian public. Recently, Liberal Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi launched a
public consultation process on immigration, claiming that public input -- gathered from
meetings held across the country -- would influence the Ministry's ten-year immigration
plan (Toronto Star, 5 February 1994). The Toronto meeting, held 20 June 1994, drew
about four hundred persons and considerable media attention.
In brief, Canada appears not only receptive to public input on certain
issues, but such input is even solicited by the state -- within certain limits. Although
critics might write off such processes as simply good public relations, the fact is that
federal and provincial governments in Canada do engage in exceptional levels of
consultation with the public.
Citizenship in a British Dominion
Citizenship in Canada was historically a non-issue: Canadians were
legally defined as British subjects until passage of the 1947 Canadian Citizenship Act.
The 1867 British North America Act gave the government of Canada jurisdiction over
naturalization and aliens. By naturalizing, foreigners could acquire the rights and
privileges bestowed on all British subjects. The Act made no mention of jurisdiction over
citizenship because granting of citizenship could only be granted by a sovereign state,
which Canada was not. It would not be until the 1931 Statute of Westminister that Britain
recognized Canada's sovereignty, paving the way for Canada's first Citizenship Act.
Canada's role in World Wars I and II sparked the desire for formal
recognition of Canadian identity. French-Canadians and those of other national origins
such as German and Ukrainian resented the British-ness of Canada's armed forces. In turn,
the government's attempts to sell the hard obligations of war to Canadians was fraught
with difficulty (Granatstein 1993). It was believed that Canadian citizenship would
guarantee a more equal status for all Canadians, many of whom had no connection to or
little interest in Great Britain.
In 1947, Canada became the first Commonwealth country to pass a
citizenship act. A full eighty years after Confederation, residents of Canada could be
called Canadian citizens. The Canadian Citizenship Act was a significant step on the road
to a distinctive, independent Canadian identity and the rejection of Anglo-conformity as
an exclusive ideal. However, in order to secure parliamentary passage, the 1947 Act
retained British-subject status as an element of Canadian citizenship and therefore did
not foster the independence and unity that Canada so badly needed (Kaplan 1993).
Canada is one of very few countries in the world which actually gives
permanent residents a right to citizenship when stated conditions are met. In
general, immigrants must reside in Canada for three years as permanent residents after
which they are eligible for citizenship. Over eighty percent of immigrants to Canada take
citizenship after the required three years of residence (Canada, Employment 1993b: 10).
Indeed, Canada has perhaps the highest naturalization rate in the world among those
eligible for citizenship. This is particularly true among Canada's visible minorities.
According to an Employment and Immigration Canada report (Hersak and Thomas 1988), members
of visible minority groups -- former residents of India or Southeast Asia, for example --
are far more likely to acquire Canadian citizenship as soon as they are eligible than are
immigrants from traditional source countries. Whereas the average number of years between
immigration and naturalization is fourteen for emigrants from the United States and
Britain, it is four for those coming from Hong Kong, Iran, and Haiti (Canada, Secretary of
State 1988: 24-5, cited in Samuel 1990: 394).
Thus, in contrast to France where immigration and integration have become
subject to polemics, immigration and citizenship acquisition are traditionally and
irrefutably linked in Canada (Crepeau 1987). In one handbook on citizenship (Serge 1993),
for example, the assumption is made that all immigrants who become permanent residents
will want to acquire Canadian citizenship. Naturalization has become more appealing to
some immigrants since a 1977 change to Canadian citizenship law which recognizes dual and
even multiple citizenships. The same act abandoned the status of Canadian citizens as
British subjects. A generation after passage of Canada's first citizenship act, the
statement "A Canadian citizen is a British subject" was eliminated from Canadian
passports.
Of course, citizenship goes beyond simple acquisition of Canadian
nationality. Interestingly, the broader connotation of citizenship has been linked in
recent years to issues of cultural diversity. Government discourse on multiculturalism has
been increasingly couched in terms of citizenship, as evidenced by the melding of these
two areas into single federal Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1992. The
mandate of this government branch was to place attention on "1) what it means to be a
Canadian citizen, 2) the rights, duties and obligations of citizenship in a multicultural
society, and 3) the necessity to highlight ethnocultural differences and human rights as
essential ingredients of Canadian citizenship" (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 79). In its
revamped form, multiculturalism is seen by the government as applicable to all
Canadians. According to then Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Gary
Weiner, "by linking citizenship to cultural diversity, we enhance and develop a
national identity in which multiculturalism is a fundamental ingredient -- a critical step
in nation-building" (cited in Rees 1990: 1). Thus, within the context of Canadian
democratic values, cultural diversity is seen as providing a basis for societal stability
and strength.
In sum, Canada accepts its immigrants with the idea that they will become
Canadian citizens. And citizenship, in an interpretation which goes beyond naturalization,
is linked to cultural diversity and hailed as an important component of Canadian
nation-building. As will become evident below, Canadian rhetoric on diversity has changed
drastically since the country's origins as a British dominion. Canada has a tolerant and
open reputation today, but that has not always been the case.
A Nation of Immigrants
The 1870-71 census, the first conducted after Confederation,
documented that the two largest groups in Canada at that time were the French, with just
over one million persons, and the British (English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish), whose
combined total was more than two million. The British population in Canada was the result
of migratory waves following the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Irish
potato famine of the 1840s. Unlike the French, the British were divided by numerous ethnic
and religious differences. Other national groups and native persons had much smaller
populations and tended to function as distinct societies, with elites to mediate with
anglophones. At that time, the farm was the basic unit of production and two-thirds of all
Canadians lived in rural areas.
National sentiment mounted in the aftermath of Confederation, as evidenced
by the Canada First movement whose goals were to promote Canadian national feeling and to
create a great British nation in North America. The British North America Act had made
room for the inclusion of other British colonies, and western expansion began almost
immediately. Expansion was met with little resistance, with the exception of the Métis,
offspring of French or Scottish men and native women. By 1885, the last Métis
"rebellion" had been quelled, made possible by the transportion of Canadian
troops on the newly completed Canadian Pacific Railroad.
The defeat of the Métis and the completion of a transcontinental
railroad paved the way for settlement of the western provinces. They also sealed the fate
of the French in Canada as minorities. The execution of Métis leader Louis Riel, a
francophone Catholic, was of symbolic significance to French-Canadians. Moreover, the new
territories consolidated under Canadian rule were primarily populated by Britons. And as
immigrants from other parts of Europe began to arrive, they settled in an English-speaking
Canada and were subject to "Anglo-conformity."
The creation of the new Dominion had hinged on British influence and
authority, and there was little room for the expansion of French interests.
French-Canadians were not privy to the government subsidies given to immigrants wanting to
settle in the west. As a result, instead of moving west to the prairies, many
French-Canadians migrated south to New England. In fact, the U.S. census of 1900 reported
that one-third of all French-Canadians in North America were living in the United States
(cited in Elliott and Fleras 1990: 54).
The 1881 census indicated that ninety percent of the Canadian population
was of British, French, or native origins. The great majority of newcomers to Canada
through the late 1800s were British, and increasingly English, but their numbers were
supplemented by migrants from central and western Europe and China. The 1880s saw about
80,000 persons per year enter Canada, many of them looking for work in railway
construction.
Canada had trouble keeping its immigrants, however. Between 1880 and 1891,
over one million persons -- fully one-fifth of Canada's total population -- migrated south
to milder American climates (Knowles 1992: 55). During the last two decades of the
nineteenth century, more people left Canada than entered it.
The Sifton Years. In need of farmers to settle the western
provinces, Canada embarked on an unprecedented recruitment campaign in the United Kingdom,
the United States, and Western Europe under the leadership of Interior Minister Clifford
Sifton (1896-1905). The author of Canada's first Immigration Act, Sifton was particular
about whom he wanted to come to Canada. Urban laborers were not encouraged; hard-working,
healthy farmers were. "Only farmers need apply" became Sifton's operating
slogan. Sifton's recruitment of central European peasants was not popular with the
Canadian public, but he did try to keep the prairies white. For example, although no law
was passed to exclude African-Americans, their emigration from the U.S. was not encouraged
and their applications were usually rejected (Hawkins 1989: 6).
Canadian businessmen, looking for cheap unskilled labor, lobbied
successfully for an open-door immigration policy. Most British immigrants had skills and a
union background, and were not what business had in mind. Italians, Ukrainians, and other
Europeans were imported to build railroads and work in mines. Most Canadians believed
these immigrants to be unassimilable and that they would return home when their labor was
no longer needed. Many immigrants also held these beliefs, hoping to save money while
leaving their families in the old country.
No group was more in demand by railway, mining, lumber, and fishing
industries than the Chinese, who worked hard for low pay. By 1900, over 23,000 persons in
British Columbia were of Asian origin, reaching almost eleven percent of the provincial
population (Granatstein et al. 1990: 348). Head taxes ranging up to $500 did not dissuade
the Chinese from coming to Canada as much as some, especially organized labor interests,
would have liked. Discrimination included the denial of franchise to Asians.
Most white persons viewed Asians as great obstacles to national unity and
homogeneity in Canada, and curtailing Asian immigration became a major political issue,
particularly in British Columbia. The government created a Royal Commission on the issue
in 1902, which concluded that the Chinese were:
a foreign substance within, but not of our body politic, with no love for
our laws and institutions; a people that will not assimilate or become an integral part of
our race and nation... They keep out immigrants who would become permanent citizens and
create conditions inimical to labour and dangerous to the industrial peace of the
community... They are unfit for full citizenship... (cited in Granatstein et al. 1990:
348-9).
The federal government's response to the report was to clamp down on
Chinese immigration, but British Columbia's business leaders then began importing large
numbers of heavy laborers from Japan and India, mostly Sikhs from the latter.
Anti-immigration sentiment culminated in a series of demonstrations and riots in Vancouver
in 1907, including racist violence in immigrant neighborhoods.
Many favored cutting off further immigration, and immigration policy did
become more restrictive after 1905 when Sifton left office. In response to the Vancouver
riots, the government moved to limit all Asian migration and also discouraged migration of
African-Americans, who had been nine percent of immigrants from the U.S. by 1911
(Granatstein et al. 1990: 108; see also Winks 1971). The 1910 Immigration Act included a
"continuous journey" clause which stipulated that immigrants must arrive
directly in Canada from their countries of origin, thereby preventing immigration from
India and Japan because there was no direct steamship service. The Act also called for the
prohibition of "immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or
requirements of Canada, or of immigrants any specific class, occupation or character"
(cited in Hawkins 1989: 16). When a ship carrying 376 Indians -- citizens of the British
Empire -- arrived in Vancouver in 1914, it was escorted back out to sea after spending
over two months in the harbor while the legality of a federal exclusion order was tested
in the provincial courts (Johnston 1979).
In all, 2.5 million immigrants entered Canada between 1896 and 1914.
Although the ethnic and racial composition of those migrants had been largely determined
by the state, the face of Canada was nonetheless remarkably altered. The arrival of so
many persons of diverse languages, religions, and ethnoracial identities had a profound
impact on the young Canadian state.
Diversification and Assimilation. Canada around the turn of the
century was in desperate need of persons to settle and cultivate the western prairies and
to labor in mines and on railroads. Like many Western European countries after World War
II, Canada needed the manpower but did not like the linguistic, religious, and other
ethnic diversity that inevitably accompanied it. The burning issue of the era was how
Canada could absorb and make loyal citizens from "hordes of strangers."
Hostility to foreigners was evident in immigration policies, exclusionary politics, and
public opinion.
In one of the first books about immigrants in Canada, Methodist minister
and social reformer James S. Woodsworth wrote:
We, in Canada, have certain more or less clearly defined ideals of
national well-being. Those ideals must never be lost sight of. Non-ideal elements there
must be, but they should be capable of assimilation. Essentially non-assimilable elements
are clearly detrimental to our highest national development, and hence should be
vigorously excluded (Strangers within our Gates, 1909, cited in Knowles 1992: 91).
Woodsworth, known for his liberal opinions, nonetheless believed that
immigrants should assimilate by embracing Anglo-Canadian Protestant values. Such views
were prevalent at the time.
This pressure for assimilation, coupled with exclusionist immigration
policies, had its roots in numerous factors. Hawkins (1989: 22-3) notes that Canada and
Australia shared numerous qualities which led the countries to exclusionism: the desire to
build and preserve political systems and societies like the United Kingdom; the wish to
promote the status of the founding peoples who were of European origin; the desire to
avoid the racial conflicts occurring in the United States; and, lastly, outright racism
among policy-makers. Canada enjoyed close ties with the mother country, and there was a
belief that Britain's success in peace and war was related to its homogeneous, unified
people. Canada wanted to remain European.
Although many Canadians worried that foreigners would undermine Canadian
society, it was thought that the land and the public schools would serve as agents of
assimilation. The Dominion lands policy required homesteaders to become British subjects
before they could obtain the issue of final patent to the land. By 1911, 45 percent of
Canada's foreign-born had indeed become British subjects (Granatstein et al. 1990: 108).
If the land was to tie immigrants to Canada, the schools were to form their children into
good Canadians. Despite English-language schooling and outreach by Protestant churches,
many immigrants continued to speak in their mother tongue and to attend Old World
churches.
Eventually, Anglo-conformity did prevail in the west, but not before a
period of multiculturalism that lasted until World War I. In addition to Britons and
Americans -- as many as 500,000 of the latter immigrated to Alberta and British Columbia
alone -- the western provinces were principally populated by Austro-Hungarians, Russians,
Ukrainians, Italians, and migrants from Scandinavia and the Balkans. Many of these
migrants had fled political turmoil in Europe. British Columbia remained the stopping
point for most migrants from Asia.
As immigration to urban areas increased, so did the visibility of Canada's
immigrant population. Many Canadians felt that government priorities had gone askew and
that Canada was becoming a workhouse for the world's poor and a dumping ground for
Europe's unfit. Immigrants were viewed as inferior and unassimilable. Almost one-quarter
of the 1914 Canadian population was foreign-born, the foreign population having increased
by 40 percent since the turn of the century. Though the British remained the largest
immigrant cohort, large numbers of immigrants also hailed from Italy, central Europe
(Germany, Austria, and the Balkan states), and eastern Europe (especially Russia, Ukraine,
and Poland). No major country had grown faster at that time. Indeed, over 400,000 persons
had entered Canada in 1913 alone. Canadians worried about the economic results of
immigration as well as its social implications. Could the country "Canadianize"
so many diverse persons? To complicate matters, Canada was sliding into depression.
The War Years. When war broke out in 1914, Europe's need for
Canadian food, supplies, and munitions brought Canada out of economic downturn. It also
had a profound effect on Canada's immigrants. Canada was host to some 500,000 "enemy
aliens," and a series of laws was passed which curtailed the rights of foreigners in
Canada (see Knowles 1992: 93-8). Unemployed aliens were sent to internment camps. At the
same time, the need for manpower brought newfound power to organized labor. Unions
recruited thousands of new members, including many immigrants, and a record wave of
nationwide strikes were launched in 1917 and 1918. Some industrialists cautioned that this
was an attempt by foreigners to damage the Canadian war effort, and a government inquiry
concluded that immigrant workers were being influenced by and were attempting to spread
Bolshevik doctrine. The Borden government moved to ban socialist organizations, suppress
the foreign-language press, and prohibit meetings conducted in "enemy" languages
(Granatstein et al. 1990: 356). Citizens' groups pushed further, demanding deportation of
aliens, and indeed some were. The immediate postwar years were precarious times for
foreign residents of Canada, who were viewed as instigators of continued labor unrest.
The 1920s witnessed the continuation of strong anti-immigrant lobbies,
supported by politicians, educators, the medical profession, journalists, and farm and
labor groups. They feared "Balkanization" and an undermining of Canada's
Anglo-Saxon character, even though most immigrants to Canada during this period were from
the United Kingdom and the United States. Canadian politicians were quick to condemn the
American "melting pot" as a failure insofar as uncontrolled immigration to the
U.S. prevented the preservation of any distinct culture. As the premier of British
Columbia stated in 1923, "We are anxious to keep this a British country. We want [it]
British and nothing else" (cited in Granatstein et al. 1990: 360). In 1928, a member
of Parliament asserted that Canada was going to learn from America's mistake by making
sure "to assimilate these people to British institutions." An editorial in a
1928 Toronto Globe opined: "The country cannot go on if its national life is
made up of races which fall short of the national standard." In 1923, it was decided
that preference for immigration given to British subjects was to extend only to
Commonwealth countries with predominantly white populations (Palmer 1975: 12).
French-Canadians shared a dissatisfaction with federal immigration policy.
Their reasons, however, were different, viewing continued immigration as a plot to reduce
French-Canadian influence in Confederation. Most immigrants were likely to be or become
anglophones, and francophones feared diminished numbers and status.
In 1929, as in 1913, immigrant influx peaked just as the economy was
diving into depression. In 1931, the new Bennett government barred all immigrants who were
not agriculturalists with capital and not British or American. There was virtually no
immigration during the 1930s, and over 30,000 foreigners were deported. During the
depression, xenophobia mounted. Asian immigrants were disenfranchised in British Columbia
and prevented from entering certain professions. Anti-semitism become more visible and
institutionalized, particularly in Quebec where it was encouraged by Catholic leaders.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 22,000 Japanese-Canadians were rounded up and
placed in makeshift internment camps and their properties were sold for next to nothing.
Between 1900 and 1930, close to five million immigrants had arrived in
Canada. Barely 200,000 entered the country between 1930 and 1945. Tragically, Canada
accepted fewer than 4,000 Jewish refugees from Europe (compared to 240,000 taken in by the
United States). In 1939, a ship from Germany with 900 Jews on board was turned back from
Nova Scotia after being denied entry to Cuba and the United States. It is believed that
many of the Jews were subsequently killed by Nazis (Abella and Troper 1982).
Postwar Immigration. Canada's doors were not opened again until
1948, when Prime Minister Mckenzie King announced that immigration was to be encouraged
once again, but that immigrants were to be selected with care:
...the policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population
of Canada by the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants
as can be advantageously absorbed in our national economy. The people of Canada do not
wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character
of our population (cited in Ramcharan 1982: 13).
The postwar period ushered in a much more confident Canadian state, but
one which still favored white, European, and preferably Christian settlers. By the end of
1948, Canada had admitted 50,000 displaced persons from Europe, but -- despite their high
numbers -- officials routinely rejected Jewish applicants (Knowles 1992: 126).
Over the next two decades, two million immigrants arrived in Canada. These
immigrants were more heterogeneous and more urban than those coming to Canada before the
war, possessing a greater range of skills, training, and occupations. The majority were
Europeans, especially from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
The Canadian government was once again pursuing immigration to expand
Canada's population and economy. Yet, as at the turn of the century, this campaign was
controlled by a few elites, there being no great public consensus on the importance of
immigration to Canada. (No Department of Immigration with its own minister even existed
until the 1950s.) French-Canadians in particular were opposed to immigration, continuing
to express fears that their status was being undermined by the influx of ethnic
minorities.
Immigration in Quebec. Any discussion of immigration to Canada is
incomplete without some mention of Quebec, and more generally of the impact of immigration
on French-Canadians. Historically, the government of Quebec showed little positive
interest in immigration affairs. First, as we have seen, Canada's immigration history has
largely been aimed at settlement of the western territories. Therefore, although Quebec
served as a major entry point for migrants, it did not attract much settlement. During the
first decade of the twentieth century, some 14 percent of the more than 1.75 million
immigrants to Canada entered the country through Quebec. According to the 1911 census,
however, hardly one-quarter of them were still in Quebec. About half of the immigrants had
moved to other Canadian provinces, and most of the rest had migrated south to the United
States. A second reason for Quebec's hesitant attitude towards immigration was that
newcomers to Quebec -- especially allophones and non-Catholics, the majority of migrants
-- were more likely to be assimilated by Quebec's Anglo-Protestants than by the French
Catholics. Immigration was therefore viewed as threatening the political and demographic
survival of francophone communities within the province of Quebec and across Canada.
The suspicion with which immigration was viewed by French-Canadians
reflects the history of Canada's French-English antagonism. That the 1867 British North
America Act had recognized the French and the English as Canada's two founding peoples was
interpreted by Canada's French-speaking minority as conferring the theoretical equality
between francophones and Britons in Canada. Francophone leaders such as Henri Bourassa in
the early twentieth century had used the image of equality to foster the image of a
bipolar, bi-national Canada. Not surprisingly, then, French-Canadians were reluctant to
admit other national groups to Canada, fearing that they would diminish the place accorded
to francophones.
In reality, however, French-Canadians were a minority in Canada -- in
terms of numbers throughout the country and in terms of power within Quebec -- and their
relative population was declining. With rising postwar immigration to Canada came the end
of a continental French-Canadian vision. Immigration to Quebec increased in the 1950s as
traditional sectors in the province were being industrialized and the need for manual
labor grew. During the 1950s, 21 percent of the immigrants to Canada settled in Quebec.
Between 1946 and 1971, fewer than 5 percent of foreigners settling in
Quebec were francophones (Harney 1988: 61). Of the 420,854 immigrations admitted to Quebec
between 1946 and 1961, 18.4 percent were Italian, 18.0 percent were British, 11.4 percent
were German or Austrian, 7.6 percent were French, and 6.8 percent were Jewish. The top
five contributing countries between 1962 and 1969 were (in descending order) Italy,
France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and the United States (Quebec 1990a). In general,
newcomers identified more with Anglophone culture and the Canadian polity than with the
Francophones and Quebec.
The industrialization and urbanization of Quebec weakened the power base
of the Roman Catholic Church and allowed for the emergence of a new technocratic elite
(Juteau 1993). In place of a pan-Canadian French-speaking Catholic collectivity arose an
emphasis on territorial identity, centered on Quebec, the one Canadian polity where
francophones were numerically superior. A series of political, institutional, and social
reforms in the early 1960s paved the way for the construction of modern Quebec. This
so-called "Quiet Revolution" witnessed the creation of the Parti Québécois
(PQ) in 1968, the first modern party to seek political independence for Quebec. In Quebec,
the term "French-Canadian" was gradually superceded by Québécois, which
embodied these newfound political aspirations.
This shift to a territorial basis for identity raised new questions of
language rights for those living within Quebec, and language debates dominated Quebec
public life in the 1960s and 1970s. Following the election of the PQ in 1976, the 1977
Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) was passed, sealing French as the exclusive
language of Quebec. Legislation imposed restrictions on the use of other languages in the
public service, primary and secondary education, businesses, and on commercial signs, road
signs, and billboards. Although Bill 101 was originally conceived to protect the
constitutional rights of francophones, the legislation in fact opened to immigrants
schools and social services which previously had been reserved for francophones (Anctil
1986). Quebec was attempting to ensure a future where French would remain the dominant
language in the province.
During the Quiet Revolution, the Quebec government began to view
immigration as a means of strengthening the provincial economy and compensating for
declining fertility rates of the Québécois. In the process, however, the
government wanted to avoid undermining the francophone nature of Quebec society. In hopes
of even enhancing Quebec's "Frenchness," Quebec sought to gain control over the
selection of immigrants to the province. In 1968, Quebec created its own Ministry of
Immigration, and over the next decades negotiated a series of agreements with the federal
government under which it became the first province to control the volume, selection, and
integration of immigrants. In sum, modernization and the changing identity of Quebec had
sparked new interest in immigration.
Towards Universalism: Immigration Reform. Quebec's desire to play a
stronger role in the recruitment of immigrants was only one of numerous factors that
pushed Canada to liberalize its immigration policies in the 1960s. Interest groups were
pressuring the government to take a more active role in the world's refugee problems. In
addition, the racist provisions of Canadian immigration policy hampered the country's role
in the United Nations and in the multiracial Commonwealth. When a Canadian Bill of Rights
was passed in 1960, it was clear that Canada's policies would have to change if the
country wanted to retain credibility in international human rights circles.
The government first moved towards the elimination of racial criteria as a
central feature of immigration policy in 1962. The Department of Manpower and Immigration
was established in 1966 (Hawkins 1972: 150-9). In 1967, Canada shifted to a "points
system" based on occupation, education, language, skills and age for determining
eligibility of independent and unsponsored immigrants. In response to these changes, there
was a serious departmental effort to improve overseas immigration operations, including
the opening of new offices in the Caribbean and Asia and the encouragement of more
immigrants from France to settle in Quebec (Hawkins 1972: Chapter 6).
The 1967 policy was supplemented by the 1976 Immigration Act (see Hawkins
1988: 374-80). Written after fifty public hearings on immigration policy were held across
Canada, the Immigration Act reaffirmed Canada's stature as a country of immigration. Most
importantly, the Act explicitly prohibited discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, color, religion, or sex. The 1976 Act also emphasized the importance of
family reunification, international obligations to refugees and displaced persons, and the
need to tailor immigrant selection to Canada's economic and demographic needs. In 1978,
immigration policy was placed under the aegis of the new Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission.
For the first time, Canada had the basis for a general quota system that
permitted control over the numbers of immigrants admitted. For example, in reaction to
high unemployment levels and a depressed economy, the government greatly restricted the
number of independent class immigrants until the mid-1980s. In addition, Canada moved
towards establishing its own population policy which recognized immigration as a central
variable in the policy, especially in light of declining fertility rates in Canada since
the early 1970s (Hawkins 1988: 380-4). The immediate effect of the Immigration Act was a
smaller but more ethnically diverse "new wave" of immigration.
The racial, ethnic, and cultural composition of migrants to Canada has
changed drastically since the new immigration legislation was implemented in 1968. About
two-thirds of Canada's current immigrants are from "non-traditional" sources of
immigration in Asia and the developing world. Canada's "mosaic" has expanded to
include new races, religions, and cultures. The minority ethnic populations in Canada
which have shown the greatest relative gains are the so-called "new immigrants,"
those hailing from southern Europe -- particularly Italy and Portugal -- and from
non-European countries.
Canada's rapidly changing mosaic has had a profound impact on policies at
all levels of government. Most notably, it has been evidenced in the shift from
Anglo-conformity to multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced the multiculturalism policy
before Canada's House of Commons on 8 October 1971. The policy recognized a more
ethnically diverse Canadian population and was a direct response to mobilization by
Canada's ethnic minorities against government attempts to accommodate francophone
Canadians. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had been appointed in
1963 to recommend
what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the
basis of equal partnership between the two founding races [sic], taking into account the
contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the
measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.
The Commission issued a series of reports between 1965 and 1968 and made
recommendations aimed at eradicating past inequalities between Canada's two charter groups
through the promotion of bilingualism and biculturalism. Official languages legislation,
recognizing Canada's languages as English and French, was implemented in 1969.
During this process, various ethnic collectivities, led by the Ukrainians,
made special presentations to the government relaying their fears that their contributions
to Canada were being ignored. The first government response was the addition of Book IV to
the Royal Commission's report. This book, The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic
Groups, provided an integration model for ethnic collectivities of immigrant origin
through sixteen recommendations for a government policy of multilingualism and
multiculturalism. The official adaptation of these recommendations was the
multiculturalism policy.
The federal government rejected the idea of multilingualism, insisting
instead on the implementation of a "multicultural society within a bilingual
framework." Four objectives were set out in the original policy statement: support
for Canada's cultures; assistance to members of cultural groups to overcome barriers to
full participation; promotion of interchange among cultural groups; and assistance to
immigrants in learning English or French (House of Commons Debate, 8 October 1971).
There were also underlying political motives for the policy. The Liberal
government's traditional support base in Quebec was undergoing rapid transformation,
brought about in part by the creation of the Parti Québécois. The Liberals were
looking to expand their appeal and viewed the multiculturalism policy as a way to woo the
votes of Canada's ethnic minorities (Hawkins 1988: 390). It was also seen as a chance to
enhance the party's electoral strength in the culturally diverse western provinces, where
bilingualism had been met with little enthusiasm.
Multiculturalism was intended to modestly contribute to good community
relations in Canada. Anything more ambitious would have been opposed by Quebec, whose
leaders at that time already viewed the policy with suspicion, fearing that francophones
too would be relegated to the "other ethnic group" status. Multiculturalism had
a small budget, and the policy made no reference to an increased political status or
special political arrangements for ethnic minorities. The policy included six programs
such as grants for cultural development, ethnic studies, and federal cultural agencies.
Multiculturalism originated as a policy, but it has also been viewed as a
demographic reality, an ideology or model, or a social movement (Fleras and Elliott 1992;
Kallen 1982a). As such, multiculturalism has meant different things to different people.
In budgetary terms, multiculturalism has remained a marginal state policy, having an
annual budget of about one dollar per capita and whose costs have never exceeded 7 percent
of the budget for bilingualism (Stasiulis 1988: 95). Its broader connotations as a model
for group relations, however, have become part and parcel of Canadian society.
Criticisms of Multiculturalism. As a policy, multicultural-ism has
been criticized by academics, ethnic activists, and policy-makers alike for a variety of
reasons. The policy has been called mere rhetoric, a tool for buying the ethnic vote, and
a means of perpetuating the power of English Canadian elites. It has also been argued that
multiculturalism emphasizes the folkloric aspects of ethnic and racial diversity and does
not address the more pressing needs of minority groups, namely equal opportunities for
employment, housing, education, and access to social services. Such problems particularly
affect recent migrants from developing countries who face greater cultural adjustment than
their European counterparts and who often encounter racial discrimination as well.
Indeed, criticisms of multiculturalism are largely reflective of the
differing needs of Canada's ethnic and racial minorities. The ethnic groups which
originally fought for a multiculturalism policy were mainly white, European, and had
resided in Canada for some time. Their needs were principally expressive, namely cultural
promotion and language retention. Canada's newest residents, however, particularly racial
minorities, wanted a more ambitious multiculturalism. According to them, the policy viewed
ethnic groups as culturally interesting while at the same time denying them full political
and economic membership in Canadian society.
In brief, Canada's newest minorities wanted policies to aid their
adaptation to Canadian society and institutions. Without belittling the particular
barriers encountered by earlier waves of immigrants, many believe that integration is more
difficult today. This is partly due to the specialized skills, education, and language
abilities needed to succeed in Canada today which were not previously necessary. It is
also due to greater differences that exist between migrants and their host society. In
addition to dealing with culture shock, most migrants have to find housing, employment,
and health services as well as to learn English or French. Lack of preparation for
Canada's cold climate may also be a source of stress. Differences in values, class,
religion, medical philosophies, and language between Canada and the country of origin all
impede attempts to adapt to Canadian society. It is precisely these barriers to
integration which have pushed minorities to demand a broadening of multiculturalism to
include social problems relevant to Canada's newest immigrants.
A Changing Policy. A number of these criticisms have been addressed
through the expansion of the policies of multiculturalism to tackle various social issues.
Juteau (1990) notes five important modifications: support for heritage language programs,
development of anti-racist initiatives, provincial development of multicultural education
programs, emergence of limited support for cultural diversity in Quebec, and political and
administrative strengthening of multiculturalism. The state is gradually acknowledging the
needs of a Canada which is not only multicultural but increasingly multiracial. In brief,
multiculturalism has moved beyond its original purpose of promoting cultural diversity.
At the federal level, such efforts included clauses in the 1982 Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, the 1985 upgrading of the Multicultural Directorate to a
"Sector," the 1986 Employment Equity Act, and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism
Act. The latter acknowledged multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian
society and integral to the federal decision-making process. The Act came out of a report
by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Multiculturalism which found the 1971 policy
inadequate:
The multicultural policy of 1971 is clearly insufficient and out-of-date.
It does not have the ability to meet the needs of today's multicultural society. There is
a sense that this 15-year-old policy is floundering. It needs clear direction (Canada
1987, cited in Fleras and Elliott 1992: 75).
The 1988 Act did provide a clearer sense of direction by promoting
cultural and language preservation, anti-discrimination efforts, the enhancement of
intercultural awareness and understanding, and culturally sensitive institutional change
at federal levels. Seeking to balance cultural diversity and equality, the Act
acknowledges "the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and
share their cultural heritage" while promoting "the full and equitable
participation of individuals and communities of all origins in ... all aspects of Canadian
society." It seeks to "ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and
equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity." The
Act was accompanied by proposals for a framework for policy implementation and a system of
Parliamentary accountability (see Fleras and Elliott 1992: 76-7).
The evolution of multiculturalism since 1971 has been a response to the
changing ethnic and racial composition of Canada, and hence to the changing needs of
ethnoracial minorities. The Multiculturalism Act has given the force of law to the
principles of racial and cultural equality. It has marked the significance and enduring
presence of multiculturalism in Canadian society. According to its proponents,
multiculturalism is not to be viewed as a temporary situation which will eventually give
way to assimilationist forces but rather as an essential component of Canadian identity.
Immigration during the 1980s and early 1990s
During Conservative leader Brian Mulroney's tenure as prime minister
from 1984 to 1993, Canada raised immigration levels significantly above those set by the
previous Liberal administration. From the decade low of 84,302 in 1985, total immigration
intake had more than doubled to 189,200 by 1989. These increased immigration levels were
the result of considerable consultation with provincial governments, the private sector,
and community organizations (Stasiulis 1991: 236).
A policy of moderate growth in immigration levels was to continue from
1990 to 1995, as announced by Employment and Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall in her
annual report to Parliament of October 1990. Canada set target levels of 250,000
immigrants annually for the period 1992-1995. Similar to earlier Tory policy, the
government report pointed to Canada's below-replacement fertility levels as justification
for increasing immigration. In fact, the announcement of higher immigration levels was
made in spite of public opinion polls revealing that Canadians were against it, and in a
context of economic downturn and rising unemployment. The government emphasized potential
long-term financial benefits of its policy (Stasiulis 1991: 236-7).
Upon assuming office in 1993, the Liberals under Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien at first varied little from existing policies, also targetting annual
immigration levels at about one percent of the current Canadian population. In the wake of
Immigration Minister Marchi's nationwide consultations in 1994, however, it has since been
announced that Canada will place limits on family class immigration in the near future.
Though there has been a general consensus among Canada's major political
parties as to the desirability of keeping immigration levels high and shying away from
discussions of race and national origins of immigrants, the Liberal government's move may
reflect hardening popular attitudes toward immigration. The strong show of support for the
Reform Party, a populist party with roots in the western provinces, in the October 1993
parliamentary elections may also reflect increasing anti-immigration sentiment. The Reform
Party -- which made its strongest showing ever, capturing almost as many seats as the
official opposition -- is known for its views that immigration levels should be slashed.
Despite what may be a trend towards increasing anti-immigration sentiment,
immigration continues to be treated primarily as an economic and demographic issue by the
government. Thus far, this contrasts markedly from the extent to which immigration has
been politicized in most European countries.
Communal Groups in Canada. In considering immigration by source
region from 1980 to 1988, 40 percent (422,993) arrived in Canada from Asia and the
Pacific, 15 percent (164,633) from the Americas excluding the United States, 10 percent
(109,424) from Africa and the Middle East. Only the remaining 35 percent were from Europe
or the United States (cited in Jansen and Richmond 1990). Europeans constituted less than
one-fourth of immigrants to Canada in 1987 -- down from two-thirds in 1968 -- while Asians
constituted 45 percent of those entering in 1987 (up from 13 percent in 1968) and
Caribbeans made up 12 percent (up from 5.5 percent in 1968). Overall, the percentage of
those entering Canada from lesser developed countries (LDCs) has increased from 26 percent
in 1968 to 71 percent in 1987 (Simmons 1990: 148). This rise in arrivals from the Third
World has not been constant over time. The most rapid shift took place between 1968 and
1976 whereas the period from 1984 to 1987 (inclusive) showed an unchanging pattern:
roughly two-thirds coming from LDCs and one-third from developed countries (Simmons 1990:
150).
A brief examination of leading source countries of immigrants over the
past forty years illustrates this changing composition. In 1951, six of the ten leading
source countries were in northern Europe, three were eastern or southern Europe, and one
was the United States. By 1984, the United States and Great Britain were the only
industrialized countries that made the list. The others were Vietnam, Hong Kong, India,
Poland, Philippines, El Salvador, Jamaica, and China (cited in Kalbach 1987: 95).
Immigration statistics show that these source countries changed little into the early
1990s.
Residents of Canada from traditional source countries are by no means
outnumbered, however. In the 1986 census, the ten most frequently reported ethnic origins
of residents of Canada -- incuding citizens and foreign permanent residents -- were (in
descending order) British, French, German, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Aboriginal, Polish,
Scandinavian, and Chinese. Of the almost four million foreign born living in Canada in
1986, almost 70 percent were from Europe or the United States. In brief, the current
situation in Canada is characterized by a predominantly European foreign-born population
which is quickly losing its numerical advantage to the recent and continuing influx of
persons from other parts of the world, Asia in particular.
Quebec. Between 1946 and 1989, Quebec admitted over one million
immigrants, 18.7 percent of total migration into Canada (Quebec 1990a: 15). As noted
above, Quebec has negotiated a series of agreements with the government of Canada that
give the province control over the volume, selection, and integration of immigrants with
the goal of fostering Quebec's status as a distinct society in North America. Quebec's
first selection powers were implemented in the late 1970s, with a view towards improving
the retention rate of immigrants to Quebec. In 1981, the Quebec Immigration Ministry
became the Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration (Fontaine 1993).
During the 1980s, Quebec worked to set immigration levels to the province,
to deploy its overseas selection network, to apply its selection criteria, to enhance
recruitment activities, and to improve coordination with the federal government (Quebec
1990a: 27-9). Quebec favors French-speaking applicants and those who seem most able to
contribute to the province's economy. Immigration remained low in the early 1980s (18,000
annually from 1981-85) due to economic downturn, then increased to an average of 26,500
persons annually from 1986-89. Quebec received 33,600 immigrants in 1989 alone, the
province's highest number of immigrants in twenty years.
Reflecting immigration to Canada as a whole, the source countries of
immigration to Quebec have diversified since the implementation of anti-racist measures in
the late 1960s. During the 1980s, immigration to Quebec broke down as follows: 43 percent
Asian, 26 percent American (north and south), 23 percent European, and 9 percent African.
More than 85 percent of these immigrants settled in Montreal (Quebec 1990a: 62).
For economic and especially demographic reasons, Quebec needs more
immigration, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of Canada. Indeed, this need
has been recognized in recent policy statements by the Quebec government (Quebec 1990a,
1990b). The challenge to Quebec, then, is to pursue higher immigration levels simultaneous
with the development and maintenance of Quebec's distinct society. How Quebec has
attempted to meet this challenge is outlined below.
In brief, the provincial government has stated that immigration can be
part of the distinct society project, as long as Quebec can select its immigrants and
control their integration. With regard to immigration, the 1990 Canada-Quebec Accord gave
Quebec most of the immigration powers it had been seeking. With regard to integration, the
government of Quebec appears determined to create its own model of minority incorporation.
A recent major policy statement by the Quebec government, entitled Vision: A Policy
Statement on Immigration and Integration, expresses a preference for
"interculturalism" over "multiculturalism." The former term is said to
foster dynamic interaction between minorities and the majority whereas the latter merely
protects isolated static minority cultures without considering their relationship to the
majority. The Vision paper outlines three principles which guide the integration
process in Quebec. Quebec is viewed as (1) a society in which French is the common
language of public life, (2) a democratic society in which everyone is expected and
encouraged both to participate and contribute, and (3) a pluralist society that is open to
multiple influences within the limits imposed by the respect for fundamental values and
the need for intercultural exchanges (Quebec 1990b: 15).
What is striking about this framework and the language used in the rest of
the Vision paper is that -- despite Quebec's desire to build a distinct society and
the gains it has made in securing control over immigration and integration policy in order
to do so -- Quebec's integration strategy appears much less assimilationist than one might
expect. Linguistic adaptation is the strongest demand made upon immigrants. Support for
the principles of democracy and pluralism may place some demands on immigrants as well,
but it also imposes obligations on the receiving society (Carens 1993).
Indeed, maintaining the primacy of the French language in Quebec is
necessary for the perpetuation of Quebec's distinct society in North America. As seen in
the Vision paper, Quebec has emphasized the French language above all else as the
basis of Quebec's identity. In doing so, Quebec allows immigrants and cultural minorities
to become Québécois. Several decades ago, collective identity was tied
exclusively to the "founding nation" and to French-Canadian history and culture.
Newcomers found it very difficult to become members of their new society, thereby
affiliating with anglophone institutions instead. Today, newcomers are expected to learn
French, and in doing so can in theory become equal members in Quebec's distinct society.
In conclusion, despite the rhetorical differences between
"interculturalism" and "multiculturalism," Quebec's goals and policies
with regard to immigration and integration are today similar to those of Canada on the
whole. Both Quebec and Canada (and indeed most western democracies) are motivated to seek
further immigration based on collective self-interest -- particularly demographic and
economic concerns -- plus humanitarian considerations in the case of refugees. If Quebec
continues on its present course of interculturalism tempered by mandatory French-language
education for immigrants, it will look increasingly like a francophone version of
anglophone multicultural Canada. Interestingly, however, public opinion in English
language Canada has been signalling less tolerance for cultural pluralism and immigration
than what exists in Quebec.
Mosaic Backlash?
Whereas both Liberal and Conservative administrations have promoted
high levels of immigration to Canada over the past decade, the government's enthusiasm has
not been matched by the public. Polls consistently reveal that Canadians want to curtail
immigration and have negative attitudes towards immigrants. A Gallup poll conducted in
January 1994 found that 45 percent of Canadians want Canada to accept fewer immigrants.
Only 11 percent favored increased immigration levels, the lowest number recorded by Gallup
since 1982 (The Globe and Mail, 3 February 1994). In the wake of the Liberal
government's February 1994 announcement that Canada could take in another 250,000
immigrants that year, a national survey revealed that 53 percent of Canadians questioned
immigration levels, up from 44 percent in 1992 and from just 31 percent in 1989 (The
Globe and Mail, 10 March 1994).
It is not just immigration that has come under fire in public opinion, but
the kinds of immigrants who come to Canada. As has previously been the case, many
Canadians are wary of racial minorities and persons who bring new cultures to Canada. An
Angus Reid poll in April 1993 found that one in four Canadians believed that non-white
minorities were threating the fabric of the country and that fewer non-white immigrants
should be allowed. A survey commissioned by the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews in
Autumn 1993 showed that 41 percent of respondents agreed that immigration policy
"allows too many people of different cultures and races to come to Canada" (both
polls cited in The Toronto Star, 5 February 1994). In a more recent survey
commissioned by the federal government, four in ten of those questioned believed that
there are too many racial minorities in Canada, particularly Arabs, Blacks, and Asians (The
Globe and Mail, 10 March 1994). The same survey found that about 67 percent of
respondents in Toronto -- which hosts Canada's largest immigrant population -- said there
were too many immigrants, up from 46 percent in 1992.
The results of public opinion polls indicate that Canadians continue to
hold certain prejudices about immigrants, ranging from accusations that they steal jobs
from Canadians to their high levels of criminal behavior. There are also concerns that
bogus refugee claimants are milking the Canadian welfare system (see Malarek 1987), as
evidenced by the Ontario Liberal leader's reference to Somali refugees as "welfare
cheaters" in 1993. Such statements do little to boost the image of foreigners in
Canada.
Not surprisingly, then, after decades of disinterest, immigration issues
are attracting the political spotlight. Most notably, the Reform Party has stepped in to
capitalize on this distance between the government and the public. Canada's new Liberal
government has also been sensitive to increased interest in immigration. In response to
the negative reaction provoked by the announcement of 1994 immigration levels, the
government held a series of public consultations across Canada. In early November 1994,
the government announced an immigration and citizenship plan for the years 1995-2000 which
included slightly decreased immigration levels, notably for family sponsorships and
refugees but not for business class immigrants.
Many people blame difficult economic times for the rise in intolerant
attitudes among Canadians. However, a trend towards intolerance is not solely a function
of economic recession. Rather, it is rooted in a confluence of various socioeconomic
factors which are manifested in a rapidly changing Canadian society. Of particular
importance among these is uncertainty about Canadian identity. To illustrate, the February
1994 poll cited above found that cultural insecurity -- the fear that the Canadian way of
life is disappearing -- ranked ahead of economic stress as a key factor in shaping
attitudes (The Globe and Mail, 10 March 1994). In this survey, six in ten agreed
with the statement "too many immigrants feel no obligation to adapt to Canadian
values."
Moreover, the split between government policy and public opinion is not a
recent development. As we have seen, Canada needed immigration to settle the western
provinces and to increase population levels at the turn of the century, but immigrants
were never well-received among earlier settlers. More recently, when the federal
government offered to accept 50,000 Vietnamese boat people in 1979, the government was
acting in spite of the majority of Canadians opposing the gesture. As Howard Adelman noted
in his account of the refugee crisis, "Government policy was far ahead of public
sentiment on this matter... Because of this lack of [public] support, many argued that the
Canadian government policy on Indochinese refugees was undemocratic" (1982: 2). In
retrospect, however, most Canadians view their country's role in resettling the refugees
as a great accomplishment.
Canada is experiencing the tensions common to all countries of
immigration, namely how to promote national unity in the context of remarkable diversity.
This challenge is made even more daunting in that Canada is a relatively young country,
its defining characteristic is the often turbulent relations between Quebec and the
anglophone provinces, and it is in danger of being culturally, economically, and possibly
politically engulfed by the United States. In the course of a few decades, Canada moved
from an assimilationist to a multicultural model of minority incorporation, officially
embracing both bilingualism and multiculturalism. In this context, it is not surprising
that Canadians should express uncertainty about their culture.
Next
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
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