Immigrants
into Citizens: Political Mobilization in France And Canada |
By
Sarah Virginia Wayland
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of The University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1995
© Copyright by
Sarah Virginia Wayland
1995
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
CHAPTER EIGHT:
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This research started from the premise that immigrants and ethnoracial
minorities living in industrialized democracies are politically active, and that they have
successfully mobilized around certain issues. In North America and especially Western
Europe, that immigrants have increasingly engaged in collective political action reflects
the fading "myth of return" and the realities of long-term settlement. The
descendants of these immigrants -- who, as the source countries of immigration have
changed over the past few decades, are largely ethnoracial minorities -- do not face the
linguistic and cultural barriers that their parents did, and they often benefit from
access to citizenship. Together, immigrants and ethnoracial minorities have made political
gains.
This mobilization has profited from the growing recognition that political
activity is much broader than voting. For immigrants who do not have voting rights, the
resort to other forms of political expression such as associational activity, marches, and
even collective violence is all the more salient. In many cases, immigrants are able to
exercise political voice without citizenship. In addition, immigrants and ethnoracial
minorities have used these expanded instruments of political behavior to add new items to
the political agenda. Thus, to use Miller's (1981; 1989) phrase, "extra-electoral
politics" has become a means for improving living and working conditions. Most
importantly, political action is a means for negotiating integration into larger society.
Changes in the instruments and substance of politics provide new avenues for participation
by communal groups that have heretofore largely been viewed as politically inactive.
Summary of Research Framework
But what are the conditions that favor the successful exercise of
political voice? This research has drawn from work on communal group mobilization as well
as from social movements theory to explore what facilitates outcomes favorable to
mobilizers. In general, a social movement is based upon the desire to seek change. When
this desire is held in common by a group of persons, usually through an organizational
base, they engage in political action in order to directly influence a social or political
structure or system. Research has found that social movements are generally made possible
when a group of persons shares the following: (1) grievances about its status, or relative
deprivation, and (2) access to resources which may remedy the grievances, including an
organizational base and external support factors, or opportunity. Mobilization is most
likely to occur when these two sets of factors exist in a given situation.
Though very few attempts have been made by students of social movements to
investigate them, these conditions for mobilization often can be found within communal
groups -- particularly the common grievances and the organizational base. Indeed, communal
groups are psychological communities which are characterized by their will to survive.
Though members are usually bonded through shared history, language, religion, race, or
region of origin, communal groups are also held together by external boundaries. Identity
is reinforced by intergroup relations. Maintenance of this external boundary is
particularly important for groups in the process of change, such as migrant peoples. In
turn, politicians and civil servants make decisions based upon these boundaries, decisions
which are manifested in specific government policies and programs affecting communal
groups, including immigration and social policies.
Given that communal groups do share common grievances, it is the access to
resources component of mobilization which deserves to be explored. Immigrants and
ethnoracial minorities -- usually within communal group boundaries but sometimes
transcending them -- do commonly join together to form organizations to meet their needs,
as was illustrated in some detail in Chapter Five. Organizational resources are rarely
bountiful, however, and many minority associations rely heavily upon the state for
funding. Nonetheless, an organizational base does exist for most immigrant and minority
communities, especially for those who live in urban centers such as Paris and Toronto.
This brings us to the final contributor to collective action: external
factors, or opportunity structures. Political opportunity structures help explain why a
challenger's chances of engaging in successful collective action vary over time and why
similar challenges may meet with very different results in different places. Until now,
most research on opportunity structure has focused on institutional variables such as
shifts in political alliances and splits among elites. Some prominent students of social
movements, however, have begun to hail the cultural variables of opportunity as equally
important (Gamson and Meyer 1992; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; Rucht, in preparation).
Cultural variables, which are loosely equivalent to political culture, seem especially
relevant for the study of how immigrants and their descendants negotiate their own
incorporation into larger society: these minorities are not just mobilizing around a
common grievance, but they are also trying to integrate into existing structures. One
cannot discount the institutional variables, but it is these cultural components which are
particularly important for a study involving newcomers and ethnoracial minorities.
Moreover, institutions and policies are often a reflection of culture. The absence of a
question regarding ethnic origin in the French census, for example, reflects France's
longstanding commitment to republican values. In sum, existing research points to the need
for further exploration of the cultural dimensions of opportunity structure.
This research has sought to fill this gap in our knowledge by employing a
political opportunity structure framework to clarify links between mobilization efforts,
political culture, and the state. In order to better assess these links, this research
focused on several tangible components of a state's political culture which were deemed
particularly salient to integration-related mobilization efforts: the past and present
contribution of immigration to population growth and state-building; the development of
citizenship and nationality, and the links between the two; and the state's dominant model
of minority incorporation, ranging from assimilation to cultural pluralism. These three
dimensions were termed "national identity structures" and were discussed in
detail in Chapter Two.
France and Canada, which have both depended heavily upon immigration over
the past century but which have contrasting models of minority incorporation, were
selected for the study. Their different political cultural traditions were examined in
detail in Chapters Three and Four, and are summarized in Figure 2. As we have seen, Canada
has been built upon a pluralist model of the nation in which immigrants are both expected
to take Canadian citizenship and allowed, even encouraged, to maintain distinctive
cultural identities. France, on the other hand, epitomizes the assimilationist state,
having certain expectations for immigrants to conform to French traditions and no
recognition of group-based rights. An overview of associational activity and other forms
of minority representation is provided in Chapter Five along with a chronology of
mobilization by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities in recent decades.
FIGURE 2. NATIONAL IDENTITY STRUCTURES
Preliminary hypotheses were proposed and tested using six case studies of
collective action by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. In each country, the cases
selected were deemed to be the most important integration-related cases of collective
action which began in the 1980s. The three French cases are detailed in Chapter Six, and
the three Canadian cases are found in Chapter Seven. How the hypotheses stood up to the
six mobilization efforts is worth examing in some detail.
Hypothesis 1. The extent to which collective demands by immigrants and
visible minorities will be of a particularistic nature will vary positively with the
extent to which state structures recognize and promote pluralist or multicultural
arrangements.
In Canada, where multiculturalism is sanctioned by the state,
immigrants and ethnoracial minorities have indeed expressed grievances that are of concern
to their particular communal or racial group. In the case of demands for the creation of
an independent agency to investigate possible police wrongdoing in Ontario, Blacks have
been the most vocal, though they have been supported by other minority groups. The issue
is viewed as a "Black issue" because Blacks and especially Black youths are more
prone to be the brunt of police violence. Black leaders have not hesitated to label police
shootings as acts of racism. As for mobilization for employment equity legislation, it was
the action by persons who would directly benefit from the legislation -- including racial
minorities -- that ensured passage of the bill. The coordinated demands for better access
to social services again demonstrated that those who were most active around the issue,
especially immigrant service agencies, had a vested interest in the cause. In the latter
two cases, activists argued that they had particular needs which the state must address.
In a few instances, minorities have called for special treatment for their
own group. Several editorials and letters in Toronto's Black and Caribbean newspaper Share
called for employment equity to be applied to individual ethnoracial groups rather than to
racial minorities on the whole. This reflected fears that employers would fulfill
employment equity obligations by hiring Asians and other minorities at the expense of
Blacks. Nonetheless, even in this instance, the persons voicing these opinions only wanted
equity. Although sometimes perceived otherwise by the general public, minorities have
generally only asked to live in a barrier-free environment, not for special entitlements.
In France, where the state has in theory avoided the establishment of
pluralist arrangements, the demands by immigrants and their descendants have often
appealed to republican values such as individualism. Though the majority of collective
action has been instigated by immigrants from the Maghreb and their Franco-Maghrébin
offspring, these efforts have only very rarely made allusions to their particular
identity. In fact, that the Beur movement was short-lived is testament to the fact
that the non-recognition of communal groups in France makes it difficult for groups to act
along communitarian lines. That Beur mobilization has been the subject of extensive
scholarly study indicates the rarity of the phenomenon.
With regard to the three mobilization efforts examined in detail, there is
further confirmation of the hypothesis. Those favoring foreigners' local voting rights and
those mobilizing against restricting access to French nationality argued that their causes
would help integrate immigrants into French society. The exceptional case in France was
the affaire des foulards in which the demands of Muslim schoolgirls were clearly of
a pluralistic nature. It was precisely because the pupils' demands flew directly in the
face of France's commitment to secular public education and individualism that their
actions caused such an uproar.
In brief, the hypothesis that collective action by immigrants and
ethnoracial minorities is likely to remain within the particular constraints created by
the state's model of incorporation held to be true in five of the cases examined. Let us
now address what factors determine the outcomes of mobilization efforts.
Hypothesis 2. Demands which are congruent with a state's national
identity structures are more likely to result in an outcome favorable to the challengers
than are those which go against the grain of such structures.
In the Canadian case studies, we have seen that all three collective
action efforts generally adhered to Canada's pluralistic national identity structures. And
all three were nominally successful -- "nominally" because, although significant
advances have been made, minority activists remain relatively dissatisfied with the
results. Calls for an independent watch-dog to monitor police behavior ultimately resulted
in the creation of two structures, a complaints commission and an investigative unit.
Employment equity mobilization was also successful insofar as it resulted in legislation.
In a political cultural context which acknowledges that group membership does matter,
i.e., that it does influence employment decisions, members of the "designated
groups" were able to articulate claims that resonated within the Ontario government.
Regarding demands for better access to social services, the gains secured are clearly
linked to Canada's recognition of and commitment to cultural diversity.
Only one of the French case studies was successful. As noted above,
mobilization against reform of the French Nationality Code was a success precisely because
it appealed to French republican values. The cogency of this appeal, in turn, mobilized a
wide array of persons and organizations to fight the reform effort. As for the other two
cases, activists found themselves opposing the strong French state which failed to
recognize the contribution of immigration to state-building. As such, there was little
tolerance for demands particular to immigrant minorities, and muscle was available to
ensure that such demands were not accommodated. The idea of foreigners' voting rights was
wildly unpopular from the outset, even among many Socialists whose party had originally
proposed the idea. The management of the headscarf affair showed some tolerance for
difference, but it was of a condescending nature. Some commentators did view the creation
of a permanent inter-ministerial committee to oversee integration in the aftermath of the
headscarves affair as a concession to the difficulties faced by immigrants. However, the
philosophy of the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration has been strongly republican.
Thus, the second set of hypotheses also held up to limited empirical
scrutiny. There were no cases of mobilization in Canada which did not fit into a pluralist
framework, so we can only conjecture that had there been, they too might have enjoyed
success. However, we see from Hypothesis One that such mobilization is unlikely to occur
in the first place. Moreover, it seems unlikely that minorities would favor
assimilationist tactics when pluralist options are available. It is more understandable
that minorities would push for pluralism within an assimilationist model -- as in the
French cases of the Islamic headscarves -- than vice-versa. However, conditions are most
favorable to success when mobilization remains congruent with national identity
structures.
This analysis can be taken one step further by inquiring about the
relationship between the institutional and the cultural components of political
opportunity structure. This research has drawn attention to the cultural aspects of POS,
but it has also implicitly considered the institutional aspects. For example, we have seen
that opportunity structures, specifically as embodied in national identity structures,
influence the organizational component of the mobilization equation as well. State funding
of immigrant and ethnoracial organizations provides minorities with internal resources,
yet it is also a reflection of the state's views on what ought to be the function and
power of such associations. Moreover, institutions are created and evolve within the
context of a particular political culture. In addition, this research has made note of the
respective strong and weak state traditions in France and Canada.
For a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of POS to
mobilization and outcomes, however, it would be helpful to analyze the intersection of
culture and institution more explicitly. We proceed by asking the following: Do the
cultural POS variables influence mobilization outcome more greatly in some institutional
contexts than others? In other words, does political culture matter more for collective
action efforts in some states than in others? This research has indicated that political
culture is indeed of variable importance in different national contexts. The following
hypothesis was proposed in Chapter One:
Hypothesis 3. Minority demands which do challenge existing identity
structures are more likely to result in favorable outcomes in weak states than in strong
states.
We can create a framework to explore the relationship between the
state and the cultural components of POS which complements the examples of Kitschelt
(1986) and Kriesi et al. (1992), each of whom examined the political opportunities for new
social movements in four Western democracies. Following Kitschelt and Kriesi, states range
along a continuum from strong to weak which for the purposes of analysis can be divided
into two discrete categories. Kriesi divides strong and weak states according to openness
to input and their capacity for output (policy implementa-tion). A state's overall
strength or weakness stems from internal factors such as centralization, strength of
social cleavages, strength and number of political parties, and patterns of linkage
between interest groups and the government. Strong states are relatively closed to input
and have a high capacity for output. They tend be centralized, have only minor social
cleavages, and have weak interest groups. Weak states, on the other hand, are
characterized by openness to input, a lack of capacity to impose themselves on the output
side, decentralization, strong social cleavages, and strong interest groups. Based on this
dichotomization, it is evident that France is a strong state whereas Canada is weak.
Dichotomizing the cultural components of POS is somewhat trickier in that
they vary by national context. What would seem most important is the "goodness of
fit" between a national political culture and the demands which are being placed upon
it, in other words, the extent to which collective demands resonate with national culture.
In the cases of mobilization by immigrants and their descendants, it is the national
identity structures outlined previously which matter: history of immigration, the
development of citizenship and nationality, and models of minority incorporation. For the
cultural dimensions of POS, then, we will use the categories "congruent" and
"not congruent."
FIGURE 3. MOBILIZATION OUTCOMES, BASED ON POS
COMPONENTS
Using the six cases of collective political action by immigrants and their
descendants we have examined, it appears that congruence between mobilization demands and
national identity structures is more important to the protest outcome in strong states
than in weak states (see Figure 3). In France, the strong state case, there was a very
strong correlation between mobilization efforts which held up favorably to national
identity structures and successful outcome: mobilization against reform of the French
Nationality Code was the only case which resulted in substantive gains. The two cases
which contradicted with France's national identity structures both failed. These limited
results support the idea that good fit between the cultural components of POS and the
demands made by challengers is salient in strong states.
In weak states, on the other hand, the importance of resonance with
dominant polito-cultural themes is not as clear. In all three Canadian cases, the outcome
was favorable to protestors. Therefore, we cannot tell whether a collective action effort
that breaks with Canadian national identity structures has a better chance of securing
substantive gains than would a parallel effort in a strong state. It certainly seems
possible that congruence may not be as important to the outcomes of collective
mobilization: the favorable outcomes reflect the strength of Canada's pluralistic model as
well as its weak state tradition which has allowed for considerable interest group
activity.
In brief, we see support for all three hypotheses presented above. Of
course, this analysis is based on a limited sample which must be expanded in order to
further confirm these findings. This is especially true for the third hypothesis in which
there was no example of failed mobilization in a weak state.
One striking feature of these six case studies, however, was not directly
addressed by the hypotheses: it is the extent to which framing appears to have been
more significant in the French cases than in the Canadian ones. This suggests that the
importance of framing may vary between political cultures and political structures. This
observation merits some discussion.
We have seen that movements depend upon the framing of issues in ways that
resonate with supporters and potential allies. No movement can persist in the absence of a
set of common values and understandings held by supporters. I have argued that framing is
not only important for relations between movements and (potential) supporters, but also
between movements and authorities. If mobilization leaders are able to articulate their
grievances in a manner which resonates with public authorities, they may secure financial
gains, recognition, and influence.
Though never the explicit focus of empirical research, it had generally
been recognized that frames vary between political cultures: within a political culture,
certain social, political, and economic traditions have shaped the frames of reference
through which persons communicate. Appeals are shaped and constrained in the context of
this culture. What had not been addressed -- and what my research suggests -- is that the salience
of framing may also vary between polities and political cultures.
In France, mobilizers in all three cases made explicit use of framing in
their attempts to garner supporters and to make authorities receptive to their causes.
Debate over altering the French Nationality Code stands out as the strongest case of
framing. The anti-reform effort explicitly appealed to France's longstanding principle of jus
soli, noting in its public statements that the reform project called into question
"a very old principle in our law which has been continually reaffirmed by the
Republican tradition" (Le Monde, 20 January 1987). In calling for France to
reaffirm this commitment to jus soli, mobilizers alluded to the viewpoint that
citizenship promotes integration. In brief, they appealed to core republican values.
The framing of the CNF case was rather straight-forward, but even
mobilization efforts which seemingly contradicted national traditions were consciously
framed by movement leaders so as to appear as to be supporting them. This was evident in
the mobilization for foreigners' voting rights in local elections, where numerous articles
pointed to the disassociation of citizenship and nationality during the regimes
immediately following the French Revolution, thereby attempting to link the vote issue
with early French policies. The Islamic headscarf affair presents an interesting case in
that most Muslims in favor of the scarves were hard-pressed to draw any link to French
political culture, and therefore their cause aroused little sympathy. Defenders of the foulards
tried to argue that France traditionally had not been so xenophobic or intolerant, but
they remained the minority.
In the three Canadian cases, framing efforts were not as apparent, and in
fact may not have existed at all. Though the underlying causes of the collective action
were in keeping with Canadian values of diversity, tolerance, and equity, movement leaders
made no explicit use of this congruence in statements either towards the wider population
or towards authorities. The cases could have been more explicitly framed in terms
of Canadian identity structures, but the point is that movement leaders have not found it
necessary to do so. In the case of Black mobilization for more police oversight, the key
demand was for accountability. For employment equity and access to social services, it was
for equal access. But, although these may be understood to be worthy demands within the
Canadian context, activists did little to relate them to broader Canadian themes.
This lack of framing raises interesting questions about mobilization in
Canada, namely whether the lack stems from Canada being a weak state or whether there is
something unique about the Canadian context which makes framing less important. Is Canada
unique because its national identity structures of tolerance and diversity inherently
favor challenges to political leaders? The Spicer Commission, created in November 1990 in
the wake of the failed Meech Lake Accords, found that Canadian core values included belief
in equality and fairness in a democratic society; belief in consultation and dialogue;
importance of accommodation and dialogue; support for diversity; and compassion and
generosity (Canada, Citizens' Forum 1991: 36-44). These very values legitimize almost any
demand by minority groups, for access to culturally sensitive social services for example.
It is also possible that framing is not as evident in Canada because
ethnoracial minority associations are newer and more fragmented than they are in other
countries, including France. Also, Canadian social movements in general are not strong, in
part because they are often able to win concessions without the strength that would be
necessary in a state such as France. The government has at least minimally accommodated
demands more readily than have other democratic states (Phillips 1994). The question
remains, however: Is framing not evident in the Canadian context because movement leaders
are inexperienced or because it is not believed that framing will result in additional
gains? This issue deserves further research.
In summary, what emerges from a comparison of collective action cases in
terms of the strength of the polity and congruence with the dominant political culture is
confirmation that cultural factors are significant to movement demands and outcomes and
that they may be more important in strong states than in weak states. Framing in
particular seems to be both more consciously practiced and of greater salience in strong
states. Again, these findings are based on the comparison of only two national contexts
and thus cannot be considered anything more than suggestive. Further empirical study in a
wider variety of national contexts is needed to validate this findings, but the two
extreme cases of France and Canada indicate the importance of resonance with the cultural
components of POS to collective demands and outcomes.
Contribution of this Research to Social Movements Theory
The above analysis of six case studies in two national contexts points
to the importance of political opportunity structure in shaping the demands and outcomes
of collective action as well as the framing of collective action efforts. Moreover, these
case studies provide an empirical basis for the conjectures of prominent social movement
theorists concerning the importance of national, cultural context to collective action.
Confirmation of the hypotheses lends support to the claim that political culture not only
matters, but that it is an important contributor to a favorable political opportunity
structure. At the very least, we can ascertain that this is evident in cases involving the
mobilization of minorities of immigrant origin seeking incorporation into the
"host" society.
The findings of this research indicate that there are cultural factors at
play in the various aspects of collective action. When consideration of institutional
factors of political opportunity structure is supplemented by cultural ones, we arrive at
a more comprehensive understanding of social movements. The importance of both culture and
structure are noted in the following summary of findings:
Demands (Hypothesis 1): Demands voiced in collective action
efforts by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities are influenced by the cultural dimensions
of POS.
Outcomes (Hypotheses 2 and 3): When demands are congruent with the
cultural dimensions of POS, substantive gains are more likely. If there is incongruence,
then structural components of POS -- namely whether the state is considered strong or weak
-- influence the outcome.
Framing: Framing assumes a greater salience in strong states than
in weak states.
At least two other other potential contributions to -- or least
confirmations of -- social movements theory arise from this research. Though they were not
my focus, they deserve brief acknowledgement:
Repertoires: Strategies pursued by social movements leaders are
influenced by structural components of POS.
Immigrant mobilization in France has been high profile, often
involving large public demonstrations. Collective action in Canada, on the other hand, has
been of a less visible nature, more often involving direct dialogue between activists and
government officials. This difference in repertoires of collective action is in keeping
with Kitschelt's (1986) finding that movement strategies were influenced by polity
structures: movements pursued assimilative strategies within open, weak polities and
confrontational strategies within strong polities.
Coalition building: Both structural and cultural elements of POS
are influential to coalition formation and maintenance.
The difference between social movements in France and Canada suggests
some broader possibilities for theories on the conditions under which coalitions are
formed. There are two levels at work here: (1) coalitions within ethnoracial communities
and (2) coalitions between immigrants or minorities and elements of larger society. Within
ethnoracial communities, the strength of coalitions among SMOs depends on models of
minority incorporation -- with those existing in multicultural societies likely to be less
unified -- and how those models are reflected in state funding processes. The formation of
multicultural coalitions is extremely difficult. As for liaisons between minority groups
and larger society, allies appear to play a stronger role in assimilationist states, in
strong states, in states with powerful left-wing parties, and in states which are
relatively unreceptive to social movements. These statements are based on research in
France and Canada only, but they could be the focus of future research.
In sum, the research and analysis presented here has shown that states
have distinctive understandings of nationhood -- called national identity structures --
which contribute to particular sets of expectations of immigrant and ethnoracial minority
behavior. As such, they influence the issues around which minorities mobilize and the
outcomes of such collective political action.
This research has used a variety of mobilization efforts by immigrants and
ethnoracial minorities to illustrate the importance of political opportunity structures.
It is hoped that this work has not only drawn attention to the cultural components of
opportunity structure but that it also has helped to dispell the myth that immigrants and
ethnoracial minorities are politically inactive. Though their collective mobilization has
not yet been of a magnitude that would topple governments, it must be kept in mind that
the activism treated herein is the work of the marginalized, the young, the inexperienced,
and the newly-arrived. As two prominent students of social movements have asserted,
"What was won must be judged by what was possible" (Piven and Cloward 1977:
xiii). We do not know what the next century holds, but there is reason to believe that it
will be full of possibilities.
Additional Contributions
I have applied a social movements framework to specific cases of
mobilization by specific minority populations. The subject of this research has broader
implications, however, which -- though alluded to throughout this work -- deserve more
explicit mention. The links between my research and three broader issues are discussed
below. They are (1) changes in ethnic identity, (2) changes in political culture, and (3)
changes in political institutions, particularly regarding what constitutes a strong or
weak state. As well, what I see as the major political implications of mass migration to
Western Europe and North America will be briefly outlined.
Ethnic identity. How may ethnic identity change in response to
immigration and collective action? First, what is the impact of migration on ethnicity?
Ethnic awareness increases with migration, both for immigrants and for those in receiving
societies. As Barth (1969: 10-13) pointed out, social interaction often enhances ethnic
distinctions rather than destroying them. Even when real differences between groups change
or diminish, the perception of difference remains, thus so do the boundaries (32). This
must be particularly true with today's migrant groups in that the majority are not only
ethnically distinct but also racially different.
The long-term effects of immigration on communal identity are somewhat
more muted. Based on historical experience, the prospects for eventual integration of
ethnic and racial minorities into Western democratic states are high. Though most
immigrants will never achieve full integration, the odds are much greater that their
children and grandchildren will -- except in extreme cases of models of incorporation
based on segregation. Ethnic identity may not completely disappear, but its salience
diminishes. In Western democratic states, ethnic identity is more a question of
"lifestyle" than of the "life-defining" nature it assumes in regions
experiencing civil strife, international conflicts, and dislocation (Heisler 1990: 21-30).
Over time, ethnicity assumes "lifestyle" dimensions for immigrant minorities as
well. While the racial differences between many of today's immigrants and members of
receiving societies pose additional challenges for integration, attitudes about particular
immigrant and minority groups tend to soften over time. For example, whereas less than a
century ago Asians were among the most reviled of immigrant groups to Canada, today they
are considered to be model immigrants.
As for the relationship between movement activity and collective identity,
there are bi-directional -- though intertwined -- possibilities. First, does movement
activity increase the sense of collective identity? Second, is the mobilization process
affected by changing identities? Based on a general assessment of minority collective
action in France and Canada, the answer to both questions is affirmative.
Movement activity does increase collective identity, though not
necessarily specific ethnic or national identities. It is more likely to add a broader
layer of identity on top of existing ones. In part, this is brought on by demographic
necessity. Migrant groups with small numbers of members frequently band together with
others from nearby countries or regions of origin, or from neighbors in the settlement
country, around common goals. This has been evident in Toronto where Blacks of Canadian
and West Indian origin have united in the fight against racism. Even large minority groups
may form coalitions around common interests, as is the case for the Conseil
d'Associations Immigrées en France. The end result for participants in these
collective endeavors is the adoption of multiple-layered and flexible identities. For
example, over time, a refugee from El Salvador comes to see herself simultaneously as a
Central American, a Latino, and a Spanish-speaking person.
The links between collective identity and movement activity are also
influenced by the state, specifically the state's support for ethnoracial minorities. If,
as in the case of France, a state does not recognize specific ethnic groups, we have seen
that mobilization efforts are unlikely to form around specific, ethnically-based demands.
Indeed, many of the oldest and most well-known associations acting around issues of race
and immigration in France are not ethno-specific but rather multinational in character.
Anti-racist associations MRAP, LICRA, LDH, and SOS Racisme have foreign and French
members. Nonetheless, though their demands may not be ethno-specific, there are hundreds
of state-supported associations whose members are exclusively from one ethnic or national
group. In Canada, on the other hand, we have seen that there have been ethno-specific and
universal demands as well as ethno-specific and culturally diverse associations. In sum,
it is difficult to assess how much state policies foster changes in collective identity,
and this question deserves further exploration. As has been shown in the six mobilization
efforts analyzed, however, it is at least evident that state structures influence the
overt behavior of immigrants and their descendants in terms of collective demands.
Political culture. Though analysis of the Canadian and French
national identity structures revealed that political culture is resistant to change, it is
not completely static. Perhaps the very phenomena which this research has examined are
partially responsible for political-cultural changes over time. Are political cultures
altered by migration, mobilization, and integration-related debates? If so, minority
mobilization has more far-reaching outcomes than the immediate gains pursued by
challengers.
This research outlined several specific dimensions of political culture,
including the contribution of immigration to state-building, the development of
citizenship and nationality, and the model of minority incorporation. In different ways,
these have all been influenced by migration. While the historical contribution of
immigration cannot be altered, it may recognized to a greater extent than before. Indeed,
contemporary migration has sparked interest in historically-oriented research in countries
such as France, a long-time country of immigration in which -- until recent decades --
there had been a paucity of migration-related studies. The knowledge that today's
immigration situation is not drastically different from what France experienced a century
ago may place some perspective on French fears about immigration.
In countries such as Canada and the United States which were literally
built by immigrants, past and present contributions of immigration are already
acknowledged. Since the beginning of white immigration, Canadian political culture has
been shaped by immigration, though perhaps more by necessity than choice. Canada's history
of bilingualism, and subsequently of multiculturalism, is more likely the result of the
inability of the Canadian state to assimilate its non-English citizens than of any
ideological desire for diversity. As a British colony and then as a young and sparsely
populated state, Canada lacked its own strong institutions for dealing with challenges.
Today, however, diversity is touted for ideological reasons and has become part and
parcel of Canadian identity. Thanks to immigration, Canada has defined itself as a
"mosaic." Even Canadians who believe that immigration levels are too high take
pride in Canada's cultural diversity. Above all, the mosaic metaphor provides a means for
Canadians to distinguish themselves from the American giant to their south.
With regards to citizenship and models of minority incorporation, these
are being challenged by immigration and immigrant collective action -- and by backlash
politics. As a result, there has been some convergence in the policies pursued by Western
societies. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and most recently Germany have eased
naturalization processes, while in 1993 the French government made it moderately more
difficult to acquire French citizenship. In the United States and Canada, however, where
access to citizenship is quite liberal, there has been little discussion of enacting more
stringent requirements. As for immigrant integration, almost every immigrant-receiving
Western state has instituted some policies to aid this process. Many of these measures are
the direct result of mobilization efforts. If a particular national approach to minority
incorporation proves to be more successful than others in the long-run, we may see its
eventual adoption in other states.
The presence of foreigners in Western Europe and North America, and their
political mobilization over the past two decades, has influenced national political
cultures in other ways. These can be seen in enhanced sensitivity to questions of race and
culture, the politicization of immigration-related issues, and, above all, heightened
concerns about national identity. Contemporary migration and integration are occurring
simultaneously with the erosion of economic sovereignty of the nation-state and, in the
case of the EU, of political sovereignty as well. As the West prepares for the
twenty-first century, its citizens recognize that vast transformations are at work in the
world. These transformations test the powers of Western democratic states, and are
personified by the presence of visibly-distinct migrants who work hard but may be less
willing to immediately and unquestioningly adapt to Western ways.
In brief, there can be no doubt that migration has affected national
political cultures. This research examined how political-cultural structures influenced
collective action by immigrants and their descendants. Other dimensions of the
relationships betweeen political culture, migration, and mobilization deserve further
empirical study.
The strength of political institutions. Third, this research has
implications for our understanding of state-society relations. We have examined how the
strength and structure of state institutions affected the outcome of specific collective
action efforts. Though the division of states into "strong" and "weak"
was adequate for the purposes of this research, the dichotomy is an oversimplification.
Rather, state power is a combination of a number of factors -- including the policy
process, the organization of the state, and the organization of interest groups -- all of
which are best measured along continua rather than discretely. In addition, the outcomes
of mobilization efforts may hinge not so much on state strength as on other
characteristics of the state, namely flexibility. These ideas are explored briefly in the
following paragraphs.
There has been some recognition that impact of state strength on social
movement outcomes is not as straightforward as has been believed. First, it has been
argued that mobilization is not necessarily more effective in "weak" states than
in "strong" states (e.g., Kitschelt 1986). While weak states such as the United
States and Canada facilitate movement mobilization because they are decentralized and
highly permeable, they are often unable to implement movement gains. Centralized strong
states like France, on the other hand, are assumed to be less vulnerable to challengers
but, once permeated, are able to implement major policy changes. A second and related
phenomenon, investigated in France by Suleiman (1987), is that highly centralized,
so-called strong states are not necessarily more resistant to the pressures of
mobilization. In fact, he argues, centralization means that activists can concentrate
their efforts on a relatively small target which, once won over, faces relatively little
opposition to policy implementation. Thus, there is evidence that social movements will
not necessarily fare better in weaker states than in stronger ones. In Canada, for
example, while the three mobilization efforts presented in this research secured gains,
fragmentation between and within levels of government meant that activists had to pursue a
"divide and conquer" strategy, and that the policy outcomes were not
far-reaching.
In addition to a reconceptualization of the impact of state structure on
collective action, a state's strength should be perceived in broader terms than resistance
to input and capacity for output. Three decades ago, Huntington (1965: 394) posited:
"the strength of political organizations and procedures varies with their scope of
support and their level of institutionalization." Given that the scope of support is
broad in democratic societies, levels of institutionalization are what differientate
strong states from weaker ones. Huntington measured institutionalization in terms of
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. These four variables contribute to the
differences in political opportunity faced by challengers in different national settings,
or in the same national setting over time. Though Huntington was concerned with
"lesser developed states," we should at least recognize that there are
significant insitutional differences between even Western democratic states.
The notion of state adaptability has particular relevance to
immigration-related demands, most of which would have been unforeseen even fifty years
ago. Indeed, France may not be strong so much as flexible. The French response to
immigration reveals a much more complicated power arrangement than is reflected in a
strong-weak dichotomy. To illustrate, though in principle firmly committed to republican
values, French governments have since at least the 1970s taken pragmatic measures for
managing ethnic pluralism (Lochak 1989). Nowhere has this been more evident than in the
issue of Muslim headscarves in the public schools. Even the way the government handled the
1989 episode revealed something about the French state. The matter was not quickly
resolved through direct policies. Instead, the government referred the case to the Council
of State, which then decided that such issues should be handled on a case-by-case basis at
the local level. In fact, this was a mere continuation of existing habit. Until the
explosion of the "affair" in the fall of 1989, the particular demands of Muslim
schoolgirls, ranging from the wearing of foulards to excusal from gym class, had
been quietly handled at the local level. In a similar manner, in the fall of 1986, the
Chirac government did not implement what it had considered to be a minor reform of the
French Nationality Code. Instead, it referred the matter to a commission which ultimately
upheld France's existing jus soli provisions. Though French public opinion and a
majority of deputés favored reform, the government capitulated to the anti-reform
effort.
This very brief analysis of two French cases raises questions about why
the French state has not been more determined and more successful in implementing its
objectives. As Suleiman (1987: 23) has asked: "...if France is the prototypical
example of the strong state, which is omnipresent and all powerful, ... why has the state
not been able to exert its authority in the face of groups seeking to maintain their
privileges?" His response, that the centralized state is in fact easily permeated by
interests and that French society is better organized than most would admit, hint at the
complexities of the policy-making process. And these complexities are by no means unique
to France. A re-examination of our six mobilization efforts in France and Canada would
reveal a number of factors linked to state-society relations which were influential to
mobilization demands and outcomes. These deserve more explicit attention in the future.
That a recently-released edited volume on the politics of social movements (Jenkins and
Klandermans 1995) is expressly concerned with theories of the state indicates the
recognition of the need for such research.
Immigration and the mobilization of immigrants and ethnoracial minorities
in recent decades have influenced the ethnic identities of immigrants and native
populations, the political culture of receiving societies, and the ways in which political
institutions respond to challengers. These influences indicate that the impact of
migration is vast. The brief discussion which follows reveals some of these broader
consequences of twentieth century mass migration for industrialized democracies.
Postwar migration and settlement has occurred in the midst of great change
in Western democratic states. In the three decades following the end of World War II,
unprecedented economic growth encouraged the creation of the welfare state. Economic
expansion also encouraged immigration and, in Western Europe, the importing of foreign
workers to fill labor shortages. When growth ended in the mid-1970s, however, states were
faced with huge capital expenditures, declining revenues, and large foreign populations.
Politics over the past two decades reflects attempts to deal with these demands. In the
process, the political climates in Western Europe and North America have been radically
altered.
Migration-related phenomena influenced this transformation in a variety of
ways. To begin, as we have seen, immigrants and their descendants have become political
actors. They have succeeded in putting their own ethnocultural and economic concerns on
the political agenda in Western states. This indicates not only the salience of such
issues but also the willingness of governments to address them. In part, this willingness
represents the recognition of (potential) voting power wielded by minorities. Political
leaders have become more sensitive to issues of ethnic diversity and to the demands of
ethnoracial groups, especially when it is thought that they have the potential to form
ethnic voting blocs.
Immigrants and minorities have also become the objects of political
debate. This is most evident in the emergence of far-right anti-immigrant political
parties. To their xenophobic supporters, newcomers are at least partially responsible for
declining prosperity and changing ways of life. Not surprisingly, then, foreigners and
ethnoracial minorities have become scapegoats for economic woes and uncertainties about
national identity. Though far-right parties have not enjoyed widespread electoral support,
their backing has been significant enough to cause a shift to the right by other political
parties. This can be seen in the immigration restrictions announced by Canada's Liberal
government in 1994, in the distancing of France's Socialist Party from its traditional
support for foreign workers and minorities in the 1980s, and in the anti-immigration
stances already espoused by Republican candidates for the American presidency. In
addition, some anti-immigrant sentiment has pushed beyond legally acceptable limits and
has manifested itself in hate crime and in violent attacks on immigrants and refugees.
This has been especially evident in the behavior of neo-Nazi youth in Germany, but
violence has occurred on both sides of the Atlantic.
Another dimension of the politics of immigration is that receiving states
frequently serve as the bases through which political movements aimed at countries of
origin are launched and sustained. To illustrate, Islamic Salvation Front activity in
France has done much to destabilize the Algerian state. Expatriates fuel ethnic and
political conflicts through powerful fundraising and public relations capabilities as well
as through the recruitment of marginalized youth. The role of Irish-American contributions
to the IRA and of Toronto's supporters of the Tamil independence movement in Sri Lanka,
for example, cannot be overestimated. On a larger scale, Islamicist movements in Western
Europe seek to promote strict adherence to Islamic law not just in countries of origin,
but in Europe as well (Deeb 1992; Kepel 1991). In addition, immigration has influenced
bilateral relations. In brief, migration impacts international relations as well as
domestic politics.
Lastly, migration signals the emergence of transnational societies in the
West. Rapid technological advancements such as capabilities for instantaneous transfer of
capital and information and the ease of international travel have facilitated the movement
of peoples who simultaneously have brought new richness to existing cultural fabrics and
have placed unprecedented demands on nation-states. The emergence of transnational
societies is especially evident in metropolises such as Paris and Toronto, cities which
because of enormous gulfs in power and culture, are "crucibles of social change,
political conflict and cultural innovation" (Castles and Miller 1993: 272).
Though Western societies need migration, they are attempting to assert
more control over migration flows, and over undocumented migration in particular. The
coordinated attempts by Western European and North American states to secure their borders
are viewed by some as self-defense, by others as a form of "global apartheid"
not unlike the homeland policies pursued in South Africa until recently (Richmond 1994).
But, in the absence of extreme measures, migration will continue unabated due to a number
of factors, including ongoing ethnopolitical strife in various parts of the world; the
large and growing gap in wealth between North and South; political, economic, and
demographic "push" factors; and the creation of new free trade zones which
encourage legal and illegal movement of labor.
For the lucky few who are able to traverse the borders of the West, it is
not foreordained that their lives will become any easier, or that their futures will be
peaceful. The road ahead will be largely determined by the extent to which settlement
states enact policies and programs to facilitate their integration, including tolerance of
cultural diversity and measures for political empowerment. Will states stand by, while
tensions mount and inequalities increase, eventually erupting in civil strife? Or will
they allow migrants to become citizens and equal members of their new societies? How the
challenges of migration are met will greatly influence the path of ethnic and race
relations -- both within and among societies -- in the coming century.
Next
Abstract/Preface/Dedication/Acknowledgements/Table of Contents/List
of Figures
Chapter 1 - Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Chapter 4 - Chapter 5 - Chapter 6 - Chapter 7 - Chapter 8 - Appendix/Bibliography
Back to Top
|
![[ Virtual Library ]](/graphics/vl_but.gif){kind=small}
